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ABSTRACT 
The democratic theory assigns citizens key decision-making roles which require good 
understanding of the political system and its policy-making dynamics. Yet, empirical 
evidence, derived largely from studies of advanced democracies, shows that most people 
lack pertinent political information. This creates a democratic puzzle in which 
information-intensive democratic process is driven by information deficient citizens. Thus, 
the key research question is: If democracy requires informed citizens, then why does it 
work well in Kenya, despite a huge political information deficit among Kenyans? To 
address this question, I first developed a new political information index and, with the aid 
of Afrobarometer survey data, used it to measure political information levels among 
Kenyans. This is critical in order to avoid anchoring the study on an untested assumption 
that Kenyans, like citizens of advanced democracies, lack pertinent political information. 
The data show that, indeed, the mean political information level among Kenyans is very 
low, while the variance is very high. I then tested whether democracy works properly in 
the face of such a huge political information deficit. Using respondent knowledge, 
satisfaction, and support levels for democracy as proxy indicators of how well democracy 
functions, the results show that democracy, as understood by citizens, works fairly well, 
despite an information deficit. Citizens’ evaluation of how well democracy works in 
Kenya seems accurate since it is corroborated by scholars (Semetko, 2010) and by expert 
assessment from Freedom House reports. Finally, I return to the research question above, 
and anchor the analysis on two interrelated assumptions derived from political cue 
theory and the extant literature. First, political behavior is primarily driven by subjective 
political perceptions rather than objective political facts. Secondly, uninformed citizens 
(respondents) tend to think heuristically rather than ideologically about political issues. 
The results largely support political cue theory and the core hypothesis. Specifically, 
partisanship reduces the perception gap between uninformed and informed citizens, 
thereby enabling the uninformed to behave as if they are informed.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION AND THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1.1 Introduction  
          Tracing back to the classic works of John Stuart Mill, John Locke and Alexis de 
Tocqueville, most democratic theorists converge on the idea that democracy requires 
well-informed citizens (Dalton and Klingerman, 2007; Dalton, 2008; 
 
Blais, 2010). In this 
regard, democratic theory assigns citizens decision-making roles that require a good 
understanding of the structure and functioning of the political system, as well as its policy 
process, goals and options (Lasswell, 1966; Dalton and Klingerman, 2007). 
Quintessentially, as Berelson et al (1954:308) observes: 
The democratic citizen is expected to be well-informed 
about political affairs. He is supposed to know what the 
issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, 
what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, 
what the likely consequences are.  
 
          Moreover, the democratic theory assumes that only informed citizens can make 
sound judgments and reasoned choices; take actions consistent with their interests; and 
hence govern themselves effectively (Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Dalton 2000; Aalberg, 
2003; Lutz 2006). Indeed, if the public is unable to distinguish policy positions held by 
different political parties and candidates, then “the public will be unable to cast its ballots 
wisely and, hence, [be] unable to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions” 
(Craig et al, 2005:483). It is further assumed that informed citizens are more likely to be 
attentive to politics, committed to democratic ideals, develop informed perceptions, and 
effectively engage in political activities (Althus, 2003; Aalberg, 2003; Craig et al, 2005).  
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          The preferences and interests of the less-informed tend to be poorly reflected in 
decision outcomes (Lutz, 2006). This is hardly surprising considering John Stuart Mill’s 
observation over a century ago that political participation ensures that citizens’ interests 
are accommodated in the decision making process.  In essence, “the informed citizen is 
the basic foundation of the democratic process” (Dennis, 1970:150), or better still, 
“political information is to democratic politics what money is to economics: it is the 
currency of politics” (Carpini and Keteer, 1996:8). 
          Despite the internal logic underpinning the theoretical expectations of a well-
informed citizenry, empirical evidence, derived largely from studies of advanced 
democracies, indicate that most citizens generally lack pertinent political information 
(Converse, 1964; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Luppia and 
McCubbins, 1998; Galstone, 2007; Shenkman, 2008). For example, in 1952, only 26% of 
Americans could correctly identify two branches of government; in 1978, only 30% knew 
the length of one term in the US House of Representatives; and in 1991, only 25% of 
Americans knew the length of one term in the US Senate (Shenkman, 2008). Even more 
interestingly, in the run-up to the 1992 presidential elections, only 15% of Americans 
knew that George Bush support death penalty, yet 85% knew that he had a dog named 
Millie (Caplan, 2007). In addition, Galstone (2007:101) observes that: 
Today’s [American] college graduates know no more about 
politics than high school graduates did fifty years ago, and 
today’s  high school graduates are no more knowledgeable 
than were the high school dropouts of the past   
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         Although systematic studies of political information levels among African citizens 
are scant, an extrapolation of the above depiction of American citizens implies that 
Africans might be less informed. This extrapolation is not without scholarly support. 
Norris (2011a) argues that information deficit exists not only in advanced democracies, 
but is likely to be more acute in countries without democratic experience, and in 
developing societies where access to information is limited. In fact, it has been pointed 
out that, “for the most part, Sub-Saharan Africa remains a low-information environment 
in which ambitious elites can easily take advantage of mass ignorance” (Bratton et al, 
2005:204). Moreover, ‘the claim that citizens lack political information has a long and 
respected history’ (Luppia and McCubbins, 1998:17).  
          Several researchers have discussed the gap between voter information assumptions 
in democratic theory and the actual citizen’s behavior. The bottom-line is that, “there is a 
mismatch between the requirements of democracy and most people’s ability to meet these 
requirements” (Lutz, 2006:66). Using the American citizens as the reference point, Taber 
(2003: 455) succinctly summarizes this democratic puzzle as follows: 
 
The American voter, as revealed in public opinion research over 
the past half-century, is a wretched caricature of the noble citizen 
of normative democratic theory. Uninterested in politics, poorly 
informed on public matters, intolerant of diversity, ideologically 
unsophisticated - it seems a miracle that any system dependent on 
such a creature could have survived, let alone prospered. 
 
          One expectation is that this mismatch between the theoretical expectations and 
empirical evidence would render democracy unworkable (Carpini and Keteer, 1996; 
Taber, 2003). However, citizens somehow form political perceptions that inform their 
decisions and actions, and keeps democracy going. Yet, in reality, ‘there [are] no longer 
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respectable alternatives to democracy; it is part of the fashionable attire of modernity’ 
(Zakaria, 1997:2) and remains ‘the most common form of government in the world today’ 
(Lansford, 2008:9). That is, ‘‘it is hard to find anybody these days who doesn’t believe in 
democracy…democracy, or at least its mechanics, are now the common currency of 
political life’ (Swift, 2010:13). Moreover, there is a resurgence of direct democracy in 
many countries, where citizens not only elect political parties and leaders, but also make 
public policies, enact laws and legitimize constitutions directly through referendums 
(Marxer and Pallinger, 2004). In a nutshell, ‘the contemporary world is no longer divided 
between those who favor and those who oppose democracy; the vast majority favors 
democracy, and the main distinction now is whether people support democracy for 
instrumental or intrinsic reasons’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:270).  
 
          Despite the myriads of problems and challenges that dodge democracy in Africa 
for instance, the substance of the discourse on African democracy by Africanists such as 
Archie Mafetje and Claude Ake has not been on whether democracy is suitable for Africa 
but what kind of democracy is suitable. According to Lumumba-Kasongo (2005), 
‘Africans should invent their own form of democracy as a means of social progress. The 
question is, what kind of democracy can serve as a tool for social mobilization and social 
participation?’ (p. 5). While not many scholars, including the writer, subscribe to the 
notion of a uniquely African brand of democracy, the bottom line is that ‘Africans are 
seeking democracy as a matter of survival; they believe that there are no alternatives to 
this quest, that they have nothing to lose and a great deal to gain’ (ibid, 1). 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
          The evidence reveals a democratic puzzle whereby citizens lack pertinent political 
information, but make decisions and take actions that require enormous amounts of 
political information. In other words, the information-deficient citizens seem to 
effectively drive the information-intensive democratic process. For instance, as one 
scholar points out, ‘in elections, the passive and disorganized mass of voters becomes the 
arbiters of the political conflict. Elections enable the masses to remove from office an 
elite group which is unresponsive to their wishes’ (Axtmann, 2007:127). However, this 
seems an almost impossible task for citizens who are not even attentive to elite activities 
and their effects, and who, perhaps, may not even know what is in their own self interest. 
Put differently, ‘the amazing thing about democracy is that the selectors and reviewers 
are substantially incompetent, but the process nevertheless generates able, even superior 
leaders, and tends to keep them responsive and responsible’ (Mueller, 1992:997). 
 
          How do we reconcile the very compelling theoretical postulation that democracy 
requires informed citizens to function well, with the equally strong empirical evidence 
which suggests that democracy works well even when most citizens are poorly informed? 
This dissertation primarily seeks to resolve this puzzle, and thus the key research question 
is: If democracy requires informed citizens, then what makes it possible for democracy to 
work well in Kenya despite an acute political information deficit among Kenyans?   
 
          To answer this research question, it is imperative to recognize and empirically 
verify the two underlying assumptions. First, the question is based on the assumption that 
since citizens in advanced democracies lack pertinent political information, it follows that 
citizens in new and emerging democracies are also poorly informed, or perhaps less 
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informed. The second assumption is that despite their information deficiency, citizens in 
new and emerging democracies effectively participate in the democratic process, or better 
still, democracy functions well even in the face of significant political information deficit. 
But, do these assumptions hold in the new and emerging democracies such as Kenya?   
          Against this background therefore, the key research question raised above can be 
reduced to three more specific questions, which this study will address: 
(i) What are the levels and determinants of political information among Kenyan citizens?  
(ii) Does democracy function well in Kenya despite an acute political information deficit? 
(iii) What makes it possible for ‘politically uninformed’ Kenyans to develop ‘politically 
informed’ perceptions that guide their actions and decisions in the democratic process? 
1.3 The Study Rationale 
1.3.1 Reconceptualizing Political Information  
          Political information
1
 is increasingly playing a significant role in most political 
behavior studies. Indeed, ‘there is growing interest in the concept of political knowledge’ 
(Bennie, 2001:11). Yet, its conceptualization continues to be problematic to the extent 
that ‘there are as many ways to measure political knowledge as there are studies of 
political knowledge’ (Dolan and Holbrook, 2001:32). Thus, Kuklinski and Quirk (2001) 
chastise political behavior scholars for failure to develop coherent conceptual framework 
for measuring political information. Similarly, Jacoby (2002) notes that, ‘it is imperative 
that political scientists continue to refine the definitions and improve the measurements 
of concepts that have already been identified as important within the sub-field’ (p. 133). 
                                                          
1
 I use the term Political Information interchangeably with Political Knowledge in this 
study, consistent with Levendusky’s (2011) approach, to refer to estimates of how much 
an individual is informed about politically relevant issues. 
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          The failure to develop a refined measure of political information has contributed to 
‘the lack of consistent, comparable indicators of political knowledge’ (Milner, 2010:99). 
This in turn has not only hampered comparative studies in the field, but has also rendered 
the replication of past studies difficult. It is not surprising that ‘despite the large number 
of studies in which political knowledge is a factor, there have been few international 
studies that take us much further in comparing political knowledge’ (Milner, 2010:100). 
Hooghe (2011:205) has succinctly noted one regrettable consequence of this failure:  
 
Comparative tests of political knowledge (to be applied in a 
number of countries simultaneously) are almost totally absent 
from research. Even within a country, various questions have 
been raised about the validity of political knowledge tests  
 
          This study takes these challenges head on and makes two major contributions to 
the field regarding political information. First, in light of the flaws inherent in the existing 
measures of political information that are well documented in the literature (Mondak, 
1993; Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2001; Prior and Lupia, 2008), I 
develop a new index for measuring political information levels to resolve this problem. 
The index will facilitate construction of standardized political information indices that cut 
across time and space. Secondly, given scanty systematic studies on information levels in 
Africa, this study uses the new index to measure political information levels in Kenya.  
1.3.2 Bringing Perceptions back into the Study of Political Behavior 
          Although the distinction between political perceptions and political reality is 
important in understanding political behavior, few scholars pay adequate attention to this 
distinction. It is not uncommon for scholars to describe politics in terms of objective 
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events, even when they measure it in terms of political perceptions (Cropanzano and Li, 
2006). For instance, economic voting studies often depict opinions about the state of the 
economy as if they are the true state of the economy. Some scholars even argue that ‘one 
need not be an economist to see which way the economy is going’ (Popkin, 1991:23).Yet, 
the true state of the economy at any time is difficult to estimate even for well trained 
economists. It requires huge data and intricate computational skills that are beyond an 
average mind. To a large extent, ‘people form attitudes about the economy on the basis of 
how they think the economy is doing’ (Arceneaux, 2004:202). Thus, ‘what really matters 
are voters’ own perceptions, not the economic realities’ (Blais et al, 2002: 129). Yet, 
‘economic perceptions are affected by partisan predispositions’ (Blais et al, 2002:131). 
          A key point of departure for this study therefore is the distinction between political 
perceptions and political reality, and emphasis on the fact that perceptions play a critical 
role in shaping political behavior. While previous studies assume that there is a direct 
relationship between political information and political participation (Zaller, 1992; 
Krause, 1997; Fearon, 1999), I advance the view that the relationship is indirect, and that 
political information only serves as raw materials for the mind to process and produce 
political perceptions (Walsh, 2004; Mondak, 2010). Therefore, individual perception is 
the intervening variable between concrete political information and the observed political 
behavior. Ultimately, it is the subjective perceptions rather than objective facts that shape 
political behavior (Morris, 2008). Hence, it is clear that political information does not in 
itself shape political behavior; the influence of information on behavior is mediated by 
many factors like information source, intensity and credibility as well as how information 
is processed, and the mental images and personal impressions derived from it. 
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          To put it concisely, ‘every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: 
information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate 
some conclusion about it’ (Zaller, 1992:6). According to Cottam, et al (2010:142), the 
processing of information into political decisions and actions occur through many stages:  
 
Information is received, and the appropriate nodes or 
schema is primed; the information is matched to the 
knowledge structure and appropriate nodes; the information 
is assessed and stored in memory, finally that evaluation is 
retrieved from memory when the individual is called upon 
to make a decision about political action.   
 
          Furthermore, past studies have treated political perceptions as though people 
develop political perceptions about different issues the same way, regardless of whether 
the issues are political or economic, or whether they are about the past, the present or the 
future. In this dissertation, I advance and test the hypothesis that people develop political 
perceptions differently depending on issue-reference (whether the focus is on politics or 
the economy), and time-reference (whether the focus is on the past, present or the future).  
 
        Besides, much of what we know about political perceptions and political behavior is 
derived from studies of advanced democracies (Dalton, 2000; Aalberg, 2003). In fact, 
“public perception of facts has been a neglected field of study, and the few studies that 
have been conducted have studied American data” (Aalberg, 2003:95). As a result, little 
attention has been given to perceptions and its influence on political behavior in Africa 
(Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007; Rose, 2007). Admittedly, a few largely descriptive studies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have recently refocused on partisanship and political perceptions 
(Bratton et al, 2005; Ishiyama and Fox, 2006; Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2009).  
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          Yet, the studies have not paid sufficient attention to the key concern of this study: 
the link between political information and political perceptions in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
For instance, past studies found that public safety predicts support for democracy better 
than it predicts perceptions about the national economy in Africa (Fernandez and Kuenzi, 
2009). Besides, low education levels and high exposure to mass media negatively affect 
perceptions about quality of democracy and national economy (Bratton et al, 2005), and 
the poor are more likely than the rich to hold partisan views (Ishiyama and Fox, 2006).  
1.4 Literature Review 
          The literature review is organized around the possible solutions to the democratic 
puzzle, and revolves around democracy, political information and political perceptions. 
1.4.1 The Democratic Puzzle: A Problem of Poor Theory and Measurement? 
          One response to the democratic puzzle is both theoretical and conceptual. Some 
scholars downplay the problem of information deficit among citizens, and attribute the 
apparent democratic puzzle to poor theoretical definition of democracy (Borchert, 2010). 
Thus, democratic elitists argue that the democratic puzzle would dissipate if democracy is 
understood as an elitist “representative system with limited citizen involvement” 
(Borchert, 2010:29), rather than a participatory process based on majoritarian principles.   
          These theorists argue that the solution to the democratic puzzle is not to “re-invent” 
better citizens, but to reframe the democratic process into one in which the ability of 
citizens to influence policy is limited (Schumpeter, 1950; Schattschneider, 1960). The 
theory of democratic elitism regards the elites not only as better informed, but also as 
agents of democracy, who should be empowered to shield democracy from the ignorance 
of the uninformed masses (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 
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2007). The rationale for this view is that since most citizens are uninformed, ‘an 
overactive citizenry is likely to make ill-considered, short-termist and generally poor 
policy decisions’ (Faulsk, 1999:144). Thus, the democratic process should be reframed to 
limit citizens’ ability to influence policy (Schumpeter, 1950; Schattschneider, 1960). 
          Yet democratic elitism does not resolve the democratic puzzle, but instead, it 
exacerbates the problem by posing yet another kind of puzzle. While it suggests that 
citizens should be stripped of the power to decide policies that govern them due to their 
deficiency in political information, it allows the information-deficient citizens to elect 
leaders. Does it mean that policies are more important than leaders who make them? Or is 
political information not required for the selection of leaders and parties at elections?  
          If we treat political parties as embodiments of policies and ideas that compete for 
the attention of citizens at elections, then the act of election in itself involves a 
simultaneous selection of public policies associated with those who have been elected. 
Democratic elitism therefore attempts to “rescue democracy by weakening its meaning”, 
since ‘the paradox of modern democracy cannot be resolved by eliminating the need for a 
broadly and equitably informed citizenry’ (Carpini and Keteer, 1996:49). 
          At the conceptual level, several scholars have sought to challenge the methodology 
used to measure political information. They view the democratic puzzle as an artifact of 
poor measurement of political information. Political information is often measured in 
terms of correct answers to a set of civic questions that require identifying politicians or 
political facts (Kingdon, 1970; Sanders, 1999;
 
Cao and Brewer 2008; Toka, 2009). 
Another measure involves summing up correct answers to civic questions, then dividing 
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by the maximum score, leading to a standardized score ranging from zero to one (Carpini 
and Keteer, 1993; Barker,
 
2002; Althus, 2003).  
          Critics argue that using civic questions to measure political information ignores 
many things that citizens know, and underrates their ability to make up for information 
deficit (Popkin, 1991; Mondak, 1999). They note that most questions testing political 
information require instant information retrieval from memory and do not motivate 
people to access and piece together relevant information. That is, retrieval and use of 
political information is situational. However, when faced with consequential judgments, 
citizens are able to acquire and use political information (Prior and Lupia, 2008).  
1.4.2 The Democratic Puzzle: Does Political Information Matter?  
          Another set of responses to the democratic puzzle typically revolve around whether 
information matters in the development of political perceptions. One group of scholars 
argues that the limited information citizens are able to acquire is adequate for political 
decision making (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al, 1991; Wittman, 1995; Popkin and 
Dimock, 1999). Specifically, they argue that, “voters do not need all the information 
about their government that theorists and reformers wish them to have, because they learn 
to use ‘information shortcuts…’” (Elkin and Soltan, 1999:117). The shortcuts consist of 
lessons from past experience, daily life, media and political activities like campaigns.  
          Radical versions of this line of scholarship even suggest that information does not 
influence whether or not people make reasoned decisions; it merely influences how 
citizens integrate new information into their decision-making calculus. They argue that 
citizens have apriori knowledge that provides the context within which they interpret 
new information, and ‘knowledge of government and its institutions is not a simple 
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function of education’ (Popkin and Dimock, 1999:123). Thus, education basically 
provides the background context for evaluating new information.  
          Others have identified a micro-macro paradox whereby the aggregate perceptions 
tend to be accurate even if individual perceptions are flawed (Parker-Steven, 2004). At 
the micro-level, politically attentive partisans tend to adopt extreme political perceptions, 
while non-partisans adopt accurate perceptions. Errors from extreme perceptions are 
assumed to be random, and cancel out in large samples (Granberg, 1985; Page and 
Shapiro, 1992; Parker-Steven, 2004). That is, ‘the inadequacies of individual citizens, 
when combined, are more likely to cancel than to multiply’ (Kinder, 1998:797). In 
essence, although the individuals may hold inaccurate political perceptions, ‘when the 
perceptions of a sample of people are considered collectively, the correspondence 
between political perceptions and political reality is very close’ (Granberg, 1985: 506). 
          However, some equally robust empirical evidence shows that uninformed voters 
make similar errors in the same direction, and hence errors cannot simply cancel out 
(Bartels, 1996; Althus, 2003). According to Althus (1998), those who argue that errors 
cancel out base their arguments on a “hypothetical fully informed public”. He found that 
if all citizens are as informed as the most informed people in the society, then their policy 
preferences would differ considerably from the results obtained from the “hypothetical 
fully informed public”. Similarly, in a study of the US presidential elections from 1972 – 
1992, Bartels (1996) found that although heuristic cues raise political information levels 
significantly, voters who rely on them for political decision-making take considerably 
different decisions than they would if they had complete information.  
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          These scholars present strong evidence that the errors from uninformed citizens are 
systematic rather than random (Bartels, 1996; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000). For instance, 
Bartels found that the uninformed make political decisions that differ systematically from 
those they would make if they were fully informed, so that ‘relatively uninformed voters 
are more likely, other things being equal, to support incumbents and Democrats’ (p. 218).  
          Similarly, Aalberg (2003:89) observes that: 
 
People have the facts wrong, often in systematic ways, and 
confidently believe that they have them right. [This] 
misplaced confidence leads them to resist accepting and 
using the correct facts even if they are made available. 
 
          Although ‘the final word has not been written in this debate’ (Jones, 2001:105) 
regarding whether errors are random or systematic, the importance of political 
information has an established presence in the literature dating back to the seminal work 
of Berelson et al (1954). This landmark study outlines three core functions of political 
information: ‘it activates predispositions
2
; it reinforces standing predispositions, and it 
(perhaps only rarely) converts predispositions’ (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002:219).  
          In addition, if citizens lack information about the incumbent party’s policies, they 
can neither hold the government accountable nor compare its polices with the alternatives 
offered by opposition parties during elections. This is because ‘without knowledge about 
how government works, it is difficult to assess the true priorities of legislators’ (Popkin 
and Dimock, 1999:125). In any case, even those who underestimate the value of political 
information, ‘ultimately fail to show that a political system can operate effectively and 
                                                          
2
 Political predispositions are ‘stable, individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance 
or non-acceptance of the political communications the person receives’ (Zaller, 1992:22). 
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democratically without an informed citizenry’ (Carpini and Keteer, 1996:23). Moreover, 
studies show that those who turn out to vote tend to be more informed than those who do 
not (Zaller, 1992; Lutz, 2006). 
          More substantively, scholars have noted that political information ‘stimulates and 
facilitates political participation’ (Carpini and Keteer, 2005:22), thereby playing a very 
significant normative role (Levendusky, 2011: 43). It is further argued that information 
considerably changes patterns of political behavior (Levendusky, 2011). In this regard, it 
has been pointed out that political information ‘enables citizens to comprehend the 
political world and develop attitudes about politics that are consistent with one’s basic 
values and orientations’ (Carpini and Keteer, 2005:22). 
1.4.3 The Democratic Puzzle: Can Democracy and Information Deficit Co-exist?  
          Another possible solution to the democratic puzzle is to admit that political 
information is important for democracy to work well, and argue that democracy does not 
usually work well when most citizens have a huge information deficit. The literature 
suggests that democratic political systems by their nature tend to make public policies 
that reflect citizens’ preferences, values and interests (Dahl, 1957; Saward, 1998; Jacoby, 
2002; Amy, 2002). Thus, democracy is ‘[the] necessary correspondence between acts of 
governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to these acts’ 
(Budge, 2006:595). Since democracy is government for and by the people, ‘[democratic] 
government should do what its citizens want done’ (Krosnick et al, 2010:1289).  
 
          Moreover, democratic governments tend to derive stability and legitimacy, at least 
in part, from their tendency to enact and implement policies that are congruent with the 
preferences of the electorate (Dahl, 1957; Krosnick, 1990). In this regard, a long research 
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tradition that dates back to the work of Edmund Burke and John Dewey recognizes that 
while citizens are good at identifying problems facing them, they are poor at articulating 
solutions to those problems. Burke and Dewey proposed social division of labor between 
citizens and leaders so that the role of citizens is to identify problems that affect them, 
while the leaders design solutions for them (Althaus, 2003).  
 
          To play this role effectively, citizens need to be informed and able to express their 
problems to their leaders for solution (Krosnik et al, 2010). As Dalton (2000:919) notes: 
For voters to make meaningful decisions, they must 
understand the options that the polity faces. Citizens must 
have sufficient knowledge of the workings of the political 
system if they intend to influence and control the actions of 
their representatives  
 
          The skepticism about the ability of uninformed citizens to drive democracy, and 
the concomitant emphasis on politically informed citizens is based on the near unanimity 
in the literature that informed and uninformed citizens tend to exhibit different political 
behavior, with the former exhibiting political behavior that is more supportive of 
democracy (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1986; Carpini and Keteer, 1996, 2005; Campbell, 
2003; Carpini, 2009). In the first instance, the processes by which the informed and the 
uninformed citizens make political decisions are different (Sniderman et al, 1991; Carpini 
and Keteer, 2005). It is noted that ‘compared with uninformed voters, informed voters are 
likely to use a broader range of considerations in reaching a candidate choice and are 
much more likely to use issues as a criterion’ (Carpini and Keteer, 2005:22).  
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          At the same time, Abrajano and Alvarez (2010:102) observe that: 
Politically knowledgeable individuals behave differently 
from those who are less knowledgeable because they 
possess a more tightly connected cognitive structure that 
allows them to organize their political beliefs and ideology 
 
          The literature also suggests that the informed tend to differ from the uninformed 
citizens in terms of ‘the structure, consistency and stability of their political attitudes and 
ideologies’ (Bennie, 2001:11). In this regard, uninformed citizens tend to exhibit political 
behavior that is not only inconsistent with their policy preference, but is also inconsistent 
from one election to another (Reilly, 2010). It is noted for instance, that because of huge 
information deficits among Americans, ‘people getting their fundamental interests wrong 
is what American political life is all about. This species of derangement is the bedrock of 
[American] civil order; it is the foundation on which all else rests’ (Frank, 2004:1-2).  
          For instance, Bartels (2008) cites some survey researches which show that most 
Americans support greater federal spending in several government programs, feel that the 
rich are taxed too little, and detest income inequality. Yet these same people actively 
support public policies whose net effect reduce tax burdens for the rich, widen income 
gaps and reduce federal spending. He attributes these contradictions to information deficit, 
and wonders how these people would reconcile their contradictions if they were to 
recognize them. Though most Americans support greater public spending in health, 
environmental protection, and education, their voting behavior do not reflect these ideals, 
as the same people vote for legislators who back expenditure cuts (Lewis, 2001).  
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          Largely due to such contradictions, Alan Wolfe (2006:30) has observed that: 
Americans have been very lucky for quite some time. 
Despite their lack of information about politics, they 
have done a fairly good job evaluating candidates and 
the public policies they support  
 
          While I share the sentiments of Wolfe, I do not agree that Americans have been 
lucky to make credible decisions despite lack of information. It is not out of sheer luck 
that they have been able to evaluate candidates and public policies, but due to underlying 
mechanisms like partisan cues, through which they overcome their information deficit 
and hence behave as though they are well informed. 
 
          These examples are drawn exclusively from American experience largely because 
studies in this area typically focus on America. Moreover, there is no indication that the 
situation is different elsewhere, given the observation that ‘self-interest is seldom a guide 
to behavior since some people often do not recognize their interests or may choose to act 
in an altruistic manner’ (Campbell, 2003:7). The critical question arising from these 
inconsistencies has been well posed by Frank (2004:1): ‘how [can] so many people get it 
so wrong?’ He was puzzled that residents of Kansas would support Republicans when it 
is Democrats who stand for issues that are in their interest. One argument presented in the 
literature is that people often subordinate self-interest to the collective or group interest.  
 
          According to Lakoff (2004:19): 
It is not that people never care about their self interest. But they 
vote their identity. And if their identity fits their self-interest, 
they will vote for that…it is a serious mistake to assume that 
people are simply always voting in their self-interest  
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          Subordinating self-interest to group interest as stated by Lakoff (2004) is not 
necessarily a problem as long as an individual’s self-interest coincides with his or her 
group identity. But there is no guarantee that this is often the case. Yet there is a long 
research tradition drawing inspirations from among other political thinkers, John Stuart 
Mill, which argue that democracy best serves the interests of those who are informed, 
since they tend to engage in it more than those who are poorly informed (Lutz, 2006).  
          According to Campbell (2003:1): 
The politically active are more likely to achieve their policy 
goals, often at the expense of the politically quiescent. And 
the ability of the politically active to do so is in part a 
legacy of existing public policy 
 
          In other words, political information facilitates political participation which in turn 
has a mutually reinforcing relationship with public policy. Campbell (2003) argues that 
policy design creates impressions on the part of target groups, particularly the designated 
beneficiaries, of how much the government values and cares about them. The perceptions 
in turn influence how target groups view and relate to the government, and whether or not 
they become politically active. Studies along this line coalesce into the policy feedback 
framework, which holds that ‘policies create incentives for targets to organize to preserve 
and expand their benefits or to minimize their costs’ (McDonnell, 2009:66). The target 
groups organize within a framework of institutionalized rules and structures created by 
the policy. The nature of the feedback generated by a policy is a function of the incentive 
structures it creates, the type of access to governmental system it provides, and ‘the 
signals it sends about the political standing of its targets’ (Mc Donnell, 2009: 66). 
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          A large volume of literature endorses the key premise of the normative democratic 
theory that democracy works well when citizens have adequate political information. 
However, it still remains unclear how to empirically verify if democracy is working well. 
The common practice is to begin from the key premise of liberalism, that ‘individuals are 
the best judges of their well-being’ (Wegner, 2008:78). Building on this premise, scholars 
have noted that ‘some type of linkage exist between how citizens define democracy and 
their practice of and support for democratic institutions over the long run’ (Camp, 2001: 
11). More precisely, a correlation has been noted between how people define democracy, 
what they expect from it, and how they evaluate it (Camp, 2001).  
          Dalton et al (2008) outlines two models that explain how the public understands 
democracy. First, the Diffusion Model suggests that democratic norms usually flow from 
those areas that have already become democratic to those that are not yet. This free flow 
and ready acceptance of democratic ideals is reinforced by the fact that democracy is 
naturally appealing. Given that knowledge of democracy has little to do with national 
conditions or even the democratic experiences of each country, it is possible to develop a 
good understanding of democracy even if one does not live in a democratic country. 
          Secondly, the Learning Model suggest that democratic ideals are learnt through 
experience and therefore the longer one lives in a democratic country, the better he gets 
to know democracy (Dalton et al, 2008). At the aggregate national level, the model can 
be interpreted to imply that the longer a country has been democratic, the more its 
citizens understand democracy. Thus, citizens of Western Europe and North America can 
be expected to be more knowledgeable about democracy than African citizens. 
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          A study by Norris (2011b) found evidence supporting the Learning Model. She 
found that an individual‘s knowledge of democracy is significantly influenced by their 
historical experiences with democracy, their education levels, political information levels 
and use of news media. In fact, she found that there is a curvilinear relationship between 
an individual’s knowledge of democracy and the length of time lived in a democratic 
state. She concluded that ‘citizens who have grown up in long-standing democratic states 
have leant how the democratic procedures and principles do and do not work [and that] 
knowledge of democracy also strengthens with age’ (p. 163). 
          Other studies have also shown that ‘support for democracy is high in most stable 
democracies and relatively high in newly consolidated democracies, but not as high in 
societies that were undergoing transition or consolidation at the time of the survey’ 
(Moreno, 2001:32). In essence, the more democratic a country is, the more its citizens are 
likely to be satisfied with the way democracy functions there. As a result, the aggregate 
level of satisfaction with democracy indicates how well democracy is working.  
1.5 Theoretical Framework   
1.5.1 The Heuristic Cues Framework and Political Perceptions  
          Heuristics has been defined as ‘convenient, informal guides that people find helpful 
and often follow in making decisions or predictions’ (Oskamp and Schultz, 2005:23), or 
more precisely, as ‘shortcuts used to understand something when the full range of 
information about that object is not possessed by an individual’ (Pfau et al, 2007:52). 
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           According to Pamela Conover and Stanley Feldman (1982: 231): 
If the candidates adopt relatively unambiguous issue 
positions and this information is readily available, then 
voters are able to rely on it for prediction purposes. If, on 
the other hand, there is only ambiguous information then 
the voter is forced to infer the candidates’ issue positions 
from other information about the candidate 
 
          The heuristic cues framework is based on the assumption that most citizens think 
heuristically rather than ideologically about political issues (Oskamp and Schultz, 2005). 
Beyond this point, theorizing and research on heuristics cues have developed in different 
directions. Some scholars argue that heuristics substantially narrow the political 
information gap between informed and uninformed citizens, thereby enabling the latter to 
make decisions which approximate the decisions they would make if they had complete 
information (Popkin, 1991; Luppia, 1994; Sekhon, 2004; Kam, 2005; McDermott, 2006). 
It is further argued that cues enable the uninformed not just to behave like the informed, 
but to ‘be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political choices without necessarily 
possessing a large body of knowledge about politics’ (Sniderman et al, 1991:19). 
          Others question the ability of heuristics to remedy citizen information deficits, and 
empower uninformed citizens to behave as if they are informed (Bartels, 1996; Kuklinski 
and Hurley, 1996; Taber, 2003). They argue that heuristic cues are error-ridden, and 
hence may sometimes mislead rather than enlighten citizens (Bartels, 1996; Althaus, 
2003; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000; Lau and Redlawsk, 2006; Taber, 2003). Some scholars 
even argue that heuristic cue-taking is fatally error-bound (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1996).  
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          Brady and Sniderman (1985) developed a version of heuristic cues model known as 
Likeability Heuristics. According to this model, an individual’s perceptions about the 
political preference of others depend on whether they like or dislike them. When an 
individual likes a group, he or she is likely to believe that the group shares his or her 
perceptions on all issues. For example, if one likes a political party but does not know its 
policy position on abortion, he or she is likely to believe his or her position on abortion is 
shared by the party. The model also holds that both informed and uninformed citizens use 
heuristics, though the latter rely more on it than on facts.    
          Although there is near consensus among heuristic scholars that citizens typically 
rely on readily available heuristic cues which they trust and presume to be better 
informed than them (Oskamp and Schultz, 2005), scholars differ on the main sources of 
heuristic cues. One version of the heuristic cues model holds that citizens derive cues 
from fellow citizens, and that “political activity is rooted in social structure” (Mutz, 2002: 
839). Repeated social interactions are said to instill in individuals a general culture of 
political participation, which in turn, drives them to participate in politics. However, the 
model leaves open the question as to whether all forms of social interactions lead to 
similar political mobilization, and hence similar levels of participation. The idea that all 
forms of social interactions promote voter turnout is doubtful. It is reasonable to expect 
some forms of social interactions to promote apathy, and others to promote participation.   
          Similarly, the Social Proof Theory postulates that people derive cues from those 
who are similar or related to them (Cialdini, 2001). The Social proof works best under 
conditions of uncertainty and similarity. Uncertainty can induce similar and like-minded 
24 
 
people operating within the context of a group, to accept as correct, and therefore follow, 
the actions of others. In this regard, Katz and Lazarsfeld (2006:44) have pointed out that:  
Interpersonal relationships seem to be “anchorage” points for 
individual opinions, attitudes, habits and values. That is, 
interacting individuals seem collectively and continuously to 
generate and maintain common ideas and behavior patterns 
which they are reluctant to surrender or to modify unilaterally  
 
          Another group of scholars offer a contrary view that people derive cues from the 
opinion of “distant impersonal others” (Mutz and Soss, 1997; Mutz, 1998). The weakness 
of these theories is that they suggest that uninformed people take cues from the majority, 
yet empirical evidence so far shows that the majority are often politically uninformed.  
           The masses also derive heuristic cues from elites (Lewkowicz, 2006; Chong and 
Druckman, 2007). Political elite refers to ‘those who devote themselves full-time to some 
aspects of politics or public affairs’ (Zaller, 1992:6), and include politicians, high-level 
government officials, journalists, some activists, experts and policy specialists (Ibid). Yet, 
‘the elites do not create predispositions, they [merely] activate them’ (Alvarez and Brehm, 
2002: 219). The masses do not just accept any elite cue; they evaluate, interpret, and only 
pick cues they perceive to be credible. For example, in the Canadian referendum of 1992 
on the Charlottetown Accord, voters rejected elite cues and voted against the accord 
despite strong elite support for it (see Ginsberg and Stone, 1996; Norris, 1997).   
          Elites do not usually convey objective and balanced political information. Much of 
elite discourse with the masses involves efforts ‘to create a depiction of reality that is 
sufficiently simple and vivid that ordinary people can grasp it’ (Zaller, 1992: 13). For that 
reason, ‘much of the information carried in elite discourse is neither neutral nor strictly 
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factual…since they have been framed for partisan purposes’ (Zaller, 1992: 22). That is, 
“mass politics is socially constructed” at two levels: elites strategically select information 
that they present to the masses, who in turn, select what to hear, and what cue to take 
(Kuklinski and Hurley, 1996; Gilens and Murakawa, 2002; Baum and Groeling, 2010).  
          As Gilens and Murakawa (2002:43) observe: 
If elite cues and other decision shortcuts lead citizens to the 
same aggregate preference that they would form if they had 
the time, interest, and expertise to reason through the 
substance of each issue, then the public can fulfill its 
democratic role while remaining largely ignorant of the 
substantive complexity of government policy. 
 
          However, ‘if heuristics leads to aggregate preferences that are strongly at variance 
with what an informed public would desire, then democracy is at risk’ (ibid, p.34). That 
is, heuristic cues can either promote or undercut democracy. It is suggested that two 
minimum conditions are necessary for effective decision-making based on heuristic cues. 
First, the masses must be able ‘to distinguish between potential cue givers who share 
their political orientations and those who do not’ (ibid, 31). Secondly, they must be able 
to identify the policy preferences of the cue givers. Only this can secure elite-mass policy 
congruence (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002). For instance, citing the 2003 US invasion of 
Iraq at a time when public opinion was against this move, Swift (2010) observes that ‘we 
have been  treated to other recent examples of our political elite giving us not what we 
wanted but what they thought we needed’ (p. 12). 
          Chong and Druckman (2007) argue that the ability of a frame to shape individual’s 
opinion depend on an individual’s perception of the frame’s applicability, its strength and 
frequency. Although one-time exposure to a frame is adequate to induce framing effects 
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on informed citizens, uninformed citizens require greater exposure for framing effects to 
occur. Thus, political information levels influence the formation of political perceptions.  
          Mass media has also been identified as a source of heuristic cues, although there is 
selective attentiveness to media (Mondak, 2010). People generally seek information and 
cues that echo their beliefs, while rejecting the uncongenial ones (Zaller, 1992; Taber, 
2003). It is well established in the literature that “citizens will resist information that is 
inconsistent with their prevailing worldview” (Aalberg, 2003:87), and hence tend seek 
media content that support their beliefs. Recent appraisal of the role of media in shaping 
political participation in advanced democracies show that due to a decline in partisanship, 
the media has replace parties as the source of political information (Frode et al, 2008). 
          People also rely on ethnicity and racism as heuristic cues (Squire and Smith, 1988). 
Indeed, until recently, African voters were thought to use ethnic cues as a guide for their 
voting decisions. Yet, recent studies in Kenya, and in many African countries, show that 
African voters and by extension, African parties, are less “ethnic” than earlier thought, 
and that ethnicity plays at best, a modest role in vote choice (Bratton et al, 2008; Young, 
2009; Kefeer, 2010). For instance, the influence of race in South African elections has 
less to do with ‘race’ as a heuristic cue, and more to do with its unique historical role as 
the basis for defining the struggles between the oppressed and the oppressors in apartheid 
era (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2008). Major parties and candidates in most African elections 
usually acquire broad-based support beyond the ethnic group of the party leader (Bratton, 
et al, 2005; Kasongo-Lumumba, 2005; Birnir, 2006; Stroh, 2010). Thus, some scholars 
have argued that African voters continue to be misunderstood, since they have not been 
properly researched (Schaffer, 2000; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). In a nutshell, ‘recent 
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publications have challenged the most popular approach to African party politics, one 
that assumes ethnic structure plays a determining role in party success’ (Stroh, 2010:1).  
 
          These revelations call for closer examination of how African voters make political 
decisions. In any case, fairly recent studies have concluded that ‘contemporary scholarly 
studies of mass politics have mostly failed to elucidate the role of ordinary citizens in the 
broader political process” (Bartels, 2004:153). 
1.5.2 Political Cue Theory  
          One of the theories within the broader Heuristic Cues Framework that attempt to 
resolve the democratic puzzle is political cue theory developed by Pamela Conover and 
Stanley Feldman. The theory hold that democracy works well even when there is a huge 
political information deficit among citizens given that uninformed citizens are able to 
surmount information deficits by developing and using schemas. In this regard, schema 
refers to “more or less integrated set of beliefs and implicit rules concerning stimulus, 
including what goes with what, how things operate, and how cues can be used to infer 
features that go beyond information that is given” (Iyengar and McGuire, 1993:93). Thus, 
political schemata refer to ‘enduring cognitive structures that influence the processing of 
political information across multiple elections’ (Lau, 1986:114).  
          In order to be able to make sense of the political world, people develop various 
types of political schemata, depending on their experience with the political world. Once 
a schema is well established, then several implications can be inferred from it as need 
arises (Iyenger, 1989). More importantly, ‘schemata organize the processing and storage 
of incoming information, and they guide the recall and interpretation of information 
already in memory’ (Lau, 1986: 95). In a nutshell, ‘schemas can affect what information 
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is attended to, how it is perceived or interpreted, how (and if) it is stored in long-term 
memory, and when it is recalled for later consideration’ (Carpini, 2009:27) 
          Consistent with the political cue theory, Lau (1986) identifies political parties as 
one of the most important political schemata, and argues that ‘if a person holds a strong 
party schema, his or her evaluation of a political candidate should be strongly based on 
the party affiliation of the candidate’ (p. 117). People with a strong party schema usually 
make political decisions and take actions that reinforce their partisan predispositions. As 
Jacoby (2010:263) rightly observes: 
Stimuli associated with one’s own party - primarily candidates 
and policy stands - are viewed more favorably while those 
from the other party [or parties] are regarded more negatively. 
The clarity and intensity of such connections are mediated by 
the strength of individual partisan attachments  
 
 
          The political cue theory emphasizes ‘cognition, information processing and the 
drawing of inferences’ (Iyengar and McGuire, 1993:93). Conover and Feldman (1984) 
argues that the political environment is characterized by scarcity of political information, 
and where information is available, it tends to be ambiguous, and open to myriads of 
interpretations. Under the circumstances, coping with political environment requires 
making inferences. Like other theories that emphasize information processing, political 
cue theory is based on the assumption that ‘individuals do not respond directly to objects 
in the environment, but rather to their mental representation of these objects’ (Cassino et 
al, 2007:211). Hence, it recognizes that subjective perceptions rather than objective facts 
drive political behavior (Morris, 2008). That is, cues enable citizens to form their political 
perceptions which in turn, inform and guide their political decisions and actions in the 
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information-intensive democratic process (Carpini and Keteer, 1996). In essence, the 
political cue theory is basically a theory of political perceptions (Granberg, 2001). 
          In short, the central hypothesis of the political cue theory is that citizens take cues 
from the political parties they trust in order to abridge their political information deficit 
and to aid in the formation of political perceptions (Baker et al, 1981; Conover and 
Feldman, 1984; Iyenger and McGuire, 1993; Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Hacker, 2004). 
The theory holds that political parties offer enduring and reliable cues which shapes 
political perceptions (Iyenger and McGuire, 1993). Party identity is thus treated as a 
perceptual screen through which individuals filter public policies and political ideas, and 
base their evaluation of candidates (Hacker, 2004). As Jacoby (2010: 263) puts it: 
Partisanship acts as a “perpetual screen” which helps 
individuals to evaluate incoming information about the 
political world, formulates attitudes, and determines 
subsequent behaviors in an efficient manner 
 
          Political parties “orient the way people think about politics” so that those with ties 
to parties turn to them for cues (Baker et al, 1981). Indeed, ‘a central idea in political cue 
theory is that political parties act as abiding and reliable anchors, serving as strong cues 
in deriving political perceptions’ (Iyengar and McGuire, 1993:94).  
1.6 Political Cue Theory, Political Parties and Partisanship in Kenya  
 
1.6.1 Theoretical and Empirical Literature on Kenyan Political Parties  
          Political cue theory treats political parties as the most important source of political 
cues on which partisan citizens rely to bridge their information deficit. To appreciate the 
relevance of political cue theory in explaining political behavior in Kenya, it is necessary 
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to understand the nature of political parties and party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
doing so, two critical points must be born in mind. First, although political parties have 
existed in Africa since the mid 19
th
 century, empirical study of African parties remain 
scanty (Erdmann et al, 2007; Cussac, 2009). Consequently, ‘we really know little about 
how African political parties are managed’ (Salih, 2007:85), and much of what we know 
is largely based on anecdotal evidence from cursory observations (Erdmann et al, 2007).   
          Secondly, recent systematic studies on African political parties conclude that these 
parties significantly differ from those in the advanced democracies of Western Europe 
and North America, and therefore should not be viewed using the same lenses (Salih, 
2003; Burnell, 2007; Erdmann, 2007). Whereas parties in the advanced democracies are 
typically institutionalized, stable and ideology-driven, most of African parties are neither 
ideological nor institutionalized (Asingo, 2003; Bratton et al, 2005; Gyimah-Boadi, 2007; 
Basedau and Stroh, 2008; Young, 2009). Consequently, ‘African political parties rarely 
present policy alternatives and the few who have sought to win power by campaigning on 
policy or ideological platform have rarely been successful’ (Gyimah-Boadi, 2007:25-6).  
          These sentiments echo my specific observations regarding the 2002 elections to the 
effect that, ‘very few political parties had prepared manifestos and even where such 
manifestos existed, there is no evidence that they played any significant role in 
determining election outcomes’ (Asingo, 2003:30). Evidently, nothing seems to have 
changed so far given that recent scholarship continues to affirm that ‘all parties in Kenya 
have no discernible ideology’ (Oloo, 2007:112). 
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          In the absence of ideology, support for political parties is in most cases based on 
expected material benefits. As Sisk and Reynolds (1998) correctly observes, ‘in agrarian 
societies, people evaluate both parties and candidates in terms of their potential for, or 
past record of, constituency service’ (p.59). The constituency services that African voters 
expect in return for their support of a political party include personal benefits and favors 
like public jobs and payment of school fees, as well as public goods like roads, water, 
education and health facilities (see Levy and Kpundeh, 2004). It is noted that ‘Kenyan 
voters have continued to understand the primary role of their representatives as being one 
of linking the community to sources of influence and patronage’ (Cheeseman, 2009:95).  
          In response, most political parties typically focus on short-term populist policies of 
immediate appeal to the masses, rather than a long term pursuit of a definite ideology. In 
most cases, ‘there tends to be very little party activity between elections’ (Gyimah-Boadi, 
2007: 25). Even the short-term policies that various parties espouse during elections tend 
to be remarkably similar (Ndegwa, 2001; Oloo, 2007; Chege, 2010).  
          As Premphe (2010:25) observes: 
 
Beyond the platitudes of party manifestos, there is no 
programmatic difference among rival parties in most 
[African] political systems. All offer vague campaign 
promises of better governance and better times to come, 
while prophesying a dismal future should the people make 
the “mistake” of choosing the other party.  
 
          Similar observations have been made specifically with respect to Kenya. Wanjohi 
(2003) notes that, ‘nearly all party manifestos in Kenya look alike, often using the same 
phraseology, and even identical paragraphs’ (p.251). As a result, Oloo (2007) adds that ‘it 
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has been difficult for voters to tell what the different parties really stand for, as all the 
manifestos are different only in language but not in substance’ (p. 111).  
          Since most parties lack ideology and espouse more or less similar policy promises, 
party support also tend to be based on trust in the party leadership and not necessarily 
party policies. Moreover, making policy promises is just the easy party. Indeed, most 
serious parties usually make promises during elections, even if their promises are based 
on ideas that are not consistent enough to constitute ideology, and even when they do not 
intend to implement them. Studies show that even in the United States, winning parties 
only implement about 60% of the campaign promises (Grynaviski, 2010). The hard part 
to which voters seem to be attentive is the ability of the party to fulfill its promises.  
          For instance, in Kenya’s first multiparty elections in 1992, the incumbent KANU 
almost lost to FORD-Asili, which lacked even a manifesto! FORD-Asili’s catchy slogan: 
Kuga na gwika (saying and doing), was viewed as reflection of the character of its leader, 
Kenneth Matiba, and signaled leadership intent on doing (fixing problems) and not just 
saying (articulating ideas). The slogan enabled FORD-Asili to package itself as an action-
oriented party, while depicting KANU as a party of empty rhetoric. Thus, ‘FORD-Asili 
supporters apparently attached importance to the person of Matiba rather than party 
polices, which in any case were not articulated in its manifesto’ (Kanyinga, 1995: 86). 
          The trend was also evident in the 2007 elections when ‘[incumbent] PNU based its 
campaign on trust in Kibaki’s competent economic stewardship, which it asserted would 
ensure a better quality of life of Kenyan people, as opposed to the “empty rhetoric” of the 
[opposition] ODM’ (Chege, 2010:207). In fact, the party adopted the Kazi Iendelee [let us 
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continue the good work] slogan. It boasted that in just five years, it had done more than 
KANU did for 39 years. In response, ODM adopted the slogan: Kazi Iaanze Sasa [let 
good work begin now]. ODM held that KANU’s development record was so dismal that 
just surpassing it would not be magical; PNU’s slogan of Kazi Iendelee means preserving 
the status quo; for them the time to start serious work is now (Cussac, 2009). This 
sloganeering had the potential of shifting the focus from the policy promises by various 
parties to the parties themselves and their leaders – which party is more action-oriented? 
          It is this emphasis on perceived ability and credibility of party leaders rather than 
party policies that lead some scholars to think that ‘African parties tend to be dominated 
by personalities’ (Gymah-Boadi, 2007:25). However, these scholars do not go far enough 
to explore the reasons behind the seeming dominance of party leaders. In Kenya for 
instance, ten major parties and serious candidates have contested presidential elections 
from 1992 when multiparty politics was re-introduced up to 2007, as shown in table 1.1.  
Table 1.1 Party Leaders and Presidential Candidates in Kenya (1992 – 2007) 
 
Party 
Party Leader and Presidential Candidate 
1992 1997 2002 2007 
KANU Daniel Moi Daniel Moi Uhuru Kenyatta - 
DP Mwai Kibaki Mwai Kibaki - - 
FORD-A Kenneth Matiba - - - 
FORD-K Oginga Odinga Kijana Wamalwa - - 
NDP  - Raila Odinga - - 
SDP - Charity Ngilu - - 
NARC - - Mwai Kibaki - 
PNU   - Mwai Kibaki 
ODM - - - Raila Odinga 
ODM-K - - - Kalonzo Musyoka 
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         Four of the candidates (Matiba, Oginga, Wamalwa and Raila) played a pivotal role 
in the struggle to reintroduce multi-party politics. In the process they paid dearly at the 
hands of the then authoritarian KANU regime, including being detained. Their charisma, 
audacity and commitment to a just society at the expense of risking their lives made them 
heroes to their supporters. Although Kibaki was part of the change-resistant KANU 
regime against which the other four were fighting, his sterling performance as the finance 
minister during the memorable periods of economic growth from 1969 to 1978 was an 
asset. Moreover, he also served as Moi’s vice-president for ten years, from 1978 to 1988, 
when he was unceremoniously sacked. On her part, Ngilu was a new entrant into the 
national politics, but caused great excitement in the political scene in 1997 as the first 
woman to take a serious stab at the presidency. This shows that, in most cases, the party 
leaders are not just everyday politicians who are easily replaceable. As Webb and Lewis 
(1998) notes, charismatic leaders have been very strong magnets that attract members to 
parties in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and hence foster the growth of their parties.  
          Besides their heroic images, party leaders, at least in Kenya, also derive dominance 
from the fact that in most cases, they fund their party activities. It should be noted that the 
nature of inter-party competition in Kenya is such that political parties do not just seek to 
defeat others in the quest for power, but they actually seek to destroy opponents. Indeed, 
‘the nature of Kenya politics predisposes both leaders and followers to see politics as do 
or die zero sum game’ (Mueller, 2011:102). Hence, without adequate resources, a party 
cannot survive even if it has huge support. In the absence of state funding, and with a 
decline in the number of card-carrying party members, most parties rely on personal 
resources, networks and the fundraising ability of leaders. Yet, ‘a party that depends 
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financially on the wealth of its leader is likely to be run as if it is the leader’s personal 
property’ (Oloo, 2007:106-7). This changed when Political Parties Act was enacted in 
2007 to provide for state funding of parties. 
          While dominant party leaders can potentially stifle intra-party democracy, Kenya’s 
experience since 1992 show that it also serves a positive role of stabilizing the party. It is 
now recognized that ‘the leader of the party is often what keeps the party together in Sub-
Saharan Africa…and support for the party is based on the leader’s charisma and capacity 
to distribute patronage’ (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011:44). Moreover, whenever parties have 
two or more strong leaders, the tendency is to split. For instance, FORD, the umbrella 
opposition movement that coordinated the struggle for introduction of multiparty politics, 
split in 1992 because it could not accommodate two equally strong personalities - Oginga 
Odinga and Kenneth Matiba. Its split gave rise to FORD-K and FORD-A respectively 
headed by each of the two leaders. However, when Oginga died in 1994, a leadership 
tussle erupted between Wamalwa and Raila, with the former taking FORD-K leadership, 
and the latter forming the NDP. Similarly, in the 2002 elections, Raila, Wamalwa and 
Ngilu supported Kibaki under NARC, but this too was short-lived. While Wamalwa died 
in August 2003, Ngilu, Raila, and Kalonzo walked out on Kibaki in December 2005 to 
form the ODM. The leadership rivalry ghost continued in ODM, with Kalonzo deserting 
it to form the ODM-K (see also Wanjohi, 2003; Asingo, 2003; Chege, 2010). 
          As already noted, a total of ten political parties have been active in Kenya since 
1992, suggesting that Kenya has a highly volatile party system. With many parties and no 
ideologies, it is hardly surprising that ‘defections have been prevalent in Kenya since the 
return of multiparty politics in Kenya in 1992’ (Oloo, 2007: 112). However, as shown in 
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table 1.1, no new party with a set of political newcomers has been able to penetrate and 
make an impact in the political scene since 1992. Most of the so-called new parties result 
from mergers or splits in existing parties, hence the “party newness” is at best symbolic. 
Even as parties change names with catchy slogans, policies and key actors are the same. 
Voters somehow understand this comedy and adjust party support accordingly.  
          Another often cited feature of African political parties that emanate from lack of 
ideology is that they tend to be ethnic-based (Gyimah-Boadi, 2007). There is no denying 
that ethnicity is a salient social cleavage in Africa. Indeed, ‘fourteen out of fifteen most 
ethnically heterogeneous societies in the world are in Africa’ (Easterly and Lavine, 1997: 
1219). Scholars have noted that most parties formed in Africa after the rebirth of multi-
party politics in the 1990s are ethnic parties (Dowd and Driessen, 2008), where an ethnic 
party is one that embodies the aspirations of one ethnic group, and seeks to pursue the 
interest of that group (Horowitz, 1985). Others argue that ‘the single most important 
factor explaining party loyalty is ethnicity or region’ (Van de Walle, 2006:63). 
          However, the high level of ethnic fragmentation in Africa, particularly in Kenya, 
makes ‘ethnic parties’ unviable. In Kenya, there are more than 40 ethnic groups, none of 
which is sufficiently large to govern at the exclusion of others. The largest ethnic group is 
the Kikuyu who constitute only 20% of the population. The other four large groups are 
the Luhya (14%), Luo (11%), Kalenjin (11%) and Kamba (10%) (Beetham, 2002). It is 
true that the parties formed at the onset of democratization tended to derive support from 
their leader’s ethnic groups. Indeed, the five major parties which participated in the 1997 
elections were headed by a leader from the five largest ethnic groups. However, from 
1997, major political parties began to build cross-ethnic coalitions so that the 2002 and 
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2007 elections were basically fought between two main political parties. It is ironic that 
‘in Africa, ethnicity is almost never absent from politics, yet at the same time it does not 
provide its basic fabric’ (Bayart, 2009:55). 
          The 2002 elections were particularly critical in neutralizing ethnicity in Kenya, 
since the two major parties in the election fielded Kikuyu presidential candidates. As a 
result the Kikuyu split their support between the two parties, and even more importantly, 
they had to use a criterion other than ethnicity to decide on party support. The elections 
also tested and confirmed that Kenyans are not ethnic voters, but can support candidates 
from other ethnic groups. The results of that election suggest that the factors that shaped 
party support among the Kikuyu may not have been different from the rest of the country. 
For instance, in Central province where 94% of residents are Kikuyus (Alwy and Schech, 
2004), Mwai Kibaki who was NARC candidate, got 69% while KANU’s Uhuru Kenyatta 
got 30.3% of the votes. This is not virtually the same as the national tally which was 62% 
for the former and 31% for the latter (Asingo, 2003). In any case, ‘a broader overview of 
African elections- including Kenya’s December 2007 contest- reveals that voters consider 
factors other than ethnicity in deciding how to vote’ (Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008:1).  
          The quest for broad-based support forces party leaders to accommodate the diverse 
ethnic and regional interests to win their support (Cussac, 2009). While the party leader is 
in most cases the face of the party, his authority is counterbalanced by various interests in 
the party. The leader cannot act arbitrarily without invoking party structures. Thus, it is 
the party as an institution and not the party leader as an individual that matters. 
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1.6.2 Political Parties and Partisan Cues in Kenya  
          The foregoing discussion highlights several characteristics of African political 
parties, with significant implications for political cue theory. In a nutshell, what sets 
African parties apart from their western counterparts is that they are not institutionalized, 
fairly unstable, and lack ideological orientation. The concern at this point is whether it is 
possible for citizens to derive meaningful political cues from such political parties. 
          I argue that there is nothing inherent in the nature of African political parties that 
would jeopardize the prospects of African citizens to rely on them for political cues. 
Despite their weaknesses, African and indeed, Kenyan parties still serve as important 
institutional frameworks for structuring political discourse. Of course, people support 
parties for a variety of reasons, particularly in a context in which parties are not ideology- 
based. These may include ethnicity, religion, party leader’s charisma, or lack of viable 
alternatives. The Political cue theory is concerned less with the reasons why people join, 
support, or aligns with parties, and more with whether and how the alignments influence 
political behavior. To the extent that Kenyans align with existing political parties, even if 
those alignments are highly volatile, political cue theory helps to explain how uninformed 
citizens develop credible opinion, make decisions and take actions that would otherwise 
require enormous information in the democratic process. After all, long-term attachment 
to parties is a uniquely American trend and hardly evident in other regions of the world 
(Baker et al, 1981; Bartle, 2001; Blais et al, 2002; Miller and Klobucar, 2005). 
          However, some adjustments must be made in order to apply political cue theory in 
the Kenyan case. Kenya has one of the highest number of political parties per capita. By 
November 2007, there were 134 registered political parties in Kenya. While the 
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presidential elections were largely a two-party affair between ODM and PNU, a total of 
23 political parties won parliamentary seats (Cussac, 2009). This large number of 
parliamentary parties, coupled with their lack of ideology, imply that the American party 
identification scale which runs from strong Democrats to strong Republicans, cannot be 
used in Kenya, and indeed in any multiparty system (Bartle, 2001; Blais et al, 2002; 
Miller and Klobucar, 2005; Saha, 2005). This calls for an innovative alternative measure 
of party identity that bring on board all the parties (Greene, 2002; Kroh and Selb, 2009). 
1.7 The Study Conceptual Framework  
          The democratic puzzle arises out of normative democratic theory’s rigid emphasis 
on political information while ignoring other mechanisms, through which the uninformed 
can surmount information deficit. Political cue theory seeks to cure the defect by opening 
an avenue through which the uninformed can emulate the informed by taking cues from 
political parties and thus behave as if they are informed. The conceptual framework for 
this study therefore fuses the two theoretical standpoints as shown in Figure 1.1 
 
Figure 1.1. The Study Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Author’s Conceptualization, 2012. 
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          The conceptual framework provides for example, that information sources such as 
education, media and political discussions can be a basis for identifying a political party 
to align with. With time, people build trust and confidence in their party of choice and 
draw either information or cues from them, on the basis of which they form perceptions. 
Alternatively, informed people may not rely on parties, but just use information as the 
basis for their perceptions. Similarly, people, especially those who are uninformed rely 
on cue sources such as ethnicity, race, and religion to either identify a party to trust or as 
a basis for forming perceptions. If they use these cues to identify a party, then they can 
derive information from the party or simply use partisan cues. Whatever root one follows, 
it is perceptions that ultimately guide political behavior, and which holds the key to 
understanding how democracy works even when people are so poorly informed.   
1.8 Study Hypotheses  
          This dissertation is conceptualized within the context of normative democratic 
theory, and draws several hypotheses from political cue theory and the broader heuristic 
cues framework. I discuss these hypotheses under three sub-titles corresponding to the 
three specific research questions that the study seeks to address. 
1.8.1. The Political Information Hypothesis 
          At the core of this dissertation lies the democratic puzzle that revolves around the 
mismatch between normative democratic theory and empirical evidence. While the 
theory presupposes that democracy is unworkable without informed citizens, several 
studies have reported that citizens generally lack pertinent political information requisite 
for democracy, and that democracy seems to function well even when citizens are poorly 
informed. Unfortunately, despite enormous volumes of such studies, and the robustness 
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of their findings, these studies have focused mainly on advanced democracies. Systematic 
studies of political information levels among African citizens remain very scanty. In the 
circumstances, and given the consensus in the political behavior literature that citizens 
are generally very poorly informed (Luppia and McCubbins, 1998), I begin from the 
assumption that Kenyan citizens are equally poorly informed:   
H 1.1: Kenyans generally have low political information levels 
 
          Political cue theory postulates that political parties offer reliable cues which help to 
reduce the information gap between informed and uninformed citizens. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that, while uninformed partisans abridge their deficit by taking cues 
from political parties which they trust, their non-partisan colleagues have no such 
mechanisms for making up the political information deficit.  
.  
          Hence, partisanship raises information levels: 
H 1.2: Partisans are likely to have higher levels of political 
information than non-partisans 
 
          I also argue that uninformed citizens who are unwilling to admit lack of political 
information are likely to make every effort either to appear informed, or at least to hide 
their deficiency. Such efforts may include developing information-seeking attitudes 
which enhance their information level; taking cues from trusted sources; or just making 
blind guesses when faced with totally unfamiliar choices or decisions. Since some of 
these strategies may succeed in hiding their true level of political information, they may 
appear more informed than they actually are. Hence, the penchant for hiding a deficit 
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may artificially raise one’s political information scores. Hence, if indeed there is a 
difference in the information levels between partisans and non-partisans, then it is 
possible that this difference may also result from the unwillingness to admit deficit: 
H 1.3: Partisans are more likely to admit information 
deficit than non-partisans  
 
1.8.2. The Functionality of Democracy Hypothesis 
          One way of gauging the extent to which democracy has taken root and is working 
properly is how well people understand democracy itself. If democracy is the only game 
in town, its features should become part of everyday discourse, and many people should 
be able to identify at least some of its features.  
H 2.1: Kenyans generally have high level of understanding 
of Democracy  
 
          Moreover, the assumption that people who are informed on one or a set of issues 
are likely to be informed on other issues, make it reasonable to expect that those with a 
good understanding of a wide range of issues captured by the political information index 
are likely to have a good understanding of democracy.  
H 2.2: The Informed are more likely than the uninformed to 
understand democracy. 
 
 
          In addition to the assumption that the informed are more likely to understand 
democracy than the uninformed, there is also the assumption that partisanship raises the 
general level of political information. This means that partisans are more likely than the 
non-partisans to understand democracy. Taken together, these two assumptions imply 
that the informed partisans are more likely than uninformed partisans to understand 
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democracy. Besides, if the influence of partisanship on knowledge of democracy is 
independent of information levels, then partisans are more likely to know democracy than 
non-partisans, regardless of information levels. Hence I expect uninformed partisans to 
have a better understanding of democracy than uninformed non-partisans: 
 
H 2.3: Uninformed partisans are more likely to understand 
democracy than the uninformed non-partisans. 
 
 
          A better way of gauging whether democracy has taken root and is functioning 
properly is the extent to which citizens are satisfied with how it is working in their 
country. Recent empirical evidence shows that those countries where citizens are satisfied 
with how democracy works happen to be those that are acclaimed even by scholars to be 
democratic (Moreno, 2001; Norris, 2011b). Indeed, satisfaction with democracy is a 
characteristic of a well functioning democracy. In line with the assumption that 
democracy is working fine despite information deficit, I hypothesize that: 
 
H 2.4: Kenyans generally have a high level of satisfaction 
with Democracy  
 
          The prominent role that normative democratic theory assigns to citizens in the 
democratic process can only be played effectively by well informed citizens. Moreover, 
both the theoretical literature dating back to John Stuart Mill as well as some recent 
empirical evidence show that democracy best serves the interests of those who are well 
informed because they tend to engage in it more than those who are poorly informed 
(Lutz, 2006). I therefore hypothesize that: 
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H 2.5: Informed citizens are more likely than uninformed 
citizens to be satisfied with the way democracy works in Kenya. 
 
 
          Alternatively, the political cue theory suggests that even poorly informed citizens 
are somehow able to surmount their information deficit and effectively participate in the 
democratic process by taking cues from the political parties that they trust. If this is true, 
then I expect that uninformed partisans are more satisfied with how democracy works in 
Kenya than uninformed non-partisans: 
 
H 2.6: Uninformed partisans are more likely than uninformed non-
partisans to be satisfied with the way democracy works in Kenya. 
 
 
          Several studies have documented the glaring gap between the usually high levels of 
support and relatively low levels of satisfaction with democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 
2005; Bratton et al, 2005; Doorenspleet, 2010; Norris, 2011b). I argue that support for 
democracy shows the extent to which citizens embrace democratic values and principles, 
while satisfaction indicates how well these values and principles are put into practice. 
Hence, the level of support for democratic ideals also indicates that democracy is taking 
root against what Bratton et al (2005) call ‘Africa’s political legacy of autocracy’ (p.72). 
 
H 2.7: Kenyans generally have a high level of support for 
Democracy  
 
          Credible support for democratic values and principles requires one to be familiar 
with the values. I expect that those who already have a high level of knowledge in terms 
of political information also have a better grasp of democratic values, and hence are more 
likely to support democracy: 
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H 2.8: Informed citizens are more likely than uninformed 
citizens to support democracy  
 
 
          In the same way people derive heuristic cues from the political parties that they 
trust, they can also acquire democratic values and principles through engagements with 
their political parties, and hence learn to support democracy 
H 2.9: Partisans are more likely than non-partisans to 
support democracy   
 
          Pulling hypothesis H 2.8 and H 2.9 together we get the following hypothesis: 
 
H 2.10: Uninformed partisans are more likely than 
uninformed non-partisans to support democracy   
 
          Although political cue theory is premised on the assumption that partisanship is 
beneficial to uninformed citizens, it can also be counterproductive. In fact, one implicit 
assumption of political cue theory is that rather than citizens shaping the behavior of 
elected representatives, they typically ‘look to the very representatives whose decisions 
they are supposed to guide’ (Carmines and Kuklinski, 1990:248). It is therefore possible 
that if political cues serve the interest of cue-givers rather than citizens, cue reliance can 
lead uninformed partisans to make decisions and take actions that are inconsistent. 
H 2.11: The uninformed are more likely than the informed 
citizens to develop inconsistent attitudes towards democracy   
 
1.8.3 The Political Perceptions Hypothesis  
          The political cue theory resolves the democratic puzzle by suggesting that 
democracy works well even when there is a large political information deficit among 
citizens, because uninformed citizens are able to surmount information deficiency by 
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taking cues from the political parties they trust. The cues help to shape the political 
perceptions, which inform and guide their decisions and actions in the information-
intensive democratic process. 
H 3.1: Partisan cues have a greater influence on the 
perceptions of the uninformed than the informed people. 
 
H 3.2: The influence of partisan cues on the perceptions of 
the uninformed citizens varies with issue-area. 
 
H 3.3: The influence of partisan cues on the perceptions of 
the uninformed citizens varies with issue-timeline.   
 
 
1.9. Study Methodology 
1.9.1 Data Sources and Description  
          This study utilizes round three of the Afrobarometer survey dataset on Kenya, 
collected from September, 6
th
 to September 28
th
, 2005. The data was collected through 
face-to-face interviews conducted in the language best understood by each respondent. 
The survey used the Kenya national census at its sampling frame, with the universe 
comprising all male and female adults aged eighteen years or older. Since the voting age 
limit in Kenya is eighteen years, all the respondents are potentially voters. The Survey 
sample was selected through stratified multistage area probability sampling. The survey 
had 60% response rate and yielded a nationally representative sample of 1278 cases, with 
a margin of error of ± 3% within a 95% confidence level. Generally, Afrobarometer is a 
reputable dataset as exemplified by the fact that it won the 2004 data set award for the 
Comparative Politics section of the American Political Science Association.
3
  
                                                          
3
Detailed description of the third round of the Afrobarometer Survey Dataset for Kenya is 
found at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/  
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1.9.2 Variable Selection, Data Analysis and Model Diagnostics   
                    This study uses a variety of statistical analysis strategies, including Pearson 
product moment correlations, test of difference of proportions, robust regression, multiple 
logistic regressions, proportional ordered logistic regression, and graphics. Virtually all 
the data analysis in this dissertation has been done using the R project for statistical 
computing.
4
 I used a two-pronged approach to test collinearity among the independent 
variables, and to fit the regression models. Each model was first tested for collinearity by 
constructing Condition Index (CI) and associated Variance Decomposition Proportions 
(VDP) using the colldiag function in the perturb library of the R program. The CI enables 
us to detect collinearity, while VDP helps to identify the responsible variables. When CI 
is equal to or greater than 30 then almost certainly there is collinearity (Belsley, 1991). 
Alternatively, if CI exceeds 5, and there are two or more corresponding VDPs larger than 
0.5, then there is collinearity among the variables involved (Callaghan and Jie, 2008). 
Where collinearity was detected, the liable variables were substituted or omitted.  
           
                   In addition, I used Variance Tolerance (VT) and Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF). VT measures the amount of variability in a given independent variable that does 
not depend on other independent variables (Walker and Maddan, 2008). It tests the 
degree of independence of each independent variable, and ranges from 0 to 1, where the 
closer to 1, the more independent a variable is. Its suggested cut-off is 0.25 (Walker and 
Maddan, 2008). However, VIF, which is the reciprocal of VT, measures the amount by 
which the correlation between a given independent variable and other independent 
                                                          
4
 R Development Core Team. 2008. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical 
Computing. Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0, URL: http://www.R-project.org.  
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variables inflates the standard errors of a regression coefficient. The smaller the VIF, the 
better the variable fits in the model so that ‘A VIF of 4 or less indicates no problem with 
multicollinearity in the model. A VIF of 5 is acceptable, but anything greater should lead 
you to explore other collinearity diagnostics to assess the problems’ (ibid, p. 294).  
 
          As Walker and Maddan (2008: 294) observe: 
The Variance Inflation Factor is one of the most trusted 
measures of multicollinearity because it not only 
indicates if there is a problem, it also indicate which 
variables are problematic, how severe the problem is, 
and what happens if the standard error is high  
  
1.10 Explanation and measurement of Key Variables 
          This study revolves around three key variables – partisanship, political information, 
and political Perceptions. The discussion on political information is reserved for chapter 
two, where I develop an index for measuring political information. In addition to the 
three key variables, the study uses several other variables, whose measurement and 
indicators are shown in appendix 1. I devote this section to explain partisanship, political 
perceptions, satisfaction with democracy, and relative deprivation. 
1.10.1 Partisanship 
          There is considerable debate over the precise meaning and measurement of 
partisanship (Baker et al, 1981; Bartle, 2001; Jones, 2001; Blais et al, 2002; Best and 
Radcliff, 2005; Miller and Klobucar, 2005; Settle et al, 2009; Kroh and Selb, 2009). 
Partisanship has traditionally been defined in terms of the long-term “psychological 
attachment to a particular political party” (Best and Radcliff, 2005: 502), or what is often 
referred to as “card carrying party membership” (Baker et al, 1981). Even so, the flaws of 
this measure are well documented in the literature (Greene, 2002). In the first instance, 
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‘lifetime loyalties anchoring voters to parties have been eroding in many established 
democracies’ (Norris, 2011a:220). The situation is not any better in new and emerging 
democracies with the literature suggesting that ‘new electorates are also unlikely to hold 
long-term party attachments that might guide their behavior’ (Dalton, 2000: 925-6). 
          The conceptualization of partisanship as long-term attachment to political parties 
has origins in The American Voter. However, “while The American Voter measure of 
party identification works well in two party system like that of the United States, it is less 
readily applicable to a multiparty situation” (Miller and Klobucar, 2005: 245). This 
measure is particularly unsuitable for the present study since the party system in Kenya 
since 2002 has been both complex and volatile so that partisanship in the sense of long-
term attachment is virtually non-existent. In 2002, Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) lost elections for the first time since independence in 1963, and assumed an 
unfamiliar role of official opposition party. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), 
which won the elections, was itself a coalition of two opposition blocs –the National 
Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Since the law 
did not recognize coalitions, NARC was registered as a political party under which LDP 
and NAK sponsored candidates. Moreover, NAK was also a coalition of several political 
parties and civil society organizations (Asingo, 2003). This complex, highly volatile party 
system, characteristic of party systems in emerging democracies, is shown in appendix 2.  
          Thereafter, LDP and NAK had a falling-out and by 2005, LDP was a defacto 
opposition party, even campaigning against government policies, while still legally part 
of government. The final straw came in 2005, when LDP teamed up with the radical 
KANU MPs to defeat a government-backed constitutional referendum. President Kibaki, 
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who was from the NAK wing of the coalition, replaced the LDP ministers with 
conservative KANU MPs. This led to a situation where legally, NARC and KANU were 
the ruling and opposition parties respectively. In reality, the legislators from both parties 
were in government and in the opposition. In the circumstances, the line between the 
ruling party and the opposition is obscure and largely depends on who is drawing it.  
          Accordingly, there have been many efforts to refine the concept of partisanship 
(Bartle, 2001; Blais et al, 2002; Miller and Klobucar, 2005). Partisanship can also be 
conceptualized in terms of biased evaluative attitude towards a party (Greene, 2002). In 
this regard, partisanship has been defined as “an ordinal attitudinal variable referring to 
the intensity with which an individual prefers a victory for one party rather than another” 
(Powell, 1976:5). On their part, Baker et al (1981) developed the concept of attitudinal 
partisanship to refer to the “attitudinal attachment to political parties” (p. 194). Relatedly, 
Clarke et al (1996) distinguish between ‘durable partisans’ and ‘flexible partisans’, where 
the former refer to those who have weak, unstable and sometimes inconsistent partisan 
orientations, while the latter have strong, stable and consistent partisan leanings. 
          In a nutshell, Jacoby (2010:263) puts it even more succinctly: 
 
Party identification does not imply a formal organizational 
membership or even any degree of overt activity in support of a 
political party. Instead, it is simply an individual’s sense of 
personal attachment to the party label…party identification 
exists entirely as a psychological state, “in the heads” of citizens 
 
          This study uses measures of partisanship that capture voters’ own judgment on 
whether the party (or faction) they belong to, or relate to, is in government or opposition. 
In this regard, I take partisanship first as self-reported closeness, rather than attachment 
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to, or membership of a party. I refer to this as general partisanship and use it as an 
indicator of whether one view oneself as closer to any of the parties. I use dummy 
variable to measure it, with 0 = not close to any party and 1 = close to some party.  
          In addition, I treat partisanship as an evaluative attitude towards existing parties. I 
then distinguish between incumbent partisanship, and opposition partisanship. I measure 
the two forms of partisanship in terms of the levels of trust in the incumbent party and the 
opposition parties respectively. In doing so, I am guided by Russell Hardin’s argument 
that ‘to say we trust you means we believe you have the right intentions towards us and 
that you are competent to do what we trust you to do’ (Hardin, 2006:17). I am equally 
guided by the emerging view that any activity that demonstrates or implies preference of 
one political party over the others can be taken as indicator of partisanship. I treat both 
incumbent and opposition partisanships as ordered ordinal variables with values ranging 
from no trust (0) to a lot of trust (3) as shown in table 1.2 and appendix 2.  
 
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Partisanship Variables 
 
 General 
Partisanship 
 
Opposition 
Partisanship 
 
Incumbent 
Partisanship 
 
Non-Partisan  407 
 (33.6%) 
459  
(38.4%) 
257  
(21.0%) 
Weak Partisan - 395   
 (33.0%) 
361   
 (29.6%) 
Partisan 804    
(66.3%) 
234     
(19.6%) 
309   
(25.3%) 
Strong Partisan - 108    
(9.0%) 
293  
 (24.1%) 
Mean  0.66 0.99 1.52 
Median 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
Valid Observations  
 
 
1211 
 
 
1196 
 
 
1220 
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1.10.2 Political Perceptions 
          As a concept, political perception is variously referred to in the literature as 
opinion, beliefs, or attitude (Aalberg, 2003). However, the literature clearly distinguishes 
political perception from political information and political knowledge. While knowledge 
has to do with correspondence of opinion to reality, perception is an opinion that may not 
necessarily correspond to reality (Aalberg, 2003). More precisely, political perception has 
been defined as “the process by which people develop impressions of the characteristics 
and positions of political candidates, parties, and institutions” (Iyengar and McGuire, 
1993:70). In this study, I define political perception not just as the process of developing 
impressions, but as the impressions themselves. In addition, these impressions are not 
necessarily about views held by candidates or political parties on certain political issues. 
They can also be, and indeed, are about any politically relevant issue such as the extent of 
democracy, or the status of the national economy. Opinion about the latter qualifies as 
political perception because ‘economic conditions are at least as significant as political 
conditions, if not more so, in their influence on election outcomes’ (Medvic, 2010:291).  
          This study departs from previous studies which treats political perceptions as if 
they are shaped by the same set of factors, regardless of whether they are about politics or 
the economy, or whether they refer to the past, the present or the future. I advance and 
test the proposition that political perceptions vary along two critical dimensions: issue-
area and issue-timeline. The former refer to whether the focus is on the economy or 
politics, while the latter has to do with whether the focus is on the past, present or future.  
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          Therefore, the study tests whether the influence of partisanship on perceptions vary 
with issue-area and issue-timeline. This way, the study contributes to the quest to resolve 
the democratic puzzle by shifting the study arena from its usual base in Western Europe 
and North America to Kenya, and by attempting to develop a broad taxonomy of 
perceptions based on issue-area and issue-timeline, as shown in table 1.3. 
Table 1.3 Types of Political Perceptions 
Issue-Area Issue-Timeline  
Past Present Future  
Economic Issues Retrospective 
Economic Perceptions   
Present Economic 
Perceptions 
Prospective Economic 
Perceptions  
Political Issues Retrospective Political 
Perceptions   
Present Political 
Perceptions   
Prospective Political 
Perceptions   
 
 
          This taxonomy of political perceptions draws from the recent political psychology 
literature. For instance, it has been noted that ‘people draw their opinion from the set of 
available beliefs stored in memory’ (Chong and Druckman, 2007:111). Scholars define 
memory as “store of information”, and distinguish between retrospective memory, which 
stores the past, and prospective memory, which stores projections into the future (Styles, 
2005). These clues yield the idea that the process of forming perceptions involves tapping 
from different memories. Moreover, some scholars emphasize the need to recognize that 
there is heterogeneity in the way people make political decisions (Sniderman et al, 1991). 
These taxonomies help to provide explanations that accommodate heterogeneity. 
          Thus, in line with political cue theory, political perceptions about current issues are 
likely to be relatively easy to predict, depending on current party alignments, and the fact 
that the masses have the propensity for ‘group-serving attribution biases (Rudolph, 2003). 
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Quite the reverse, retrospection and prospection are likely to be relatively more complex, 
since party alignments may change (in the case of retrospection) or too uncertain (in the 
case of prospection). As past studies show, the masses are incapable of accurately 
recollecting basic politically relevant facts (Luppia and McCubbins, 1998; Pasek and 
Krosnick, 2010). This is partly because ‘people tend to assume that they always believed 
what they believe today’ (Pasek and Krosnick, 2010: 41). 
          The taxonomy depicted in table 1.3 also make it possible to test whether or not the 
factors that shape perceptions about the economy and politics are the same, and whether 
or not the perceptions about the past, present and future are defined by the same set of 
factors. In addition, the study seeks to establish whether cue-taking from political parties 
is the preserve of the uninformed people, or whether all people take cues from political 
parties regardless of their levels of political information. Table 1.4 and 1.5 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the six political perception variables.  
 
Table 1.4 Descriptive Statistics for Perception of Democracy 
 
Perception of 
Democracy 
 
 
Retrospective 
Political 
Perceptions 
 
Present 
Political 
Perceptions 
 
Prospective 
Political 
Perceptions 
 
Very Undemocratic 493  
(41.6%) 
32  
(3.1%) 
51  
(5.2%) 
Fairly Undemocratic 503  
(42.5%) 
370  
(35.4%) 
177  
(18.0%) 
Fairly Democratic 143  
(12.1%) 
512  
(49.0%) 
515  
(52.4%) 
Very Democratic 45  
(3.8%) 
131  
(12.5%) 
239  
(24.4%) 
Mean  1.8 2.7 3.0 
Median 2.0 3.0 3.0 
Valid Observations  
 
1184 
 
1045 
 
982 
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Table 1.5 Descriptive Statistics for Economic Perceptions 
 
Perceptions of 
the Economy   
 
 
Retrospective 
Economic 
Perceptions
 
Present  
Economic 
Perceptions 
 
Prospective 
Economic 
Perceptions 
 
Very Bad 131  
(10.5%) 
302  
(24.2%) 
99  
(9.2%) 
Fairly Bad 416  
(33.2%) 
384  
(30.7%) 
221  
(20.5%) 
Not Good or Bad 315  
(25.2%) 
205  
(16.4%) 
205  
(19.1%) 
Fairly Good 352  
(28.1%) 
326  
(26.1%) 
465  
(43.2%) 
Very Good 38  
(3.0%) 
33  
(2.6%) 
86  
(8.0%) 
Mean  2.8 2.5 3.2 
Median 3.0 2.0 4.0 
Observations  
 
1252 
 
1250 
 
1076 
 
 
 
1.10.3 Satisfaction with Democracy  
          In this study, I treat satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of how well 
democracy functions in Kenya from the citizens’ perspective. There is a debate on what 
satisfaction with democracy actually measures (Canache et al, 2001). Some scholars view 
it as an indicator of support for the incumbent regime based on her performance (Bratton 
et al, 2005). In fact, Bratton and colleagues (p.  81) observe: 
 
We draw a sharp distinction between support for democracy 
and satisfaction with democracy. The former refers to an 
abstract normative preference, absent constraints, of one’s 
political system. The latter refers to an empirical assessment 
of the concrete performance of an actual elected regime. 
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          Some scholars treat satisfaction with democracy as a measure of contentment with 
a country’s system of government irrespective of who is the incumbent (Klingermann, 
1999). Others view it as a measure of an individual’s evaluation of the general political 
milieu, including political institutions and processes, and incumbent regime structure and 
performance (Canache et al, 2001). This debate tends to revolve around the meaning of 
democracy rather than satisfaction with it. Yet, ‘democracy is a concept with multiple 
meanings that is the product of more than 2500 years of history’ (Carrion, 2008:27).   
 
          There are several reasons that justify the use of satisfaction with democracy as an 
indicator that democracy is functioning well. First, empirical evidence from recent cross-
national studies demonstrate that ‘people are indeed, happier with how democracy works 
in states characterized by good quality of governance, where regimes respect the rule of 
law, prove  effective in managing the delivery of public goods and services, and are open 
and transparent on the policymaking process’ (Norris, 2011b:126). That is, people tend to 
be satisfied with democracy where it actually works and produces satisfactory outputs.  
 
          Secondly, it has been observed that ‘popular satisfaction with the way democracy 
works is an essential characteristic of a well-functioning democracy as satisfaction 
supports the link between citizens and the representative institutions’ (Guldbrandtsen and 
Skaaning, 2010:164). This link is essential, since it promotes the stability of democratic 
regimes. Yet it is additionally true that ‘observable characteristics associated with a given 
concept are often termed indicators of the concept or its empirical references’ (Waltz et al, 
2010:28). To the extent that satisfaction with democracy is a characteristic of a well 
functioning democracy, using it to estimate how well democracy is functioning is fair and 
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reasonable. Third, if citizens who know the meaning of democracy are satisfied with how 
it works, it can be concluded that in their assessment, democracy is working well. 
 
 
Table 1.6 Descriptive Statistics for Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
Satisfaction Levels
 
Respondents 
 
Not  Satisfied 107      
(8.5%) 
Not very   Satisfied 294 
  (23.4%) 
Fairly Satisfied 528 
  (42.1%) 
Very Satisfied 124 
   (9.9%) 
Don’t Know 202 
    (16.1%) 
Total Valid Observations 
 
1255 
 
 
1.10.4 Relative Deprivation 
          Relative deprivation has been defined in terms of ‘wanting what one does not have, 
and feeling that one deserves whatever it is one wants but does not have’ (Walker and 
Smith, 2002:2). It is ‘a psychological condition that obtains when individuals feel that 
those “goods and conditions of life to which they are rightfully entitled” fall short of 
those they are actually capable of achieving, given the social means available to them’ 
(Gurr, 1970:13). Runciman (1966:10) formally specified this definition as follows:  
 
A is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not 
have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, 
which may include himself at some previous or 
expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or 
will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he 
sees it as feasible that he should have X  
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          Evidently, relative deprivation can be variously defined in terms of egoistic relative 
deprivation, where one compares his or her present living condition: (1) with that of other 
people; (2) with his or her previous “better” condition; or (3) with an abstract, imaginable 
or desirable condition which may even be unattainable (Folger et al, 1983; Walker and 
Smith, 2002). In this study, I restrict the term to feelings of deprivation relative to one’s 
past living conditions. Indeed, scholars have long recognized that relative deprivation is 
mainly an intra-personal cognitive process, which does not depend on comparisons of 
individual life situations with that of others (Folger et al, 1983).  
 
          In addition, I argue that simply observing other individuals and noticing that their 
living condition is better than our condition, does not necessarily instill in us a sense of 
deprivation. After all, we may not even understand other people’s living conditions 
properly. Hence, it is our own past living conditions, rather than the conditions of others, 
which provides a more useful reference point when defining our sense of deprivation.  
 
 
Table 1.7 Descriptive Statistics for Relative deprivation  
 
Deprivation Levels 
 
Respondents
 
Not at all Deprived 31      
(2.5%) 
Not very Deprived 349 
  (27.6%) 
Same 414 
  (32.7%) 
Deprived 344 
   (27.2%) 
Very Deprived 121 
    (9.6%) 
Don’t Know 5 
(0.4%) 
Total Valid Observations 
 
1264 
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1.11 Dissertation Chapter Outline 
          The prime objective of this dissertation is to investigate how information-deficient 
citizens surmount this deficiency so as to engage effectively in the information-intensive 
democratic process. This task is undertaken in five chapters. This first chapter has mainly 
provided an outline of the research design. I began by situating the research problem 
within the context of the democratic puzzle, presented a rationale for the study, and an 
overview of key theoretical and empirical literature, the hypotheses, and methodology. 
          In chapter two, I develop a new political information index and use it to evaluate 
political information levels among Kenyans, and to establish whether the information 
levels vary in a systematic way, and the factors that account for the variation. This is 
important in order to avoid undergirding the study on the largely untested assumption that 
Kenyans, like citizens of advanced democracies, lack pertinent political information.  
          In chapter three, I examine whether (not how or why) democracy functions well in 
Kenyan despite the lack of a critical mass of informed democratic citizens. In so doing, I 
use the knowledge, satisfaction, and support levels for democracy as proxy indicators of 
how well democracy works in Kenya. Chapter four examines how uninformed Kenyans 
form political perceptions that guide their actions and decisions in the democratic process. 
It is in this chapter that I test the main hypothesis of political cue theory, namely: citizens 
use party identity as cues to overcome information deficit and form political perceptions. 
Chapter five presents a summary of the key study results and implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
QUANTIFYING POLITICAL INFORMATION                                  
LEVELS AMONG KENYANS 
2.1 Introduction  
          One of the key assumptions underpinning this study is that citizens generally lack 
pertinent political information, and yet political information is vital for democracy to 
function well. Indeed, the major concern of this study is how information-deficient 
citizens successfully navigate the information-intensive democratic process. Surprisingly, 
although ‘political knowledge has attained the status of a cornerstone construct in 
research on political behavior’ (Mondak, 2001), there is virtually no agreement on how to 
measure political information or even what it means (Jacoby, 2010).   
          As Jones and McDermott (2009:39) succinctly observe: 
There has been a long-running debate in the field of political 
information about how exactly to measure political 
knowledge…Most researchers tend to forge their own way in 
this regard, choosing their own particular set of questions and 
indices to measure political knowledge... While they may do so 
in ways that are logical, the end result remains that their studies 
are not comparable to others, and they can therefore only draw 
conclusions that are particular to their own technique  
 
          The idea that citizens generally lack pertinent political information is based on 
findings of studies done largely in advanced democracies. There is virtually no evidence 
of systematic efforts to quantify political information in Africa in general and Kenya in 
particular. Consequently, information deficiency among citizens must be treated not as a 
universal fact, but as a feature of advanced democracies that need to be retested in the 
61 
 
new and emerging democracies like Kenya. This study therefore seeks to fill the void by 
providing a comprehensive evaluation of political information levels in Kenya.  
          Against this background, the present chapter addresses three key issues. First, I 
develop a new political information index. This is very important in light of the warning 
sounded to political information scholars several decades ago that, ‘we shall not get very 
far without decent measurement’ (Luski, 1987: 857). This chapter provides great details 
on the subject of political information, not only because its conceptualization is a major 
contribution of this study, but also because its understanding is key to understanding the 
subsequent chapters and the entire dissertation. I begin with an attempt to delimit the 
concept of political information, and a critical examination of traditional measures of 
political information, especially the Carpini and Keteer index, which is most widely used 
in the literature. In the process, I highlight some weaknesses of this measure, and identify 
its strengths which I incorporate into the new index of political information.  
          Secondly, I use the new index to assess the political information levels among 
Kenyans, and to establish whether information levels vary in a systematic way. In this 
regard, I test three political information models built on the political cue theory, while 
controlling for known correlates of political information such as education, media, gender, 
and political discussions. These tests seek to establish whether partisans are better 
informed than non-partisans, and hence whether partisanship is information-enhancing. 
      Finally, I treat ‘incorrect guesses’ and ‘don’t know’ responses to survey questions not 
as shades of political knowledge (as suggested by Mondak, 2001), but as manifestations 
of individual’s underlying predilection to reveal or hide their political information deficit. 
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I limit the concept of political information to factually accurate responses to questions 
testing grasp of political issues. I then try to identify factors that account for individual’s 
predisposition to hide or reveal information deficit. In the process, I test whether there is 
a correlation between the predisposition to guess and political information levels, and 
hence whether guesswork considerably infiltrates the political information scores. The 
results are expected to serve as a basis for further research on how to estimate and 
eliminate guesswork from inflated political information scores. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion and a summary of its key findings.     
2.2 Traditional Measures of Political Information 
2.2.1 What is Political information? 
          The terms political information and political knowledge are used interchangeably
5
 
in the literature to refer to the extent to which an individual is either knowledgeable or 
unknowledgeable about pertinent political issues (Althus, 2003). According to Carpini 
and Keteer (1996), political knowledge is ‘the range of factual information about politics 
that is stored in the long-term memory’ (p. 10). This definition underscores the fact that 
political information has to do with facts (Zaller, 1992; Mondak, 2001) as opposed to 
opinion. Indeed, Carpini and Keteer (1993) notes that ‘a common conclusion in an 
increasing number of studies is that factual knowledge is the best single indicator of 
sophistication’ (p. 1180). Political knowledge resides in “the realm of verifiable correct 
information” (Carpini and Keteer, 1996:10-11). Thus, ‘to be informed requires, first, that 
people have factual beliefs and, second, that the beliefs be accurate. If people do not hold 
factual beliefs at all, they are merely uninformed’ (Kuklinski et al, 2000:793).  
                                                          
5
Converse (2000) identifies several other terminologies used to refer to virtually the 
same phenomenon – political awareness, political expertise and political sophistication. 
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          The rationale for insisting in factual questions for measuring political knowledge is 
that such questions, ‘capture what has actually gotten into people’s minds, which, in turn, 
is critical for intellectual engagement of politics (Zaller, 1992:21). Factual questions tend 
to reduce the researcher’s “judgmental calls” since they have consensual answers (Kahn 
and Kennedy, 1999). Also, ‘[factual] questions assessing an individual’s level of political 
knowledge are relatively immune to self-report biases such as social desirability response 
sets or differences in “standards of self-description”’ (Kahn and Kennedy, 1999:180).  
          It is noteworthy that ‘political knowledge is not about education attained but rather 
what citizens know about politics specifically and how they use that as part of their 
political sophistication as citizens and voters’ (Reilly, 2010:136). It is important to stress 
this point because as Carpini and Keteer (1996) notes, several studies rely on the levels of 
educational attainment as an indicator of political information levels. Besides, the term 
political information as used in this dissertation transcends the standard political science 
definition of “what is political”, and among others, ‘includes economic and social events 
that have political significance” (Remington, 1988: 49). For example, to the extent that 
information relating to popular culture often influence authoritative allocation of scarce 
resources, such information constitutes political information (Carpini and Keteer, 1996). 
          The new index of political information which I develop in this chapter differs from 
the traditional measures, particularly the one proposed by Carpini and Keteer (1996) in 
two major ways. The first one which I label Political Information Questions refers to the 
type and format of questions for measuring political information. The second one which I 
call Political Information Computation refers to the computation of information scores.  
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2.2.2 Political Information Questions 
          The literature identifies four crucial areas of concern when deciding the type and 
format of questions used to measure political information. These include, ‘the number of 
information items needed to form an acceptable scale; the use of open-ended vs. closed-
ended formats; the number of response options to use on closed-ended measures; and the 
treatment of possible “don’t know” responses’ (Mondak, 2006:3). 
          In addition, as Carpini and Keteer (2005:41) have correctly observed: 
The most appropriate way to measure political knowledge 
remains a matter of some controversy, centering on issues such 
as the dimensionality of knowledge, the use of open-versus 
closed-question formats, question ordering and placement, the 
number of response options, and the encouragement or 
discouragement of  “don’t know” responses. 
 
 
(a) Number Of Questions 
          There is a near consensus that a long battery of questions is not necessarily useful 
in measuring political information (Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Mondak, 2001). The study 
by Carpini and Keteer concluded that a few carefully selected questions can still yield a 
good measure of political information. As they observe, ‘a short scale covering a modest 
range of topics can constitute a reliable measure of general political knowledge’ (p. 301).  
          Three rationales can be cited to support the view that few carefully selected 
questions are sufficient for measuring political information. First, it is argued that since 
the survey instruments need to be concise, there is a limit to the number of questions that 
can be asked in a survey instrument (Mondak, 2001). Secondly, there is the fear that 
flooding a survey instrument with many questions that test political knowledge can create 
a sense of “being quizzed”, which can render respondents less cooperative. Some studies 
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show that respondents tend to ignore questions that seek to test their knowledge levels 
(Aalberg, 2003). In particular, ‘many people do not enjoy participating in a survey that 
tests their general knowledge and intelligence’ (Aalberg, 2003:96). Yet, other studies 
using large battery of questions, have found no decline in respondents’ co-operation that 
can be blamed on feelings of “being quizzed” (Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Mondak, 2001). 
Given these mixed results, it is safer to have few questions than risk low response rates. 
          Third, it has been noted that most citizens tend to be generalists rather than 
specialists so that ‘[those] individuals knowledgeable about one aspect of politics were 
apt to be knowledgeable about others’ (Carpini and Keteer, 1993: 1185).  
          As Althaus (2003:284) puts it more succinctly: 
An emerging consensus suggests that since most citizens 
tend to be generalists when it comes to political knowledge, 
knowledge of specific issues can be predicted with some 
accuracy from a person’s score on a test of general 
knowledge consisting of only a few questions. 
 
          The idea that most citizens tend to be generalists is supported by a detailed item 
analysis by Carpini and Keteer (1996) which found that no specific topics were harder or 
easier to measure than others. Hence, ‘measures of national political knowledge in one 
domain can provide reasonably good – though not ideal – measures of overall knowledge 
about national politics’ (Carpini and Keteer, 1993: 1185). This does not mean that a 
person can be evenly well informed on all issues. Neither does it imply that knowledge of 
one issue is a sufficient measure of information. In fact, “no matter how great a citizen’s 
overall knowledge of politics, there will always be some issues that political junkies 
know well and others that they know nothing about” (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002:36).  
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          Nonetheless, as Carpini (2009:25) observes: 
Despite some evidence of specialization, knowledge about 
different areas of national politics appears to be highly 
intercorrelated. Citizens who are more informed about one 
area of politics (e.g., foreign affairs) are generally more 
likely to be informed about other areas of politics 
 
          Based on the few-questions approach, Carpini and Keteer selected five from a pool 
of several questions, which they prescribe as ideal for making information index (p. 306):  
‘[First,] do you happen to know what job or political office is 
now held by (insert current vice-president)? [Secondly,] 
whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional 
or not…is it the president, the Congress or the Supreme Court? 
[Thirdly,] how much of a majority is required for the US 
Senate and House to override a presidential veto? [Fourth,] 
do you happen to know which party had the most members in 
the House of Representatives in Washington before the 
election this/last month? [Fifth] would you say that one of the 
parties is more conservative than the other at the national 
level? Which party is more conservative?’ 
 
          However, Carpini and Keteer seem to have since veered off this initial position in 
their more recent work. For instance, in their 2005 study, they developed a political 
information index with a total of 51 political knowledge questions. In the same study, 
they also constructed another information index comprising 16 items from the National 
Election Studies Survey (Carpini and Keteer, 2005).  
(b) Closed-Ended vs. Open-Ended Questions  
          It is clear that apart from Carpini and Keteer’s second question, which is closed-
ended, their other four questions are open-ended, consistent with the popular view in the 
literature (Hagen, 1995; Krosnick et al, 2010). Carpini and Keteer (1996) found that 
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neither open nor closed-ended questions perform better than the other. Their study found 
that ‘open and closed-ended [question] formats were represented among the best and the 
worst performers [in equal measure]’ (p. 300). Nonetheless, other studies have found that 
‘the readiness with which a political issue comes to mind when talking about politics 
naturally is best assessed with survey questions that are “open-ended”, asking 
respondents to speak for themselves’ (Hagen, 1995:52). On the contrary, ‘closed-ended 
questions cannot be used to assess proportions of people who do or do not know a 
particular fact sufficiently well to receive credit for it’ (Krosnick et al, 2010:1291). This 
is because they provide incentive for blind guessing, which, as already noted, potentially 
inflate political information scores. For instance, Lau (1986), argues that multiple choice 
questions cannot be used to distinguish those who are informed from those who are not, 
since ‘it is too easy for anyone to pick a number between one and seven irrespective of 
schema content’ (p. 99). A more general defect of closed-ended questions is the response 
order effect – the tendency for uninformed respondents to pick the first option (primacy 
effect) or the last option (recency effect) (Pasek and Krosnick, 2010; Brennan, 2011). 
          Moreover, it has been argued that closed-ended questions guide people’s thought 
process in very limited number of directions, unlike the open-ended questions which 
‘encourage respondents to think about issues from multiple perspectives, which may then 
trigger appropriate memories’ (Graber, 2001:51). For example, suppose one is presented 
with a closed-ended version of the Carpini and Keteer’s first ‘ideal question’: do you 
happen to know what job or political office is now held by Joe Biden... is he the  vice-
president, a Supreme Court judge, or the Secretary of State? This question force one to 
think in terms of a very restricted range of Biden’s responsibilities, mainly as a member 
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of the executive arm of government. However, without the options, one’s search area 
increases to include even the legislature. Such an expanded horizon would be an asset if 
for instance, one only know Joe Biden as the president of the US Senate rather than the 
vice-president, which would still be accurate, even if not a complete depiction of his job.  
          The other deficiency of the set of questions proposed by Carpini and Keteer is that 
they all revolve around the relatively more stable political institutions and processes, 
focusing on constitutionality; the executive; the political parties; the legislature and the 
legislative process. As a result, the questions are not sufficiently broad to capture the 
whole range of knowledge items that democratic citizens should have. This significantly 
limits the content validity
6
 of their indices. More specifically, the questions do not tap 
knowledge of the information on outputs of the political process such as public policies. 
Yet, from the democratic citizens’ perspective, it is expected that political behavior is 
influenced more by perceptions about the relatively dynamic public policy issues rather 
than the more stable political institutions and processes. Information relating to parties’ 
and candidates’ policy positions for example is of immediate political relevance to a 
voter than knowledge of the constitutional provisions for a legislative veto.  
          Finally, the questions are tailored for the American political context, and may not 
be wholly applicable in other settings. For instance, African political parties are rarely 
based on any clear ideological platforms and hence it makes little analytical sense to ask 
which party is more or less conservative. I argue that rather than specifying the questions 
to be used in creating information index, there is need to identify and classify the relevant 
                                                          
6
 Content validity refers to the extent to which an index fully encapsulates the range of 
issues envisaged by the concept it purports to represent. 
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questions into a broad taxonomy, and ensuring that questions from each category are 
reflected in the political information index. Although there is no consensus on the sort of 
knowledge requisite for effective democratic citizenship (Carpini and Keteer, 1996; 
Krosnick, 1998; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2001), it is possible to create broad taxonomies 
that incorporate a broad range of issues. For instance, using David Easton’s input-output 
model as a framework for organizing our questions, we can classify questions into those 
that relate to the inputs, the political system, the outputs, and the environment.    
          Ironically, it is Carpini and Keteer (1996) who have made perhaps the most vital 
contribution on this front. They classify political information needed by a democratic 
citizen into three. First, the Rules of the game include political institutions and processes. 
Second, the substances of politics include salient local and international topical issues, 
social and economic conditions as well as public policies. Third, People and parties 
include key actors in the political sphere as well as political parties and party systems. 
          This classification is however, problematic in at least two ways. First the three 
categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance, political parties are by definition, part 
of the rules of the game. Secondly, questions relating to familiar issues are not very 
suitable for testing the effects of heuristic cues on opinion (Mondak, 1993). The names of 
public officers such as the vice president for example, may be too obvious for many 
people to warrant any external cues. On the flip side, some public figures are only known 
by nicknames. Moreover, even if we admit that questions on personalities are important, 
there is still a debate as to whether people best identify others by their photographs or by 
names (Krosnick et al, 2010). Besides, mere knowledge of the name or the position held 
by any public officer is less informative compared to (or if we cannot match it with) the 
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tasks vested in his/her office. Essentially, the People and parties category can easily be 
eliminated without much harm if political parties are treated (as they ought to) as rules of 
the game, and people’s names are omitted from questions testing political information. 
(c) Handling Don’t Know Responses  
          When it comes to don’t know responses, the main contention has been whether or 
not to encourage them in questions that seek to test political information. Carpini and 
Keteer (1996) argue that questions that test political information should be worded in a 
way that allow, if not encourage, don’t know responses for those who are unsure of the 
correct answers. More specifically, they recommend that the following hints should 
accompany such survey questions: ‘many people don’t know the answers to these 
questions, so if there are some you don’t know just tell me and we’ll go on’ (p. 305). 
          Yet, other scholars reject this view, arguing that don’t know responses should be 
discouraged as much as possible. Instead, respondents should be encouraged to give ‘best 
guesses’ when they are unsure of answers. Mondak (2001) suggest that Carpini and 
Keteer’s hints should be reworded to read: ‘many people don’t know the answers to these 
questions, but even if you are not sure I‘d like you to tell me your best guess’ (p. 226).  
          Mondak’s views have been supported by Pasek and Krosnick (2010:37) who note: 
Discouraging “Don’t Know” responses collects more valid 
data than does encouraging such responses. And 
respondents who truly are completely unfamiliar with the 
topic of a question will say so when probed, and that 
answer can be accepted at that time, thus avoiding 
collecting measurements of non-existent “opinions” 
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          I argue that neither of the two approaches is flawless. If respondents are actively 
encouraged to give don’t know responses, they may not think hard enough to be able to 
retrieve information from the long-term memory. Hence, their responses may be based 
solely on the information stored in the short-term memory, or information at their finger 
tips. That is, they are likely to use don’t know responses even for questions which they 
may be able to answer accurately with a little more reflection. The result is that such 
respondents are likely to have deflated political information scores. However, if the 
respondents are encouraged to substitute ‘blind guesses’ for don’t know responses, some 
guesses may turn out to be correct answers (especially for multiple choice questions), and 
this artificially inflates information scores. Indeed, in his later work, Mondak recognizes 
this double-edged nature of his proposal as noted in Mondak and Canache (2004:548): 
Where DKs are prevalent, uninformed respondents who 
guess will receive inflated knowledge scores while partially 
informed respondents who are reluctant to guess will take 
refuge in the DK causing real knowledge to go undetected  
 
          The futility of encouraging or discouraging the respondents to give “don’t know” 
responses is further exposed by the contradictory results of studies using either approach. 
In this regard, some studies show that when respondents who gave don’t know response 
initially are asked to make “best guess”, they tend to get it right. This shows that guessed 
responses can conflate what respondents know with what they do not know (Pasek and 
Krosnick, 2010), thus artificially inflating information scores. In contrast, other studies 
including a recent experimental study found that ‘when people who initially select a DK 
alternative are subsequently asked to provide a “best guess”, they fare statistically no 
better than chance’ (Sturgis et al, 2008: 90). This latter finding suggests that encouraging 
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DK response adds no value. In addition, it has also been found that don’t know responses 
can be prevalent even without any conscious efforts to encourage them.  
 
          The debate on the precise meaning and utility of don’t know responses simply skirt 
around what seems to be the main issue, which in my view, is whether the survey method 
is a reliable means of obtaining objective and reliable data. Why for instance, should one 
accept a respondent’s response about age, educational attainment, religion, income, state 
of the economy or democracy without a grain of doubt, yet doubt the same respondent 
when he or she offers a don’t know response to a particular question?  Does it mean that 
respondents are infallible so that they know answers to all questions? Given the high cost 
of information and human cognitive limits, it is reasonable to expect that even the most 
informed people may not know answers to all questions. Hence, when respondents say 
they don’t know, we need to give room to the possibility that they actually don’t know.  
          I advance the argument that “don’t know” responses should neither be encouraged 
nor discouraged. Instead, respondents should be free to answer survey questions without 
any shade of influence. As will be explained later, don’t know responses do not constitute 
political information, and therefore, actively encouraging or discouraging respondents to 
make “best guess” cannot improve political information scores. In fact, if the goal is to 
insulate political information scores from extraneous factors, then that goal miserably 
fails since it is nearly impossible to do so. This is partly because the line between blind 
guesses and outright dishonest survey responses is never too clear. Even if blind guesses 
are controlled, there is no watertight remedy for dishonest responses, and thus extraneous 
factors will still filter into political information measures. For now therefore, we have to 
live with the fact that we can only offer the best estimates of political information levels.  
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          The other critical debate in the literature is whether don’t Know and incorrect 
answers mean the same thing and whether they can be lumped together when computing 
the political information index. It has been pointed out that ‘knowledge scales typically 
define “knowledge” as the sum of a respondent’s correct answers on a battery of items, 
meaning that incorrect answers and DKs are collapsed into one category’ (Mondak, 
1999:58-9). According to Mondak, incorrect answers can only be lumped together with 
don’t Know responses, if knowledge is discrete so that you either know something or you 
don’t. However, he argues that knowledge is not discrete since there are some shades of 
grey in between knowing and not knowing. Besides, don’t know and incorrect answers 
do not mean the same thing since they produce different results when regressed against a 
set of demographic variables. As a result, incorrect responses should not be lumped 
together with don’t know responses when computing the political information index.  
          Mondak’s arguments are flawed in many ways. First, the rules of logical inference 
do not allow us to jump from the premise that correct answers constitute knowledge, to 
the conclusion that all other things that are not correct answers (in this case incorrect 
answers and DKs) mean the same thing. To do so, as Mondak does, is to commit what, in 
the science of logical inference, is known as fallacy non-sequitur – lack of a clear nexus 
between the underlying premises and the conclusion reached. Don’t know responses and 
incorrect guesses are usually lumped together in the calculation of political information 
index not because they mean the same thing, but because they have some “undesirable” 
common trait in that they do not constitute correct responses, and ipso facto have to be 
isolated from correct responses, which is the proper domain of political information. 
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         Second, political information is about factually accurate responses, and hence any 
response that is not factually accurate falls outside the sphere of political information. A 
good political information index should strive to consolidate the factually accurate 
responses, while isolating them from any other responses that are not factually accurate. 
This should not necessarily be misconstrued to imply that all the other responses that are 
not entirely factually accurate mean the same thing, or that they should relate in the same 
way with a set of demographic variables as Mondak argues. Indeed, even if we admit his 
idea that knowledge is not discrete for argument’s sake, we must still draw a line between 
what comprise knowledge and what does not, and this is where he misses the point.  
          Third, some scholars have also attempted to distinguish between the misinformed 
and the uninformed citizens (Kuklinski and Jerit, 2000; Mondak, 1999). For instance, 
Mondak (1999:59) highlights this distinction as follows: 
To be misinformed implies that exposure to information 
occurred and that the processing and storage of the 
information were somehow flawed. To be uninformed, in 
contrast, implies that no information was received and stored  
 
          To explore this distinction, let us consider Carpini and Keteer’s first ‘ideal 
question’: Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Joe Biden? 
Suppose one respondent says: “I don’t know Biden”, and another one say: “Biden is the 
Secretary of State”. According to Carpini and Keteer (1996) and Mondak (1999), the first 
respondent is uninformed and therefore does not know Biden, while the second one is 
misinformed but somehow knows him partially since he can give at least an inaccurate 
response. This distinction is hardly convincing, borders on splitting hairs, and is founded 
on largely untested conjectures. The reality is that both respondents do not know Biden, 
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going by their responses. The difference between them is that one is honest enough to 
admit information deficit, while the other one is either unwilling to admit information 
deficit or do not know how information deficient he or she is. Either way, the bottom-line 
is that anyone who lacks political information on anything is uninformed about that thing. 
          Furthermore, it is notable that Mondak (1999) distinguishes the misinformed from 
the uninformed on the basis of whether they are exposed to information and whether they 
perfectly processed and properly stored the information. But, what if the information that 
one is exposed to is inaccurate in the first place? Does flawless processing and storage of 
flawed information make a respondent informed or misinformed? The underlying point 
here is that I do not find the distinction between being misinformed and uninformed to be 
analytically useful, at least for this study as already pointed out. 
 (d) Number of Response Categories in Closed-Ended Measures 
          Advocates of closed-ended questions suggest that although the actual number of 
response categories
7
 for questions that test political information varies with question text 
and context, the optimum number should be three (Mondak, 2001). Nevertheless, one can 
also argue that the fewer the response options the higher the mathematical probability of 
making correct guesses, which would otherwise erroneously pass out as knowledge. As I 
have already indicated in the preceding discussions, there is little value in discussing this 
matter in great depth except to re-state that closed-ended questions are not useful in 
determining the levels of political information for reasons already explained. 
 
                                                          
7
 Response categories refer to the ‘categories offered for respondents to select among or 
to interviewers for recording answers’ (Schaeffer and Dykema, 2011; 928). 
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2.2.3 Political Information Computation 
          The starting point in discussing the traditional measures of political information is 
Carpini and Keteer’s index which is ‘probably the most thoroughly tested and widely 
used political knowledge index in current use’ (Michaud et al, 2009:34). It is a simple 
additive political information index which measure political information levels in terms 
of the proportion of correctly answered factual questions about politics. 
          The weaknesses of this and the other measures of political information are well 
documented in the literature (Popkin, 1991; Mondak, 1993; Carpini and Keteer, 1996; 
Krosnick, 1998; Sanders, 1999; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000; Prior and Lupia, 2008). In 
fact, Carpini and Keteer recognize the limit of their index, and note that ‘the percentage 
who answered correctly is, of course, not necessarily the same as the percentage who 
knew the answer’ (Carpini and Keteer, 1996: 65). Correct answers especially for multiple 
choice questions are not accurate measures of political information because the answer 
may also include (reflect) blind guesses. Being politically informed means much more 
than just knowing some correct answers to a set of civic questions. The number of correct 
answers must significantly exceed the incorrect ones. As Madison notably remarked, 
‘knowledge must forever govern ignorance’ and thus to be politically knowledgeable 
requires that the balance between what we know and what we do not know is in favor of 
the former. This study develops a political information index based on this principle.  
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2.3 The New Political Information Index 
          Several conclusions drawn from the above discussion will guide the development 
of the new index. In the first place, since the problems associated with blind guessing and 
outright respondent dishonesty cannot be completely eliminated, it is virtually impossible 
to accurately measure political information. As a result, the new index provides the best 
estimate rather than the precise measure of political information. In fact, this study treats 
political information as an estimate of how knowledgeable, or how much an individual is 
informed or uninformed about politically relevant issues. Relatedly, as already explained, 
a good measure of political information should not be based solely on correct answers to 
relevant civic questions. It must also take into account the incorrect answers.  
          In developing the political information index, I begin from the assumption that 
everybody knows at least something about politics, and thus “it is hard to find people 
whose political knowledge is literally non-existent” (Caplan, 2007: 95). Indeed, ‘heuristic 
models [which guide this study] are based on low information rationality, not no 
information rationality’ (Carpini, 2009:29). It is also critically important to note that the 
main reason for developing a political information index is to help determine whether and 
how the political behavior of informed citizens differ from that of uninformed citizens. 
Hence, a crucial stage in the construction of the index is to define a standardized cut-off 
point that separate the informed from uninformed citizens. Those whose information 
levels lie at this cut-point are neither informed nor uninformed, but instead are referred to 
as average citizens. In this regard, I define an average citizen as one who knows as much 
as he or she does not know. Given a set of factual questions that test political knowledge, 
it is expected that an average person would get half correct, while the other half would be 
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incorrect answers. An individual’s information level is thus measured in terms of how far 
above or below the average citizen he or she is located.  
          The proposed index is therefore, a relative measure
8
 that defines an individual’s 
information level as a function of, or relative to, the average citizen’s information level. 
It estimates how much an individual’s level of political information differs from that of 
an average citizen, rather than how it differs from “know-nothings”. Those whose levels 
of information are above the average citizen are regarded as well-informed or informed, 
while those who fall below the average citizen are poorly-informed or uninformed.      
          This is a significant departure from what we find in much of the political behavior 
literature. Virtually all the political information indices developed so far, including the 
Carpini and Keteer index, are absolute measures that try to locate an individual’s precise 
scores on an information scale, independent of the other individuals’ scores. Such indices 
typically treat zero as their baseline when measuring political information. This implies 
that political information levels cannot go below zero. The zero baseline itself comprise 
of citizens whose ‘political minds’ are some sort of John Lock’s tabula rasa in the sense 
that they have no political information at all. From this baseline, an individual’s political 
information level is expressed as a function of some supposedly maximum information 
level that all citizens are expected to have.   
         However, this approach has several defects. For instance, with a baseline set at zero, 
a score of 60% translates into an index of 60 (or 0.6) on Carpini and Keteer scale. 
Conceptually, this not only implies a score of 60 above the zero-baseline which is the 
                                                          
8
 Detailed discussions on the meaning and differences between the absolute and relative 
measurements as used in this study can be found in Cardinet et al (2010). 
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most common interpretation, but also a score of 40 below the maximum level which is 
commonly ignored. This raises an important question: What justification does Carpini 
and Keteer, and others who use absolute measures have for preferring 60 and not 40 or 
both, as the information level? In contrast, the proposed index uses both scores in 
estimating the political information levels as I explain shortly. Allegorically put, while 
absolute measures focus on how full and ignore how empty the glass is, the new index 
takes into account both how full and how empty the glass is.  
          Since absolute measures are usually constructed with little attention to the cut off-
point between informed and uninformed citizens, they usually draw arbitrary distinctions 
between the informed and uninformed citizens. In fact, virtually all studies that use the 
absolute measures are never transparent enough to display their cut-off line. Thus, their 
line between informed and uninformed citizens remains arbitrary, anonymous, and more 
importantly, subjective. As one scholar has pointed out, ‘with the essentially contested 
concept of democracy, it is difficult to establish an appropriate clear-cut factual baseline 
of agreed truth against which to assess the levels of knowledge’ (Norris, 2011a:148). This 
problem dissipates when we adopt a theoretical cut-off based on the average citizen. 
           Even more importantly, the absolute measures unjustifiably assume that there is a 
fixed mass of information that a democratic citizen need to know. Yet, no study has been 
able to define the universe of political information that democratic citizens need to have 
(Krosnick et al, 2010; Norris, 2011a). Moreover, as Marcus (2009:363) rightly observes: 
What people must know depends on the circumstances in 
which they find themselves. Ignoring the context and 
setting forth an arbitrary array of things that all citizens 
should know is to set forth a test that citizens will fail. 
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          Thus, Political information index (PII Index), is the total number of factually 
correct answers minus the total number of answers that cannot be considered as factually 
correct (including incorrect guesses and ‘don’t know’ answers), divided by the total 
number of relevant questions. A score of 60% is read as 60 on a scale of zero to 100, or 
60 above the minimum possible score and 40 below the maximum possible score. Hence, 
the PII Index = [(60-40) / 100] = 0.2 on a scale of -1 to +1. 
          This can be expressed using a simplified mathematical notation:    
PII Index = (
  
 
  – 1 ………………………………………………Equation 1 
where x is an individual’s total score or the total number of questions answered correctly, 
while Z is the maximum possible score or the total number of relevant questions.  
          The need to define knowledge in terms of both correct and incorrect answers is 
already evident in the literature, even if in disguised forms. For instance, with respect to 
measurement of knowledge of democracy, it is suggested that, ‘Knowledge of democracy 
is calculated by measuring the perception that procedural features are important minus 
the identification of the instrumental or authoritarian characteristics’ (Norris, 2011a:163). 
          However, equation 1 holds true if and only if x lies within the domain: 0≤ x ≤ Z. 
That is, if the possible values of x ranges from zero for the least informed people, to Z for 
the most informed people. This ensures that the values of (
  
 
  range from zero (if x=0) 
to two (if x=Z), so that the equation, [(
  
 
  – 1] yields a standardized index with values 
ranging from -1 (if x=0) to +1 (if x=Z). This condition can be met in a variety of ways 
such as creating dichotomous information test items so that correct answers = 1, and 
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incorrect answers =0; creating ordered polytomous information test response items with 
the lowest possible score being zero (for instance, least informed=0, fairly informed =1, 
well informed =2); or transforming the test scores into ratio scales like percentages. 
          The question is: what happens when the information test responses do not begin 
from non-arbitrary zero-point? If for instance, there are ten dichotomous information test 
items, and each of them is coded: 1= inaccurate answers; and 2= correct answers, then the 
values of x would range from 10 to 20 rather than from 0 to 10. Although, the maximum 
possible score, Z would still be +1, the lowest score, w will be zero rather than -1.           
If the scale is changed to 2=incorrect and 3= correct, then x will now range from 20 to 30. 
The highest possible information score would remain +1 but the lowest possible score 
would be 0.3. Worst still, when [-1, 0] coding is used for incorrect and correct responses 
respectively, then every test-taker scores -1 regardless of the number of correct responses.  
          This problem arises because equation 1 defines political information as a function 
of the actual scores and the maximum possible scores, while ignoring the minimum 
possible scores (or at least assuming that it is always zero). Yet, the value of minimum 
possible scores has a significant bearing on the scale. For instance, a score of 90 on a 
scale of zero to 100 is not equivalent to a similar score on say a scale of 50 to 100. The 
former translates into 90% while the latter is only 80% of total score.  
          To overcome this problem, I insert the minimum possible score, w into equation 1:   
 
PII Index = [
      
   
  – 1 ………………………………………………Equation 2 
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          Conceptually, the numerator of equation 2 is a measure of an individual’s level of 
political information compared to the most ignorant person in town. The denominator of 
the equation is the range of possible information scores or the distance between the most 
and the least informed persons. If x is a typical case or an average score, then the distance 
between x and the least possible score, w is the same as that between x and the highest 
possible score, Z. That is, for an average person, x - w = Z- x = ½ (Z - w), and hence 2(x - 
w) = (Z - w), and therefore  
      
   
 =1.  
          Put differently, the political information scores for an average citizen, as defined 
by the formula, [
      
   
  is 1 on a default scale of zero to two. Yet, this is inconsistent 
with my definition of average citizen as someone who knows as much as he or she does 
not know. For the score of an average citizen to be in line with my definition of average 
citizen, the average citizen’s score has to be set at zero. To accomplish this task and to 
standardize the index, I introduce the constant, -1 to the above formula, resulting into the 
formula set out in equation 2. This formula basically compares an individual’s score with 
that of a typical case or an average person. Hence, an individual’s political information 
level is defined in terms of how different he or she is from the average person.  
          It is evident that when w =0, then equation 2 is the same as equation 1. However, 
since there are instances when w ≠ 0, equation 2 is the formal specification of the index 
of political information. Equation 2 will yield a [-1, +1] scale regardless of the minimum 
possible score, the test item coding format used, the number of test items, or the number 
and type of scores per response item (whether the item responses are dichotomous, 
polytomous or some rating scale). Even [-1, 0] coding, which according to equation 1 
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grants every test-taker a score of -1, can fit the scores on a [-1, +1] scale using equation 2. 
Another plus for equation 2 is that it works even when the value assigned to correct 
response is smaller than the one for incorrect answers such as when 1=correct answer and 
2= incorrect answer. Moreover, the equation is also applicable when the different test 
items to be included in the information index or any other test score are coded differently. 
For instance the Afrobarometer dataset codes knowledge of education policy as [1, 2], 
and Presidential term limits as [2, 3] for incorrect and correct responses respectively.  
          As is already apparent, in the new information index, +1 is the highest political 
information level, while -1 is the lowest information level. Another way of interpreting 
the PII index is to consider negative as information deficit, zero as average information, 
and positive as information credit. In this sense, a PII score of 1 is maximum political 
information (highly informed); zero is average information (averagely informed or people 
who know as much as they don’t know); and -1 is minimum information (least informed).  
          The index has at least six distinct advantages over traditional political information 
measures. First, although the need to take into account both correct and incorrect answers 
in determining competence has long been recognized in most psychological testing, it has 
not received sufficient attention in the estimation of the political information scores. For 
instance, correct and incorrect answers are used in calculating most statistical coefficients 
used to estimate the internal reliability of a test such as the Cronbach alpha and the KR-
20 (Kuder-Richardson Formula 20) reliability coefficients (Miller et al, 2011:166).    
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          Secondly, unlike the other measures which arbitrarily distinguish informed from 
the uninformed citizens, PII provides criteria for consistently distinguishing informed 
from uninformed citizens by using the positive and negative signs as benchmarks. 
Previous literature presents a number of instances in which the distinction between well-
informed and poorly informed citizens has been done arbitrarily. To begin with, various 
definitions have been assigned to well- informed voters: ‘(1) voters above the mean level 
of political information; (2) voters above the 33
rd
 percentile of information (i.e. above the 
bottom third of the information distribution); and (3) voters above the 67
th
 percentile of 
information (i.e. above the top third of the information distribution)’ (Levendusky, 
2011:46).  This approach is unsuitable since the mean and the percentiles depend on raw 
information scores of those involved, and thus vary from one distribution to another. 
Hence, they cannot be used to compare information levels across different distributions. 
          Thirdly, although PII is primarily an index for measuring political information, it 
can also be used to measure information deficit (PID), or information gap, or the extent to 
which an individual lacks pertinent political information. Beyond the general statement 
that people lack information, it is important to quantify the magnitude of information 
deficit. To do this, we obtain PID which is the additive inverse of PII or (PII)
-1
:   
PID   = (PII)
-1
 = 1- (
      
   
  ………………………………....Equation 3 
          Using PID, -1 is the lowest and +1 the highest levels of information deficit. Since 
PID is an additive inverse of PII Index, the two scores add up to zero, and consequently, 
the difference in PII Index and PID is just involve a switch in the (+) and (-) signs. Since 
the additive inverse of zero is zero, if an individual’s PII Index =0, then his/her PID =0.
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          Fourth, since the minimum and maximum possible scores do not depend on the 
value of Z, the PID index is independent of the number of test items. That is, proportional 
scores results in similar PII index regardless of the number of items in the test score. For 
instance, if x=18, w=0, Z=20, then PII index = 0.8 just as would be the case if x=9, w=0, 
Z=10 or if x=9.5, w=5, Z=10. In all these cases the actual score is 90% despite the 
difference in the number of test items which are 20, 10 and 5 respectively. 
          Fifth, PII Index can be used at the three higher levels of measurement –ordinal, 
interval and ratio. The advantage of this flexibility is that it raises the range of statistical 
tools which can be used whenever PII Index or PID Index are the dependent variables. 
Also, unlike most indices which have a narrow range from zero to one, both indices range 
from -1 to +1, thereby allowing for a wider variation of the political information score.  
          Finally, PII index correlates well with other indices, and has a perfect linear 
correlation with Carpini and Keteer index (r = 1.0; α =.05) as shown in figure 2.1(a). 
Figure 2.1 (b) shows that the gap between the two indices widens as the number of 
correct answers to questions testing political knowledge decreases. 
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2.4 Afrobarometer Dataset and Political Information Questions   
          In line with Carpini and Keteer’s suggestion that a small number of carefully 
selected questions can yield a good index, this study will measure the PII Index using a 
panel of six questions that meet most of the criteria I have set up in the above discussion. 
In this regard, the first set of three questions tests knowledge of key political institutions 
and processes, namely the judiciary and the constitution; the presidency and elections; 
and the legislature and the political parties. This broader category of questions subsumes 
what Carpini and Keteer refer to as rules of the game, substance of politics, and parties.     
          That is, with the exception of their questions about names of public officers, all the 
other questions they propose fall in this category. The other three questions are about the 
outputs of the political processes, namely governmental policies. They test knowledge of 
public policy on key policy areas, namely health, education, and fiscal devolution (CDF):  
 
Q1. Do you happen to know: Whose responsibility it is to 
determine whether or not a law is constitutional? 1=Know 
but can’t remember, 2=Incorrect guess, 3=Correct name, 
9=Don’t Know 
 
Q2. Do you happen to know: How many times someone can 
legally be elected President? 1=Know but can’t remember, 
2=Incorrect guess, 3=Correct name, 9=Don’t Know 
 
Q3.  Do you happen to know: Which political party has the 
most seats in parliament? 1=Know but can’t remember, 
2=Incorrect guess, 3=Correct name, 9=Don’t Know   
 
Q4.  Can you tell me whether the Kenyan government has a 
policy to provide: Free health care at public clinics, that is, 
no fees for visits or medicine? 1=Incorrect answer, 
2=Correct Answer, 9=Don’t Know. 
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Q5. Can you tell me whether the Kenyan government has a 
policy to provide: Free primary education, that is, parents 
do not have to pay school fees? 1=Incorrect answer, 
2=Correct Answer, 9=Don’t Know. 
 
Q6. Have you heard of the Constituency Development Fund 
[CDF]?  1=Yes, 2=No, 9=Don’t Know. 
 
 
          The descriptive statistics for each of these variables/items used to construct the 
Political Information Index are presented in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Political Information Items  
 
Information Items 
 
Observations 
 
Incorrect Guess 
 
Correct Answer 
 
DK 
 
Parliamentary 
Majority Party 
1263 230 
(18.2%) 
716 
(56.7%) 
317 
(25.1%) 
 
Presidential  
Term Limit 
1264 426 
(33.7%) 
508 
(40.2%) 
330 
(26.1%) 
 
Constitutionality  
of the Law  
1256 561 
(44.7%) 
254 
(20.2%) 
441 
(35.1%) 
 
Education Policy 1267 49 
(3.9%) 
1184 
(93.4%) 
34 
(2.7%) 
 
Health Policy 
 
1267 347 
(27.4%) 
829 
(65.4%) 
91 
(7.2%) 
 
Fiscal  
Devolution (CDF)
9
 
1267 334 
26%) 
883  
(69.7%) 
50 
(3.9%) 
 
                                                          
9
 In the case of Fiscal Devolution (CDF), what appear as Incorrect Guess in the table are 
“No” Answers, while what appears as Correct Answers are “Yes” Answers. The actual 
number of observations in each case is 1267, but the few who said they know but cannot 
remember were omitted. I have calculated these values from individual level data. The 
CDF as a fiscal devolution policy was enacted by Kenyan parliament in 2003. It provides 
that 2% of total government annual incomes be distributed to all constituencies according 
to some defined formula. It is up to the citizens of each constituency through their local 
committee under the direction of the area legislator to decide what projects to implement 
with the CDF Funds through a local participatory process. 
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          It is noteworthy, that the Afrobarometer survey questionnaire neither explicitly 
encourages nor discourages the respondents to make guesses when they are unsure of the 
answers. Moreover, the six questions selected from the Afrobarometer questionnaires are 
open-ended. The responses were coded after questionnaire administration. In computing 
the new index, I re-coded the responses to the six questions so that correct answers were 
coded as 1. Those respondents who gave incorrect guesses or ‘don’t know’ responses, 
were coded as 0. However, in question six, ‘Yes’ was marked 1, while ‘No’ and ‘Don’t 
Know’ were marked 0. This is in line with my argument that questions testing political 
information must isolate factually accurate responses from all other forms of responses.  
 
2.5 Reliability and Inter-Item Correlation for the PII Index 
2.5.1 Item Cluster Analysis 
          To determine the reliability and the internal consistency of the political information 
index resulting from the selected questions, I performed Item Cluster Analysis (ICA).
10
 
The results in Figure 2.2 show the standardized Cronbach alpha and Revelle’s β.  
                                                          
10
 I performed the Item Cluster Analysis using the iclust function in the psych package 
of the R Project for Statistical Computing. The psych package was developed by 
Revelle William and can be found at: http://personality-project.org/r. The Item Cluster 
Analysis identifies the most similar items in an index and combines them into clusters. 
Similar clusters are likewise combined together and the process repeated until either of 
the two measures of internal consistency - the standardized Cronbach reliability 
coefficient α (which is the average half split reliability), or Revelle’s β (which is the 
worst half-split reliability that estimate the general saturation of the index) reaches the 
saturation point or the point at which none of them increase (Revelle, 2011). 
89 
 
 
     
  
          As expected, two of the public policy items - health policy and education policy – 
strongly cluster together with (α = 0.56), and constitute the strongest cluster in the whole 
index. It is also notable that the presidential term limits and majority party initially cluster 
together (α = 0.47), and then cluster with Constitutionality of law (α = 0.51), thus 
completing cluster three (α = 0.51) which comprise political institutions and processes. 
The deviant item in the analysis is CDF which I expected to cluster with the other policy 
items, but instead joins with the political institutions and processes to form cluster four (α 
= 0.55). Finally, the PII Index has reliability α = 0.55, β = 0.31 and Guttman  6 = 0.53.  
          One possible way of improving the reliability of the index is to remove some items. 
The first criterion for doing so is to eliminate an item or items that fail to cluster with the 
rest in the theoretically expected way. In this regard, CDF would be the best candidate for 
elimination since it clusters with the political institutions and processes items instead of 
clustering with the other public policy items. However, if CDF is eliminated, then the 
90 
 
reliability of the resultant index reduces to α = 0.51,  6 = 0.49. Therefore the removal of 
CDF from the items that constitute the index is not a viable option.  
          The other solution suggested in the literature is to use either item-total correlation 
(an item’s multiple correlation with the entire index) or the item difficulty (the proportion 
of correct answers for each information item), to eliminate some item(s) from the index. 
Indeed, it has been noted that ‘item-total correlation and item difficulty are the two most 
common statistics used in item analysis’ (Carpini and Keteer, 1996:297). The problem 
with the item difficulty option is that ‘no standards for choosing items based on difficulty 
exists’ (ibid), though it is suggested that extremely high (≥ .90) or extremely low (≤ .10) 
should be eliminated (ibid). Using this criteria imply that education policy should be 
eliminated. Yet, even with education, the average test difficulty is 0.58, which is good, 
given that the closer the test difficulty is to .50 the better it is (Coaley, 2010). Moreover, 
removing education weakens the index to α = 0.52,  6 = 0.48 as shown in table 2.2. 
          The item with least item-total correlation is health policy (α = 0.53), which reduces 
to α = .21 for corrected item-total correlation. Yet the suggested cut off is α ≤.20 for the 
former (Coaley, 2010), with some suggesting an even more conservative cut off of α ≤.15 
(Kehoe, 1995). This means that each method proposes a different item to be eliminated. 
Table 2.2 shows that the reliability of the index would be weakened further if any item is 
removed. Besides, since Alpha typically underestimates index reliability, and depends on 
several factors like the number of items in the index, it has been suggested that α ≥ .50 is 
acceptable when the test items are few (Kehoe, 1995; Omoeva, 2010; Lindmeier, 2011), 
and more so when the underlying latent variable is as complex as political information. 
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Table 2.2 Inter-Item Reliability for PII Index 
Political 
Information Items 
Criteria for dropping items from PII Index Reliability of PII Index 
when one item is dropped 
Item 
Difficulty 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Standard α Guttman  6  
Majority Party 0.57 0.55 0.35 0.51 0.48 
 Term Limit  0.40 0.61 0.41 0.48 0.45 
Constitutionality 0.20 0.55 0.34 0.51 0.49 
Education Policy 0.93 0.54 0.15 0.52 0.48 
Health Policy 0.65 0.53 0.21 0.52 0.48 
CDF 0.70 0.56 0.30 0.51 0.49 
 
 
          Table 2.2 shows that Item Difficulty has a huge range from 0.20 to 0.93. This is in 
line with Zaller’s (1992) suggestion that when the political information index comprise of 
few items, as in this case, there should be a mix of easy and difficult questions. While this 
tends to yield low average inter-item correlations, it nonetheless results into an index with 
better differentiation of the political information levels, than if questions have an average 
difficulty level (Zaller, 1992; Carpini and Keteer, 1993; Mondak, 1995; Converse, 2000).  
2.5.2 The Inter-Item Bivariate Regression for PII Index 
          A rule of thumb in the construction of an index is that there should be sufficient 
empirical relationship between the items constituting the index so that responses to any 
one item can be used to predict responses to any of the other items (Coaley, 2010; Babbie, 
2010). Thus, table 2.3 shows an inter-item correlation matrix constructed using a 
combination of simple logistic regressions and robust regression. It shows the beta 
estimates, with the associated t-scores or z-scores in bracket. More specifically, the base 
of the matrix is constructed using robust regression, with PII Index as the dependent 
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variable. The rest of the matrix is constructed using simple logistic regression, where the 
item on the right of each cell is the dependent variable while the one on top is the 
independent variable. The PII Index was measured on interval scale [-1, +1], while other 
variables are measured on nominal scale [0=incorrect; 1= correct answer]. 
Table 2.3: Bivariate Regression Coefficients Matrix for PII Index 
 Majority 
Party 
Presidential 
Tenure 
Education 
Policy 
Health 
Policy 
CDF PII  
Index 
Constitutionality  1.09*** 
[6.80] 
1.37*** 
[9.24] 
1.0.05** 
[2.62] 
1.00*** 
[5.85] 
1.12*** 
[6.02] 
0.27*** 
[7.53] 
Majority 
Party 
 1.33*** 
[10.62] 
0.73** 
[3.13] 
0.36** 
[3.04] 
0.82*** 
[6.60] 
0.51*** 
[21.34] 
Presidential 
Tenure 
  0.66** 
[2.57] 
0.61*** 
[4.87] 
1.21*** 
[8.60] 
0.52*** 
[21.40] 
Education Policy 
 
   0.66** 
[2.90] 
0.77** 
[3.35] 
0.54*** 
[9.24] 
Health Policy      
 
 0.47*** 
[3.75] 
0.14*** 
[4.64] 
CDF      0.51*** 
[19.01] 
 
 
          The results in table 2.3 show that there is a strong bivariate empirical relationship 
between the six items constituting the index. That is, respondents who answered any one 
question correctly had a higher chance of answering each of the other questions correctly. 
For instance, the probability that someone who knows the constitutionality of law would 
also know presidential term limits is 34%, compared to 11% for someone who does not 
know the constitutionality of law. Similarly, someone who knows presidential term limits 
has 95.7% chance of knowing education policy, compared to an equally significant but 
slightly lower chance of 92.0% for someone who does not know the former. 
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          Relatedly, those who answered any question correctly were likely to score highly 
in the PII Index, compared to those who did not answer the same question correctly. That 
is, those who knew one question, were relatively more likely to know the other questions, 
and hence more likely to get a higher PII Index. The results support the view that citizens 
are generalists rather than specialists (Carpini and Keteer, 1993; Althaus, 2003), and offer 
strong empirical rationale for including all the six items in the political information index. 
          Although responses to one question can predict responses to other questions, this 
does not imply that any information item can replace another item, or effectively supplant 
the index. The range and intricacy of issues captured by political information as a concept 
require harnessing synergies between information items, rather than using any one item 
alone. For example, a person who knows the constitutionality of law has 85.5% chance of 
knowing CDF, but one who knows CDF has only 24.8% chance of knowing the former.  
 
2.6 Political Information in Kenya  
2.6.1 Measuring Information Levels among Kenyans  
 
          Figure 2.3 shows the political information index for each information item as well 
as the average national political information index. It is clear that Kenyans are generally 
poorly informed, with the overall national political information index of 0.151 on a scale 
of -1 to +1. That is, on average, Kenyans are aware of just 57.5% of the information they 
need to be effective democratic citizens, while unaware of a significant 42.5%.  
 
          What is even more disturbing is the fact that Kenya’s mean information level of 
0.151 is not only low, but is further worsened by an equally high standard deviation of 
0.477. Why do I consider the standard deviation of 0.477 as very high?  According to the 
three-sigma rule, mean ± 3 SD = 99.73% of cases, which is virtually all the cases. Thus, 
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given the distribution of political information scores among Kenyans, the normal level of 
SD = [(0.997-0.151) / 3] = 0.282. Even if we take a lower threshold of 95% confidence 
level which is conventionally used in social sciences, mean ± 1.96 SD = 95%, and hence 
SD = [(0.950-0.151) / 1.96] = 0.408. Evidently the SD of 0.477 is much higher than both. 
Nonetheless, the results are consistent with past studies that report a pattern where, ‘there 
is high variance in political awareness around a generally low mean’ (Zaller, 1992: 18).  
 
 
 
 
          Figure 2.3 show that there is a significant variation in terms of information levels 
for each of the items. As already evident in tables 2.1 and 2.2, education policies are the 
most known, while constitutionality of law is the least known political information item. 
The salience of education policy can be attributed to the fact that Free Education Policy 
(FPE) had just been introduced in Kenya in 2003, with several memorable outcomes that 
significantly raised its saliency. For instance, ‘as a result of the bold move [to adopt FPE], 
Kenya has earned a place in the history books as having enrolled the oldest primary 
school student on earth’ (World Bank, 2009:157). This is in reference to the late Kimani 
Maruge who enrolled in standard one in 2003 at the age of 82 (ibid).  
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Kimani Maruge, the world’s oldest student, started his primary education at the age of 82, when 
FPE was introduced in Kenya in 2003. Photo taken by Action Aid International and accessed 
online on January, 10 2012 at: http://www.actionaid.org/stories/whatever-happened-first-grader. 
 
          Further, unlike other social service facilities such as hospitals which are scarce, 
primary schools are dotted all over Kenya, and hence, a major change that affects them 
like FPE becomes easily noticeable to nearly all Kenyans. The policy also became 
popular for some wrong reasons resulting from poor and hasty implementation. For 
instance, as the World Bank (2009:148) notes: 
Absence of prior planning led to crowded classrooms with too 
many children sharing few and inadequate facilities…enrolment 
rates soared, class sizes increased significantly…construction of 
additional schools and classrooms was not part of the initial FPE 
initiative…in some schools, multishift or multigrade classrooms 
were created in response to the shortage of teachers and classrooms 
 
          When we group constitutionality of law, the presidency and political parties into 
political institutions and processes, and health, CDF and education into public policies, it 
is notable that Kenyans are fairly well informed about public policies (PII = 0.526), but 
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have serious information deficit on matters relating to political institutions and processes 
(PII = -0.223). This is surprising since the survey was done just a month before the 2005 
constitutional referendum. With campaigns in climax, one expected constitutionality of 
law and presidential tenure to be very salient issues then. The low information levels on 
these issues may be an indicator that the referendum campaigns could have veered off 
pertinent issues and instead was being driven by extraneous issues.   
          Nonetheless, the fairly high level of information on public policy is good to the 
extent that electoral contests revolve around the relatively dynamic governmental outputs 
like public policy, rather than the more stable political institutions and processes. As a 
result, attentiveness to public policy issues is important, not only for electoral decisions 
but also for purposes of holding leaders accountable. However, information about public 
policy may not be very useful without corresponding knowledge of political institutions. 
For instance, if one does not know which party has majority legislators, and hence which 
party espouses public policies, he or she cannot accurately attribute the success or failure 
of those policies to the responsible party. Moreover, he or she may not appropriately 
distribute electoral rewards or punishments during elections. This is, at least partly, why 
Carpini and Keteer’s selection of information items is inadequate since they completely 
neglect governmental outputs when computing political information index.  
2.6.2 Determinants of Political Information among Kenyans 
          The selection of the variables to include in the political information models tested 
in this section has been informed by two key factors. First, the political cue theory, which 
guides this study, suggests that citizens derive political cues from the political parties that 
they trust and that political cues enable those who are uninformed to act as though they 
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were informed (Conover and Feldman, 1984; Popkin, 1991; Luppia, 1994; Sekhon, 2004; 
Kam, 2005; McDermott, 2006). However, two critical issues remain unresolved. In the 
first place, it is unclear whether partisan inclinations towards the incumbent party and the 
opposition parties yield similar cues. To address this, I use three independent variables – 
General Partisanship (closeness to a political party regardless of whether it is the 
opposition or the ruling party); Incumbent Partisanship (trust in the ruling party) and 
Opposition Partisanship (trust in the opposition parties). The goal in this regard is to see 
whether any or all of these variables drive political information levels.  
          The second unsettled issue with regard to the political cue theory has to do with 
whether these cues comprise political information, or whether they just transmit signals 
that citizens use without being attentive to the underlying issues. To test this, I blend the 
political cue theory with Petty and Cacioppo’s likelihood cue taking model. According to 
this model, cue taking follows two paths – the central route which involves focusing on 
the substance or content of the cue issue, and the peripheral route which focus on issues 
that are extraneous to the cue issue (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981).  
          I argue that cues derived from political parties through the central route, are likely 
to contain useful information clues that enable partisans to fill information gaps and thus 
become more knowledgeable. If this is correct, then I expect that partisans would be more 
knowledgeable than non-partisans. On the other hand, if cues follow the peripheral route, 
then the issues at hand are relegated to the periphery and people just adopt positions that 
they believe are in line with their party position regardless of the issues at hand. In           
the circumstances, partisanship is not a knowledge-enhancing cue source, and hence there 
are no significant differences in information levels between partisans and non-partisans. 
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Allegorically put, partisan citizens unreservedly trust political parties the way disciplined 
motorists trust traffic lights to guide them in road intersections, and thus, hardly try to 
understand or just cannot comprehend the process by which traffic lights change colors.  
         In addition, the political information model being tested here takes into account the 
observation that ‘building a model to explain political information presents a serious 
difficulty [because] several key variables cause one another’ (Smith, 1989:192). To begin 
with, ‘there is virtual unanimity on one point: formal education is the strongest, most 
consistent correlate of political knowledge’ (Niemi and Junn, 1998:13). Yet, diagnostic 
tests show that education highly correlates with the other variables believed to be strong 
predictors of political information like mass media. Indeed, education correlates with 
radio news (r = 0.34), newspapers (r = 0.56), and TV news (r = 50). Also, the three forms 
of mass media (radio, newspapers and TV) are highly correlated among themselves as 
shown in table 2.4. As a remedy, I created a media news index (α = 0.69;   6 = 0.63), 
which is similar to the exposure to news media index developed by Bratton et al (2005). 
 
Table 2.4: Bivariate Correlation Matrix for Media Index  
 Radio Newspapers TV Media Index  
 
Radio r=1.000 
rho = 1.000 
r = 0.307 r = 0.344 r = 0.632 
 
Newspapers rho = 0.311 r =1.000 
rho = 1.000 
r = 0.615 r = 0.838 
 
TV rho = 0.341 rho = 0.615 r=1.000 
rho = 1.000 
r = 0.871 
 
Media Index  rho= 0.578 rho = 0.850 rho = 0.879 r=1.000 
rho = 1.000 
 
Note: r = Pearson correlation coefficient and rho = spearman correlation coefficient. 
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          However, the media index is also highly correlated with education (r = 0.60). I 
therefore, I tested three separate models. Model I includes partisanship, education, gender 
and political discussion. Model II replicates model I but replaces education with media. 
Model III combines models I and II by interacting education and media. The dependent 
variable in all the models is Political Information, while the key independent variables 
are the three measures of partisanship- General, Incumbent and Opposition Partisanship. 
The regression results are shown in table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Determinants of Political Information Levels in Kenya 
 
 Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
 
General Partisanship                               0.09**      0.10**     0.09** 
 (3.04) (3.19) (3.20) 
Opposition Partisanship             -0.04** -0.05*    -0.04** 
 (3.11) (3.38) (3.28) 
Incumbent Partisanship                           -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 ( 0.01) (0.37) (0.30) 
Political Discussions                        0.11***                 0.12***                 0.10*** 
 (5.44) (5.82) (5.12) 
Gender: Female                             -0.17***               -0.16***              -0.17*** 
 (6.36) (5.72) (6.26) 
Education        0.10***         0.06***         
 (13.53)  (3.54) 
Media News               0.11*** -0.01 
  (9.20) (0.45) 
Education x Media News      0.01* 
   (2.19) 
Intercept       -0.21***      -0.13]**    -0.16** 
  (4.56) (2.67) (2.57) 
RES                                                                               0.42 0.42 0.40 
Observations 1129 1129 1129 
 
Entries are Robust Regression Coefficients with t-values in brackets.                                             
Significance:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05  
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          In all the three models, partisans on the general partisanship scale tend to be more 
informed than their non-partisan counterparts. The average political information index for 
the partisans is 0.224 compared to 0.034 for non-partisans, suggesting that partisanship 
on general partisanship scale is an asset in political information acquisition since it raises 
an individual’s information level by 0.190. In line with Petty and Cacioppo’s likelihood 
cue taking model, it can be inferred that cue taking from political parties follows ‘the 
central route’, thereby enhancing information levels. While it can be counter-claimed that 
it is information that drives partisanship and not vice versa, the direction of causality in 
this study is firmly anchored on the political cue theory.    
          However, the picture gets messier when the focus shifts from General Partisanship 
to incumbent and opposition partisanships. In all the models, Opposition Partisanship 
has negative influence on information levels, and hence a source of misinformation rather 
than a source of credible political information. Whereas the average political information 
level among those who are non-partisan on the opposition partisanship scale is 0.168, it 
is only 0.010 among strong opposition partisans. Hence, partisanship on the opposition 
scale reduces an individual’s political information level by 0.158. This may be attributed 
to the fact that opposition parties may be presenting to their supporters distorted versions 
of government policies so as to discredit the incumbent party. The upshot this is that 
opposition partisans who rely on partisan cues may have distorted public policy images.  
          Certain contextual factors may have had deflating effects on the information levels 
since they undercut the ability to correctly answer questions on political institutions and 
processes. For instance, the uninstitutionalized party system characterized by unclear 
delineation between opposition and incumbent parties in Kenya, could have jeopardized 
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the ability to correctly identify which parties constitute the ruling coalition. Moreover, the 
culture of impunity that had taken roots in Kenya over the years also makes it difficult to 
precisely identify who determines the constitutionality of the law.  
          It is hardly surprising, that the three items that comprise political institutions and 
processes (majority party, presidential term limits, and the constitutionality of the law) 
have the lowest item difficulty levels as shown in table 2.2. Indeed, the average item 
difficulty for political institutions and processes is just 0.39 compared to 0.76 for public 
policies. It is also notable that the average political information levels for the former is a 
paltry -222 compared to the latter are 0.524. Taken together, the results imply that at least 
theoretically, knowledge of public policy represent nearly two-thirds of an individual’s 
political knowledge. Consequently, an individual’s overall information levels to a large 
extent depend on how well he or she understands the policy component of the 
information index. Accordingly, if opposition partisans have hazy public policy images, 
as I suspect is the case, they would have low political information scores.   
          Even more intriguing is the fact that incumbent partisanship has no statistically 
significant influence on political information. That is, the informed are just as likely as 
uninformed citizens to be partisans on the incumbent partisanship scale. Since, as I noted 
earlier, general partisans tend to be relatively more informed than non-(general) partisans, 
and opposition partisanship tends to undercut political information, I expected strong 
incumbent partisans to be better informed than non-(incumbent) partisans. Hence, one 
possible interpretation of this result is that the incumbent party may be conveying both 
factual information and some distorted information in equal measure. 
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          The results reveal some sort of a puzzle whereby partisanship in general enhances 
political information levels; partisanship on opposition scale reduces information levels; 
while partisanship on the incumbent scale has insignificant effect on information levels. 
There are at least two possible explanations for this. First, the three continuums along 
which partisanship has been measured (general partisanship, partisanship in relation to 
the incumbent party, and partisanship in relation to the opposition parties) are completely 
independent of each other. Consequently, being partisan along one continuum does not 
necessarily predict one’s position in the other continuums. Secondly, general partisanship 
has been measured as a dichotomous variable, while the other two have been measured as 
ordered variables. In the circumstances, the temptation would be to reduce the latter into 
a dichotomous variable. However, some recent literature discourage collapsing ordinal 
categories to create dichotomous variables (unless very necessary), since this tend to raise 
standard errors and reduce variable explanatory power (Agresti, 2010). 
          The results also show that gender, political discussion, education and media news 
are significant predictors of political information levels. There is a significant gender gap 
in political information levels, with an average of 0.022 for women and 0.282 for men. 
Similarly, the average level of information among those who frequently engage in 
political discussions is 0.342, as compared to -0.096 for those who never engage in 
discussions. Further analysis shows that the average level of information level among 
those with no formal education is -0.225. It increases to 0.083 for primary school 
graduates, 0.282 for secondary school graduates, and 0.772 for university graduates.   
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          Similarly, the average level of political information is -0.279 among those who 
have no access to media news, and 0.495 among those who have had the greatest access.  
Media news is regarded as a potential source of political information and heuristic cues. it 
is argued that, ‘media news expand the range of considerations that people bring to bear 
in forming their political and economic attitudes’ (Bratton et al, 2005:209). Yet it is 
apparent from model III, that when media is interacted with education, then its effect on 
political information levels out. Thus, it is not independent but dependent on education so 
that highly educated people have greater access to media news. Also, information levels 
increase as education levels increase regardless of the level of access to media news.    
          There are three reasons why the media may not play a useful information role in 
Kenya. To begin with, the apparent inability of the Kenyan media to exert tangible 
influence on information levels is attributable to its limited circulation. For instance, 
although radio is the most widely used outlet, the 38 radio stations existing by 2006 had 
an estimated receivership of three million, in a country of 35 million people. In addition 
there were eight Television stations with an estimated 730,000 TV sets in use, as well as 
five daily newspapers with a daily circulation of 250,000 (Ongong’a, 2010).   
          Secondly, even among those who are attentive to media news, biases in the media 
news may serve to reinforce their beliefs rather than improve knowledge of politically 
relevant information about Kenya. Yet, it has been observed that ‘voters can use party 
positions or media opinion only when they trust these opinions and they only trust them if 
they have a previous record of knowledge of the party or media position’ (Lutz, 2006:80). 
Hence, when people develop the perception that the media is biased, they may not take it 
as credible information source. With reference to the 2007 elections for instance, media 
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monitoring reports in Kenya concluded that, ‘there was a general bias [by media] 
favoring the incumbent president in both state-owned and private media, in terms of more 
time and space in all major media, with largely favorable coverage’ (Semetko, 2010:169).   
          Finally, even among the few who have regular access to media news, there is still 
the generic tendency to seek media content that buttresses what one already believes, 
while rejecting the uncongenial ones (Zaller, 1992; Taber, 2003; Mondak, 2010). This 
selective attentiveness and consumption of media content also has the same effect as 
media news biases. Indeed, ‘because citizens often feel most gratified when information 
reinforces existing knowledge, preferences or world views, they are selective in their 
attention and assimilation of information’ (Bimber, 2003: 208). 
          Hence, it is possible, and indeed very likely as Bratton et al (2005: 219) puts it that: 
To a degree, ordinary Africans can compensate for low 
levels of education by learning, probably from discussions 
among themselves rather than via the radio, about the 
virtues of a set of procedures like free speech and open 
elections that point to a regime called “democracy”  
 
2.6.3 Are Kenyans aware of their political information Deficit? 
          The final question which I address in this section is whether Kenyans are aware of 
and willing to reveal their political information deficiency. This question is less than 
trivial because, if people are not aware of their information deficiency, they are less likely 
to look for information. The problem is more severe if people think they know when in 
fact they lack requisite information to participate meaningfully in the democratic process. 
Indeed, ‘not only are most citizens effectively disenfranchised by their ignorance, but 
they aren’t even aware of it’ (Carpini and Keteer, 1994:37). 
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          Figure 2.4 shows both the respondents who readily admitted lack of information by 
stating that they ‘don’t know’, and those who tried to hide their lack of information by 
making incorrect guesses.
11
 These values are calculated as percentages of the total 
number of respondents who did not provide inaccurate answers to the questions posed. 
Besides, the analysis excludes CDF since the question testing knowledge of CDF was 
framed in a way that does not enable the respondents to reveal or hide deficit. 
 
 
 
          On average, Kenyans are more likely to hide than to admit lack of information. For 
every five Kenyans who do not have information on a given political institution or public 
policy, two are likely to admit ignorance, while three will either be unaware of their 
ignorance or they will try to cover it up by offering guessed answers. It is curious that the 
ratio of correct to inaccurate responses (58:42) is more or less the same as that for 
incorrect guesses and ‘don’t know’ responses (60:40) implying that guessed responses 
could have contributed greatly to the observed information levels. Moreover, it is notable 
                                                          
11
 I have drawn figure 2.4 as well as figure 3.8 using barp and addtable2plot functions 
in the plotrix package of the R Project for Statistical Computing by Jim lemon et al. 
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that education and health, which had the highest ratio of correct to incorrect answers, also 
had the highest ratio of guessed responses to don’t know answers. 
          To test the likelihood of honestly admitting political information deficit as opposed 
to trying to hide it through inaccurate guesses, I selected all the respondents who did not 
correctly answer all the three factual questions testing knowledge of political institutions 
and processes (constitutionality of the law, presidential term limit and majority party). 
That is, I selected all those respondents who had a total score of zero on the knowledge of 
political institutions and processes, and whose final PII Index only reflect their scores on 
the public policy items. On the surface, it might seem that three questions are too few. 
Nonetheless, since the focus here is on extremely uninformed respondents, an increase in 
the number of questions automatically increases the likelihood that many of the 
respondents answered at least one question correctly. Thus, using a large number of 
questions would have considerably reduced the sample size for this particular test. 
          In the final analysis, there were 198 extremely uninformed respondents, with 56 
incorrect guesses and 142 don’t know responses. From these responses, I constructed a 
dummy dependent variable, admitting information deficit, with 0 = hide deficit (where all 
answers are incorrect guesses) and 1= admit deficit (where only don’t know responses 
are given). As an index, admitting information deficit is sufficiently reliable (N = 385; 
Cronbach α = 0.61), and hence it may be an indicator of an underlying respondent trait.  
          I then estimated a logit regression model for determinants of admitting information 
deficit as shown in the equation below. The results are presented in table 2.6: 
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Table 2.6: Determinants of Admission of Political  Information Deficit (don’t Know) 
 
 Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
 
General Partisanship -1.08***     -0.99**       -0.91** 
       (2.50)     (2.38)         (2.19) 
Incumbent Partisanship  0.60***   0.62***      0.55*** 
      (2.95)     (3.06)         (2.74) 
Opposition Partisanship      -0.46**      -0.40**        -0.36*  
      (2.15)       (1.96)       (1.72) 
Respondent Honesty  1.80***        1.73***      1.76***  
       (2.87)        (2.78)          (2.87) 
Gender: Female        1.30***        1.23***      1.12***  
       (2.92)        (2.73)          (2.53) 
Religiosity       -0.25       -0.31*        -0.30* 
      (1.39)      (1.87)          (1.83) 
Education Level   -0.42***   
      (3.18)     
Question Difficulty   0.85**   
        (2.08)     
Media News     -0.33*  
   (1.83) 
Intercept     2.16** 0.79       1.86**  
 (2.16 ) (0.88 ) (1.95) 
Model  2 54.08 47.3 44.72 
Pseudo R
2
 0.402 0.358 0.344 
Observations 161 161 161 
 
Entries are logit regression coefficients with z-values in brackets. The dependent variable 
is Admission of Information Deficit: 0 = Hide Deficit and 1=Admit Deficit. Significance:  
0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.10. 
 
 
          Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from Table 2.6. Broadly speaking, the 
results show that incorrect guesses and don’t know responses do not occur haphazardly, 
but instead, follow some systematic pattern. Not only do they mean different things, but 
they also produce different results when regressed against a set of independent variables 
as argued by Mondak (1999). With respect to don’t know responses for instance, scholars 
maintain that ‘it is difficult to know what “Don’t Know” means’ (Jamieson, 2000:84), 
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and suggest that it can imply ignorance, lack of clarity about the questions, indecision, or 
just the unwillingness to respond (see Jamieson, 2000). Yet, Table 2.6 shows that honest 
respondents are likely to admit that they don’t know rather than to offer incorrect guesses 
when they are not very sure of the answers to survey questions. In contrast, the dishonest 
respondents are more inclined to guess than to admit lack of information. In essence, 
when honest respondents say they ‘don’t know’, most likely they ‘don’t know’. However, 
dishonest respondents can pretend to know even when they clearly do not know.  
          These results are important since they strongly support the argument I made earlier 
in passing, that incorrect guesses and don’t know responses to survey questions do not 
constitute political information, and hence should not be regarded as shades of political 
information as suggested by Mondak (2001). The results also support my argument that 
incorrect guesses and don’t know responses should be viewed as some sort of outward 
manifestations of individual respondent’s underlying predilection to either admit lack of 
information by saying “I don’t know”, or hide lack of information by making inaccurate 
guesses. Hence, it adds no value to either encourage or discourage respondents to say “I 
don’t know” or to urge them to make wild guesses. Honest respondents are already 
predisposed to say “I don’t know” if indeed, they don’t know. For this reason, don’t know 
and incorrect guesses should be excluded when computing political information indices. 
          Another important finding is that, just like honest respondents, those respondents 
who find survey questions to be difficult for them are likely to admit that they don’t know 
rather than attempt to make wild, and often, incorrect guesses. This further fortifies the 
preceding argument that when respondents say they ‘don’t know’, it is most likely that 
the question is difficult for them and they are honest about it. It should be underscored 
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that respondent honesty and question difficulty variables are constructed from respondent 
non-verbal behavior observed during the interview process. In fact, a major strength of 
the Afrobarometer dataset worth noting at this point is that it provides vital quantifiable 
information about the interview process and environment, thus enabling us to investigate 
whether and how the interview environment may have affected the respondents’ answers. 
          It is also notable that the influence of partisanship on the likelihood of admitting or 
hiding lack of information depends on the type of partisanship. Whereas the uninformed 
incumbent partisans are more likely to admit that they don’t know than to try to hide their 
ignorance through guesses, uninformed general partisans and opposition partisans more 
likely to hide than to admit that they don’t know. Moreover, the educated people and 
those who pay keen attention to media news are less likely to admit lack of information. 
Given that education and media are considered as vital assets in information acquisition, 
higher educational attainments and greater access to media news can create a sense of 
infallibility which can either make people think they know everything, or at least make it 
embarrassing for them to admit that they don’t know basic facts such as majority party, 
presidential term limits or the constitutionality of the law.  
          More importantly, when the results in table 2.6 are interpreted alongside those in 
table 2.5, a consistent and statistically significant pattern emerges, whereby the variables 
which were significant and positive in Table 2.5 (general partisans, education, and media 
news) are still significant but negative in Table 2.6 and vice versa (gender). This suggests 
that those who make incorrect guesses usually end up with higher political information 
index than those who honestly admit information deficit. Indeed, Table 2.5 shows that 
general partisans, educated people, and those with greater access to media news are more 
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likely to be more informed, while Table 2.6 shows that people with these attributes are 
less likely to be honest enough to admit their lack of political information. Relatedly, 
women are less likely than men to be politically informed, yet more likely to admit 
information deficit. The average PII Index for all the respondents who admitted that they 
don’t know the political institutions and processes is -0.390, compared to -0.238 for those 
who tried to hide their deficit by giving incorrect answers.  
          A surprising result is that although strong opposition partisans tend to guess than to 
admit that they don’t know, they are less likely to be politically well informed compared 
to non-(opposition) partisans. Similarly, strong incumbent partisans are likely to admit 
than to hide lack of information compared to the non-(incumbent) partisans, yet there is 
no statistically significant difference in the likelihood that either of them would end up 
with higher political information index than the other. Relatedly, even though religion is 
expected to cultivate virtues like honesty, there is no indication that uninformed religious 
people are likely to admit information deficit. In fact, religiosity is only significant at α 
=.10. Even then, its coefficients are all negative, suggesting that religious people are in 
fact, more likely to hide than to admit that they don’t know.   
          In short, most of the factors that determine the likelihood of hiding lack of 
information are the same factors that determine information levels, suggesting the 
possibility that a sizeable amount of guesswork infiltrates political information indices. 
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2.7 Chapter Conclusion 
          In this chapter, I have created a robust formula for measuring political information 
and used the new political information index to demonstrate that the level of political 
information is low even in new and emerging democracies. More specifically, the results 
show that Kenyans are generally poorly informed, with a low mean national political 
information index of 0.151, and an equally high standard deviation of 0.477. Worst still, 
most Kenyans tend to be unwilling to reveal their information deficit and therefore might 
not engage in information-seeking activities.  This supports results of several earlier 
studies of advanced democracies, and anchors the dissertation on a sound empirical base: 
Kenyan citizens generally lack pertinent political information.    
          In addition, I have shown that the influence of partisanship on political information 
depends on the type of partisanship scale used. The general and opposition partisanships 
have positive and negative influence on political information respectively, while the 
incumbent partisanship has no statistically significant influence on political information. I 
attribute this partly to the messy party system existing at the time of data collection, and 
substantively, to the fact that the three partisan scales used in this analysis are radically 
independent of each other. Finally, I find a strong correlation between the predisposition 
to make guesses when respondents are unsure of correct answers, and levels of political 
information. This opens avenues worth further exploring to determine how to estimate 
and eliminate the influence of guesswork from the inflated political information indices. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CAN DEMOCRACY WORK WITHOUT INFORMED        CITIZENS? 
EVIDENCE FROM KENYA 
3.1 Introduction  
          Most democratic theorists converge on the idea that ‘citizen participation is at the 
heart of democracy’ (Verba et al, 1995:1) and effective participation in democratic 
processes require informed citizens (Lutz, 2006; Blais, 2010). Hence, they conclude that 
democracy requires well-informed citizens (Dalton, 2008; 
 
Blais, 2010). However, the 
data in chapter two show that the political information levels in Kenya are generally very 
low (PII Index = 0.151), suggesting that the informed democratic citizens prescribed by 
the normative democratic theorists are largely absent in Kenya.  
          This chapter addresses the second dissertation research question: Does democracy 
function well in Kenya even with such an acute political information deficit among its 
citizens? The prime focus of this chapter is to verify whether (not how or why) 
democracy works well despite lack of a critical mass of informed democratic citizens, or 
whether political information deficit undercuts democracy. This remains a sticky issue in 
the literature, with scholars arguing that the uninformed can subvert democracy (Craig et 
al, 2005), and suggest that, ‘questions about whether, when and how the uninformed or 
misinformed citizens can harm democracy deserves to be asked…’ (Gans, 2004:58). 
         In a nutshell, the study identifies three indicators of a well functioning democracy. 
These include knowledge of democracy, satisfaction with democracy, and support for 
democracy. I begin with a model of a properly functioning democracy built around these 
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three indicators. The three subsequent sections address each of these indicators, and how 
they vary with partisanship and political information. These indicators individually and 
collectively offer reasonable basis for determining if democracy works well. Finally, I 
examine the internal consistency of democratic attitudes, especially the extent to which 
support for democracy is consistent with other democratic attitudes - support for rule of 
law, support for universal adult suffrage, support for free and fair elections, opposition 
to one-man rule, opposition to one-party system, and opposition to military rule.  
          In terms of the analysis strategy, I take advantage of the flexibility of the political 
information index developed in chapter two, and measure it at the ordinal level, creating 
an ordered variable with three categories – the uninformed citizens [PII Index <0]; the 
Average citizens [PII Index = 0]; and the informed citizens [PII Index > 0]. I then divide 
the data into three sets corresponding to the three groups. The goal is to perform a 
comparative analysis of the two extreme groups (PII Index < 0 and PII Index > 0] to test 
whether there is significant difference in the way they rationalize their evaluations of how 
well democracy works in Kenya. Technically, uninformed citizens are the experimental 
group whose behavior is the focus of this chapter. Rather than examine them in isolation, 
to the extent necessary and feasible, I compare them with the informed citizens.   
3.2 Model of a Properly Functioning Democracy 
          Although democracy has been treated largely as an institutional variable, it also has 
a behavioral dimension. I argue that building and sustaining a democratic society requires 
democratic attitudes and behaviors as much as it requires democratic institutions. Indeed, 
some scholars have argued that the functionality of democracy should be measured using 
a combination of behavioral, attitudinal and institutional dimensions of democracy (Linz 
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and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1999). However, others argue that such an approach would 
yield unnecessarily complex measure (Schedler, 2009). In this study, I adopt a behavioral 
approach in explaining how democracy works. In this case, I use respondents’ aggregate 
attitudinal and cognitive predispositions towards democracy as indicators of how well 
democracy works in Kenya (see Guldbrandtsen and Skaaning, 2010; Norris, 2011b).  
          In its basic formulation, the model used in this chapter identifies one cognitive and 
two attitudinal indicators of a properly functioning democracy. The former refer to high 
aggregate level of knowledge of democracy, while the latter refer to a strong aggregate 
support for democracy as a form of government, and a greater degree of satisfaction 
among citizens with how democracy is working in their country. These three elements 
individually and collectively, give indications of how well democracy is working.   
          The model which is shown in figure 3.1 has three components. The top part depicts 
aggregate level of knowledge, support and satisfaction with democracy literally lumped 
together in one container. In the middle part, there is the democratic space characterized 
by a properly functioning democracy. The bottom part separately shows each indicator - 
knowledge, support and satisfaction with democracy. The arrows show the four ways in 
which the identified indicators relate to a properly functioning democracy.  
          For instance, knowledge of democracy is critical for the sustenance of a properly 
functioning democracy. It is only when people know their civil rights for example, that 
they can hold the government accountable for either protecting or violating those rights. 
Without such knowledge, people risk cheering autocracy and jeering democracy. Yet, at 
the same time, a properly functioning democracy reinforces knowledge of democracy. 
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This is because, when democracy works well, it becomes “the only game in town”, and 
hence people are likely to know what it is (Przeworski, 1991; Camp, 2001; Cook, 2005). 
Figure 3.1 A Model of Cognitive and Attitudinal Dimensions of Democracy 
 
 
Properly Functioning 
Democracy 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
Support for 
Democracy 
 Knowledge of 
Democracy 
Knowledge 
of 
Democracy 
 
Support for 
Democracy 
 
Satisfaction 
with 
Democracy 
 
Author’s Conceptualization of a properly Functioning Democracy, 2012 
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3.3 Knowledge of Democracy among Kenyans  
          There are three reasons why people’s aggregate knowledge of democracy is vital in 
understanding whether democracy works well. First, recent evidence from cross-national 
studies on Africa show that people who know the meaning of democracy tend to be very 
supportive of it. In contrast, ‘individuals who cannot define democracy are much less 
attracted to it as a preferred form of regime’ (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:117). In essence, 
knowledge of democracy enhances an individual’s ability to acquire and nurture attitudes 
that are supportive of democracy. According to Gunther et al (2007: 30): 
 
Mass-level attitudes supporting democracy are often regarded 
as the bedrock of democratic stability and an important 
ingredient for the functioning of a healthy democracy, and 
much of the literature on democratic consolidation therefore 
places considerable emphasis on the establishment and 
dissemination of democratic attitudes and values. 
 
  
          It is therefore unlikely that people who understand democracy would support it if 
they are not satisfied with the way it is working, or at least, if there is a better known 
alternative. It has been argued for instance, that, ‘if a strong and lasting democracy is to 
be achieved in Kenya, the general citizenry must understand, believe in and embrace 
democratic practices – not just in the political arena, but also in other areas affecting their 
lives’ (Gathuo, 2004:3, cited in Ibelema, 2008:49). On this score, aggregate knowledge of 
democracy is a necessary even if not a sufficient condition for a properly functioning 
democracy. Not only does knowledge of democracy herald democratic consolidation, but 
it is actually indicative of the level of democratic consolidation itself. 
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          Second, the link between knowledge of democracy and its functionality is also 
anchored on the democratic consolidation literature. According to Linz and Stepan (1997), 
a consolidated democracy is ‘a political regime in which democracy as a complex system 
of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, 
‘the only game in town” (ibid, p. 15). They identify three critical dimensions of a 
consolidated democracy – behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional. Behaviorally, 
consolidation occurs when a state is devoid of actors and actions bent on creating non-
democratic regimes or seceding from that state; Attitudinally, democracy is consolidated 
when mass public opinion is in favor of democracy as the best way to manage public 
affairs; and Constitutionally, consolidation is attained when legal resolution of conflicts is 
institutionalized within the framework of rule of law. They conclude that: 
 
In most cases after a democratic transition has been 
completed, there are still many tasks that need to be 
accomplished, conditions that must be established, and 
attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before 
democracy could be considered consolidated
12
 
 
 
          On the same vein, Adam Przeworski (1991:26) observes that:  
 
Democracy is consolidated when under a given political 
and economic conditions a particular system of institutions 
becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine 
acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the 
losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions 
under which they have just lost 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Linz and Stepan (1997:5) 
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         Thus, from both the behavioral and the attitudinal perspectives, if democracy works 
well, then citizens as key actors in the democratic process, would desist from behaviors 
and attitudes that jeopardize democracy, and embrace those that support it, thus making 
democracy “the only game in town”. Moreover, if democracy becomes “the only game in 
town”, then “citizens of that town” should be able to understand the game and its rules. 
As Robert Putnam puts it, ‘if you don’t know the rules of the game and the players, and 
don’t care about the outcome, you are unlikely to try playing yourself’ (2000: 35). 
 
                     Finally, how people define democracy significantly influences what they 
expect from it, which in turn shapes how they evaluate it (Camp, 2001). It has been noted 
that ‘among the conditions of democracy, the one recalled least is that wrong ideas about 
democracy make democracy grow wrong’ (Nwankwo, 2003:13). If the citizens do not 
understand democracy, they cannot tell how well it is working, and hence cannot make 
credible claims that they support, approve or are satisfied with it. Metaphorically put, 
‘democracy is like a party. It won’t work if nobody knows about it, nobody cares, and 
nobody comes’ (Cook, 2005:203). Therefore, when people say they support democracy, 
‘we need to know more about what people mean by democracy and hence what they are 
actually supporting’ (Doorenspleet, 2010:111). Without a clear understanding of what 
democracy means, people are likely to anchor their evaluations of democracy on “the 
myth of democracy”. As discussed elsewhere (Asingo, 1995:4):  
The myth of democracy refers to those ideas, beliefs and hopes 
about democracy held supreme and even glorified due to lack of 
a clear understanding of what democracy is … inadequate 
definitions and an illusory paradise on earth thought to 
accompany democratic ideals are at the core of this mythology. 
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          The Afrobarometer Survey asks respondents an open-ended question suitable for 
testing knowledge of democracy: ‘What if anything does democracy mean to you?  
 
 
Table 3.1 Valid Response to Knowledge of Democracy Question 
 
Response  
 
Frequency 
 
1. Understood Democracy in English 748 
 (60.1%) 
2. Required Local Language  Translation 185 
 (14.9%) 
3. Did not Understand Either 311 
 (25.0%) 
Total Valid Responses 1244 
 (100%) 
 
 
 
          The first two response categories imply that respondents know the meaning of 
democracy but differ in the language used to extract the responses. Since even experts do 
not agree on the meaning of democracy (Dalton et al, 2008; Norris, 2011a), the main 
concern here is not how accurately respondents define democracy, but whether their 
definitions reflect at least some basic understanding of the concept. In any case, scholars 
have noted that in Afrobarometer datasets, ‘all survey respondents who could offer any 
sort of meaning [of democracy] were held to possess basic awareness of democracy’ 
(Bratton et al, 2005:66). Using this simple criteria used by Afrobarometer to determine 
those who understand democracy, I dichotomous knowledge of democracy, by recoding 
response 3 to 0 (doesn’t know) and merging responses 1 and 2 to 1(Know Democracy). 
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3.3.1 How Knowledgeable are Kenyans about Democracy?  
          As already pointed out, one way of determining the degree to which democracy has 
taken root and working well is to assess how well the masses understand democracy itself. 
When democracy becomes “the only game in town”, its principles and ideals should also 
permeate everyday discourse, and hence many people should be able to identify at least 
its salient features. The key objective of this section therefore, is to test hypothesis H 2.1: 
Kenyans generally have a high level of understanding of Democracy. 
          Given the low information levels in Kenya, I had expected that most people would 
be unable to correctly define democracy. As already evident in table 3.1, the results show 
that 75% of Kenyans understand the meaning of democracy. That is, three in every four 
Kenyans can correctly define democracy. This translates into a PII Index of 0.500 for 
democracy, suggesting that Kenyans are more informed about democracy than they are 
about most political issues such as party system, electoral system, the constitution, health 
policies, and fiscal devolution policies (CDF), as already evident in figure 2.3. It is only 
education policies that appear to be much better known than democracy.  
3.3.2 Political Information and Knowledge of Democracy  
          Hypothesis H 2.2 is informed citizens are more likely than uninformed citizens to 
know the meaning of democracy. The results show that there is a big and statistically 
significant difference in the level of understanding of democracy between informed and 
uninformed people. More precisely, 90.3% of informed people know the meaning of 
democracy, as compared to 52.9% of uninformed people. In other words, the informed 
are 37.4% more likely to know democracy than the uninformed.  
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         To explore the link between political information and knowledge of democracy, I 
created the Conditional Density Plot (Cd Plot)
13
 shown in figure 3.2, which illustrates the 
conditional distribution of knowledge of democracy over different levels of information. 
  
         To begin with, I take advantage of the Cd Plot to show the proportion of Kenyans 
who can define democracy by comparing the grey region (representing those who know 
the meaning of democracy) with the black region (representing those who do not know 
the meaning of democracy). Since the grey region is nearly three times the black region, 
it is apparent that three-fourth of Kenyans knows the meaning of democracy.  
 
                                                          
13
 I drew the conditional density plot using the cdplot function in the graphics package 
of the R program for statistical Computing, developed by Achim Zeileis in Hofmann 
(2005): (http://stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-patched/library/graphics/html/cdplot.html). The 
Cdplot is used when the dependent variable is categorical while the independent 
variable is continuous to depict the conditional distribution of the former over different 
levels of the latter.  
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          Substantively, the Cd plot shows that the proportion of Kenyans who understand 
democracy increases significantly and consistently as political information levels increase 
from -1 to +1. As this happens, the proportion of Kenyans who cannot define democracy 
declines at the same rate. Reading from the second y-axis, only 30% of the extremely 
uninformed citizens (PII Index = -1) know what democracy means, compared to almost 
70% of the average citizens (PII Index = 0), and 98% of extremely well informed citizens 
(PII Index = +1) who understand democracy. Further analysis shows that, the average PII 
Index is 0.255 for those who know democracy and -0.167 for those who do not.  
 
          These results not only support the hypothesis that informed citizens are more likely 
than the uninformed citizens to know the meaning of democracy, but also show that, as 
the political information level increases, the likelihood of knowing democracy increases 
too. The findings also support the widely held view that people tend to be generalists as 
opposed to specialists so that those who know an issue or set of issues (such as those who 
know the issues used to compute political information index) are likely to know other 
issues (such as the meaning of democracy) (Zaller, 1986; Carpini and Keteer, 1993).  
3.3.3 Partisanship and Knowledge of Democracy   
 
          The next hypothesis is H 2.3: the uninformed partisans are more likely than the 
uninformed non-partisans to understand democracy. The idea here is that knowledge of 
democracy varies along two important continuums - the political information levels, and 
partisanship. I have shown in the previous section that the informed are more likely than 
uninformed citizens to know the meaning of democracy. I also argue that even among the 
uninformed, understanding of democracy varies with the extent of partisanship, so that 
partisans are expected to have better understanding of democracy than non-partisans. 
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This is because the political cue theory on which the study is anchored, hypothesize that 
uninformed partisans use partisan cues to abridge information deficit, and hence should 
be relatively better informed than uninformed non-partisans. Besides, as shown in chapter 
two, citizens are typically generalists rather than specialists so that those who know an 
aspect of politics are likely to know others too (Carpini and Keteer, 1993; Althaus, 2003)  
          Since the dependent variable, knowledge of democracy, is a binary variable, I use 
the logistic regression. Rather than treat political information as a variable in one model, I 
isolate the informed and the uninformed citizens and ran two identical logit regression 
models for the uninformed (PII Index < 0) and informed citizens (PII Index > 0).
14
 While 
uninformed citizens are the focus of this section, I use the informed citizens as a control 
group. In each model, the three forms of partisanship - general, incumbent and opposition 
- are the key independent variables. I also include several control variables like interest in 
public affairs, education, ethnicity, residence, patriotism and living conditions.
15
 
          The resultant logit regression coefficients are presented in table 3.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 This strategy is important in this context because political information is correlated 
with key independent and control variables included in the logit regression models below 
as was already evident in chapter one. Thus, if it is included in the model as a normal 
independent variable, it would result in a needlessly complex model that may nonetheless 
be affected by collinearity. Moreover, it makes better analytical sense to run two identical 
models for the informed and the uninformed citizens since this allows for comparison of 
how the dependent variable and the key independent variables behave in each data group.  
15
 Both models are statistically significant (p < .05), and all the variables are sufficiently 
independent of each other and hence no collinearity problems noted.  
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Table 3.2 Determinants of Knowledge of Democracy 
 
  Uninformed  
 
Informed  
 
Opposition Partisanship   0.03        -0.22 
  (0.20)        (1.31) 
Incumbent Partisanship -0.25         0.06 
  (1.53) (0.34) 
General Partisanship      -0.28                                              0.14
      (0.83)                                          (0.36)
Education      0.29**        0.40*** 
 (2.84) (3.90) 
Ethnicity -0.86*                                                       0.18
      (2.00)                   (0.39) 
Interest in Public Affairs  0.26                                                             0.68*** 
 (1.70)                                               (4.21)
Residence: Rural 0.38    -1.24** 
 (1.03)                                            (2.70)
Patriotism   0.11                                                      -0.07
 (0.83)                                              (0.50)
Living Conditions 0.15                                                      -0.21 
 (1.04)                                              (1.44)
Intercept -1.74*    2.52*  
 (2.03) (2.28) 
Model  2 23.0                                                     53.8
Pseudo R
2
                                                                                0.16 0.21
Observations 186   554 
 
Entries are Logit regression coefficients with t-values in 
brackets. Significance:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05   
Dependent variable: Knowledge of Democracy: 0 = Does 
not know democracy; 1=  knows democracy                                                       
 
 
 
          The results in table 3.2 do not support the hypothesis that uninformed partisans are 
more likely than uninformed non-partisans to understand democracy. In the first place, 
none of the three partisanship variables is statistically significant predictor of knowledge 
of democracy among the uninformed citizens. That is, regardless of which partisan scale 
we adopt, and regardless of the level of political information, partisans are just as likely 
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to understand democracy as the uninformed non-partisans. In fact, generally speaking, the 
partisanship does not aid partisans in their quest to understand democracy.  
 
          These results suggest that Kenyan political parties are not effective as conduits for 
disseminating political information perhaps due to structural constraints, failure to instill 
internal democracy, and lack of internal party discipline (Asingo, 2003; Oloo, 2007). 
Hence, partisans cannot understand the meaning of democracy by observing what goes 
on in political parties, at least in Kenya. Most Kenyan parties are characterized by party 
anarchy, where politicians disregard party rules but cannot be disciplined for fear that the 
party will be seen to be less democratic, even if these defiance borders on anarchy.  
 
          This trend has roots in the struggle for the country’s liberation from the British 
colonial rule, and more recently, from the struggle to restore multiparty in Kenya and the 
removal of KANU from power after ruling for 39 years. The two historic events required 
immeasurable courage, defiance and disregard for the very laws designed to preserve the 
dominance of authoritarian regimes. The few politicians who exhibited these “virtues” 
and laid the foundation for the rebirth of multiparty in Kenya in the early 1990s such as 
Oginga Odinga, Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, Martin Shikuku, Masinde Muliro, Raila 
Odinga, and George Anyona, were treated as heroes of second liberation.  
 
          Today, most aspiring leaders in Kenya still build their political careers through the 
same tactics of defiance, rebellion and disregard for existing order, especially within the 
political parties. This undermines democracy and promotes anarchy. It seems that the 
authoritarian party structure of the one party era is increasingly being supplanted by an 
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anarchical party structure. Yet, just like authoritarianism, the emerging anarchy stifles 
intra-party democracy. Indeed, one commentator on Kenyan politics noted recently that: 
Kenya is full of amazing characters we call leaders… Should 
one find his aspirations, personal ideologies and or principles 
not in tandem with the sponsoring party, the most honorable 
thing to do, from a moral and principled point of view, is to 
resign and seek fresh mandate from the electorate not only in 
line with this Act [Political Parties Act] but as a matter of 
self conviction and deep rooted principles…However, we 
have seen a number of politicians, “mortally” divorced from 
the ideologies of sponsoring parties and yet remain holed up 
in parties with whom they share literally nothing. This is not 
only fraud; it is an abuse of democracy.
16
 
 
 
These sentiments were separately echoed by another keen observer of Kenyan politics: 
 
You cannot undermine your party and continue to enjoy 
privileges of membership if you consistently vote against 
party positions, campaign against party candidates in elections, 
petulantly insult party leaders, openly declare intention to 
move to another party or conspire with rivals to weaken the 
party. Is that democratic conduct or political anarchy? Dissent 
is healthy and spices up the practice of democracy. But dissent 
must be within the bounds of party rules. Dissent is not 
destroying your party.
17
 
 
3.2.4 Education, Political Discussions and Knowledge of Democracy   
          Of all the control variables, only education is a significant predictor of whether or 
not one understands democracy for both the informed and the uninformed citizens. As 
expected, the probability of knowing democracy increases as education level increases 
                                                          
16
 Sungu Otieno. 2011. ‘Kenya: Political Fraudulence - Time to Reject the Architects’. 
Jaluodotcom on January 12, 2012 at: http://blog.jaluo.com/?p=12308 
17
 Namwamba Ababu. 2011. ‘Democrats do not set out to create disorder’ Daily Nation 
Newspaper. March 5 2011. Accessed at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201103070068.html 
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regardless of whether one is informed or uninformed. In particular, nearly all university 
graduates understand democracy, regardless of their political information level.
18
  
 
          What is surprising though is that a significant proportion of people without formal 
education (43%), are also able to define democracy. I attribute this to the fact that after 
decades of authoritarian rule, the struggle for change that led to the rebirth of democracy 
in Kenya in 1991 may have been guided by populist definition of democracy as ‘the sum 
of correct ways of doing all the wrong things associated with past authoritarianism’.  
 
          As Bratton et al (2005:348) notes: 
 
People compare the performance of a succession of regimes 
over the long run: those who suffered through their adult 
lives under the poorly planned economies of indigenous 
African dictators are quick to endorse liberalized regimes – 
even in incomplete hybrid versions – as long as they regard 
these as perceptibly better than the status quo ante  
 
 
          As a result, by intuitively applying John Stuart Mill’s method of difference, those 
who associate past regimes with arbitrary arrests and detentions without trials may view 
democracy as justice or rule of law; those who link it with the systematic marginalization 
of communities or groups perceived as unsupportive of the regime may define democracy 
in terms of equality among citizens; while those who link the past regimes to imposition 
                                                          
 
18
 Age was omitted from the model presented in table 3.2 since it is strongly correlated 
with education among uninformed people (r = -0.39; α < 0.01), though only modestly 
correlated with it among the informed people (r = -0.19; α < 0.01). Age is only 
significantly correlated with the knowledge of democracy among the uninformed (r = 
0.13; α = 0.02), but not the informed (r = 0.01; α = 0.82). Thus, uninformed youth tend to 
be more educated and knowledgeable about democracy than the uninformed older folks. 
128 
 
of unpopular leaders on citizens may view it in terms of free and fair elections. These are 
simple cues that attentive citizens can use even without any formal education. 
           
          Political discussion is one avenue through which uninformed but attentive people 
can learn and be able to define democracy without formal education. However, I did not 
include it in the model shown in table 3.2, since it correlates with general partisanship 
among informed (r = 0.22) and uninformed people (r = 0.31). Yet, general partisanship is 
a key independent variable. Figure 3.3 is effects plot
19
  showing how education moderates 
the effect of discussions on uninformed people’s ability to understand democracy.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 I constructed the effect plot using effect function developed by John Fox in the effects 
package of the R Program. It shows the effects of ethnicity on knowledge of democracy 
across different education levels. The successive education levels are marked by vertical 
orange lines and begin from no formal education in the bottom left box to postgraduate 
education in the top right box. The ten education levels are outlined in appendix 1. 
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          The bottom-left box in figure 3.3 shows the effect of political discussions on the 
likelihood that uninformed people without formal education will understand democracy. 
It is clear that uninformed people who lack formal education but participate in political 
discussions more frequently are more likely to have a better understanding of democracy 
than those who do not discuss politics, suggesting that they gain from these discussions. 
However, the effect of political discussions on the likelihood that uninformed people will 
understand democracy is significantly moderated by the level of education, to the extent 
that as education levels rise beyond high school (top-left box), engagement in political 
discussions hardly generates useful political cues that can alter one’s knowledge of 
democracy in a significant way. Political discussions at this level may be taking place 
largely among like-minded people thereby merely reinforcing partisan positions. 
 
         Beyond high school level, frequent engagement in political discussions undermines 
one’s ability to properly conceptualize democracy. In this regard, the more a very highly 
educated Kenyan (top-right box) engages in political discussions, the less likely he or she 
will have a good understanding of democracy. Though this finding sounds surprising, it is 
not entirely unexpected. It is surprising since political discussions among highly educated 
people are supposed to enhance not impede knowledge; it is not entirely unexpected since 
we already know from chapter two (table 2.6), that highly educated people are typically 
reluctant to admit political ignorance, even for things that they clearly do not know. It is 
likely that political discussions at this level succumb to factors known to impede the 
ability to understand the meaning of democracy such as ethnicity (see table 3.2). 
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3.2.5 Ethnicity and Knowledge of Democracy   
          In addition to education, table 3.2 shows that ethnicity is the only other significant 
predictor of knowledge of democracy among the uninformed citizens. This is consistent 
with the heuristic cues literature which suggests that ethnicity is a potential source of 
heuristic cues especially for the uninformed citizens (Squire and Smith 1988). Ethnicity 
has negative effect on the uninformed people’s ability to define democracy, implying that 
the uninformed members of the president’s ethnic group (Kikuyu) are less likely to 
understand democracy than the other Kenyans. Surprisingly, ethnicity has no statistically 
significant influence on the knowledge of democracy among informed citizens. This may 
be due to the fact that the informed citizens have their facts correct and therefore their 
understanding of democracy is less colored by ethnic or even party cues. 
          I explore further the influence of ethnicity on the uninformed citizens’ knowledge 
of democracy using a spine plot
20
 in figure 3.4. 
 
 
                                                          
20
 I drew the spine plot using the spineplot function in the graphics package referred to 
in footnote 13. It is interpreted the same way as the cdplot, only that it used where both 
the dependent and independent variables are categorical. 
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        Two critical observations can be made from figure 3.4. First, since the width of each 
bar in the spine plot shows the proportion of each ethnic group in the population defined, 
it is clear that among the five largest ethnic groups in Kenya, the Kamba have the highest 
number of uninformed people followed by Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya and Luo. Secondly, 
consistent with the results in table 3.2, uninformed Kikuyus are least likely to understand 
democracy even when compared to uninformed members of the other four large ethnic 
groups. Only 43.3% of uninformed Kikuyus understand democracy compared to Kambas 
(55.6%), Luos (63.6%), Kalenjins (65.9%), and Luhyas (66.7%).   
          The question is: why would uninformed members of the president’s ethnic group 
(the Kikuyu) be disproportionately unable to define democracy compared to uninformed 
members of the other ethnic groups? This question is compelling particularly since the 
Kikuyu generally have some of the best educational facilities in Kenya and are fairly well 
educated. For instance, Central province, where 94% of residents are Kikuyus (Alwy and 
Schech, 2004), had the highest primary school completion rate of 91.8% in 2004, as 
compared to 81.2% for the second placed Eastern province. It also had the best teacher-
pupil ratio of 36.5% compared to other provinces (World Bank, 2009). Yet, as shown in 
Table 3.2, education significantly influences the ability to understand democracy. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that ethnicity may not have an independent influence on 
the ability of the uninformed Kenyans to understanding democracy.  
          Thus, I used the effect plot shown in figure 3.5 to demonstrate whether the effect of 
ethnicity on the ability of an individual to understand democracy is conditioned by his or 
her level of education. The suspected interaction between ethnicity and education does 
not necessarily mean that the two variables strongly correlate. In fact, their correlation is 
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very weak (r = 0.04), suggesting that the conditional distribution of ethnicity over various 
education levels is inconsistent, and therefore statistically insignificant.   
 
 
 
          Figure 3.5 supports my expectation that the effect of ethnicity on the ability of the 
uninformed Kenyans to understand democracy varies with the level of education. It is 
instructive to note that the level of understanding of democracy is generally low among 
the uninformed Kenyans without formal education (bottom-left plot). Nonetheless, this 
low level of understanding does not vary significantly between the ethnics (members of 
the president’s ethnic group) and non-ethnics (non-members of the president’s ethnic 
group). That is, among uninformed Kenyans without formal education, members of the 
president’s ethnic group are just as likely to understand democracy as the members of the 
other ethnic groups. However, the effect of ethnicity changes as education level increases 
so that uninformed Kikuyus with educational attainment beyond primary school are less 
likely to understand democracy compared to non-Kikuyus with the same attainment. 
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          It is difficult to tell if we would get the same results if the president’s ethnic group 
is not Kikuyu. What is clear is that the relatively low level of understanding of democracy 
among the Kikuyu elite is reflected in Kikuyu voting patterns, suggesting that elite cues 
may be having considerable influence on voting decisions of the masses. In all the four 
elections that Kenya has held since the advent of multiparty democracy in 1992, the 
Kikuyu are the only ethnic group in Kenya that are yet to shed off the tag of ethnic voters 
because they have never supported a presidential candidate from a different ethnic group.  
In contrast, Kalenjins supported a Kikuyu candidate in 2002 and a Luo candidate in 2007; 
while Kambas, Luhyas and Luos supported a Kikuyu candidate in 2002.  
          Thus, a twisted logic of democracy may be taking root among the Kikuyus whereby 
democracy means a chance to elect “one of their own”. Indeed, the perception that the 
Kikuyu are atypical ethnic voters permeates everyday political discourse in Kenya. For 
instance, in a recent opinion article, one commentator observed that: 
The Kikuyu, the most numerous and influential of the Mt Kenya 
communities, are infamous for their insular voting habits, their 
tenacious collective refusal to vote for anyone else, but one of 
their own at presidential elections. Whatever else it is based on, 
whatever strain of political DNA, this bad and blinkered habit 
cannot possibly be blamed on council of elders.
21
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Adama Joe. ‘What Must Raila do to regain Rift Valley?’ The Nairobi Star Newspaper. 
June 13, 2011.  
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3.2.6 Urban, Rural Residence and Knowledge of Democracy  
          Although an individual’s residence (whether urban or rural) significantly influence 
knowledge of democracy among the informed people, it has no statistically significant 
effect on the uninformed people. In particular, while informed urban residents tend to 
understand democracy better than their rural counterparts, residence has no significant 
influence on the uninformed people’s knowledge of democracy. This is partly due to 
differences in urban and rural settings in Kenya in terms of availability of resources and 
opportunities like media news that can enhance one’s ability to understand democracy.  
 
          For instance, while both the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) 
and some private television channels were already available in key urban areas by 2005, 
only KBC which is largely government mouthpiece had close to national coverage, and 
could therefore reach rural audience. Evidently, the information needed to understand 
democracy is relatively more accessible in urban than rural areas. Yet, it has also been 
noted that ‘it takes information to get information’ (Converse, 2000:334). In other words, 
‘as information cost fall and information sources multiply, the information-rich get richer 
and the information-poor stay poorer’ (Bimber, 2003: 206).  
          Therefore, I argue that the difference in the ease of access of information between 
Kenya’s urban and rural settings, together with the differences in the information-seeking 
behavior of the informed and uninformed people explains why residence influences 
knowledge of democracy among the informed but has no significant effect on the 
uninformed people. I present this in table 3.3 and show the percentage of each of the four 
resultant categories of people (informed-urban, informed-rural, uninformed-urban and 
uninformed-rural) that understand democracy. 
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Table 3.3 Residence, Information-Seeking Behavior and Knowledge of Democracy 
 
 
Information Status  
Residence  
Effect of 
Residence 
 
 
 2  
Significance
 Rural 
[Information 
Inaccessible] 
Urban 
[Information 
Accessible] 
Uninformed 
[Don’t seek Information] 
 
52.3% 
 
 
54.9% 
 
 
2.6% 
 
0.82 
Informed 
[Seek Information] 
 
87.0% 
 
96.0% 
 
9.0% 
 
0.04*** 
Effect of Information 34.7% 41.1% 5.4% 0.43 
 
  2  Significance p < 0.01*** p < 0.01*** 0.10  
 
Source: Author’s Conceptualization, 2011. 
 
 
          Consistent with the information-accessibility and information-seeking model, the 
results in table 3.3 show that the informed urban residents are 9.0% more likely to 
understand democracy than the informed rural residents. However, the uninformed urban 
residents are just as likely to understand democracy as the uninformed rural residents. 
Thus, residence influences informed but not uninformed citizens. This is due to the fact 
that the former seek information while the latter do not, and while information is readily 
accessible to urban residents it is not equally accessible to rural residents. Moreover, 
since the uninformed do not seek much information, the mere accessibility of information 
does not have a significant bearing on whether or not they understand democracy. It is 
also notable that although general political information significantly enhances knowledge 
of democracy among both the rural and urban residents, the effect is slightly greater 
among the latter than the former. Nonetheless, this difference is statistically insignificant 
(p = 0.43). On the whole, one stands better chance of understanding democracy if he/she 
seeks information in urban areas where it is relatively more accessible than in rural areas. 
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3.3.7 Interest in Public Affairs and Knowledge of Democracy   
          As was shown in Table 3.2, interest in public affairs has a statistically significant 
positive effect on knowledge of democracy among the informed people. In fact, it is the 
most significant predictor of knowledge of democracy among informed people. This is 
consistent with the results of recent cross-national studies on Africa which also noted that 
‘individuals who lack awareness about public affairs are also very likely to be oblivious 
to the meaning of democracy’ (Bratton et al, 2005: 217). Yet, the influence of interest in 
public affairs on knowledge of democracy among the uninformed is very weak (α = .10).    
 
         To understand why interest in public affairs has significant influence on knowledge 
of democracy among the informed people but not among the uninformed, I take recourse 
to the discussion in the previous section. I argued then that a major distinction between 
the informed and the uninformed people is that the former tend to show relatively greater 
information-seeking behavior than the latter. Yet we also know that, at least in electoral 
contexts, ‘information seeking occurs when a sufficient level of interest in ideas or 
candidates can be generated’ (Baran and Davies, 2011: 285). Hence, I argue that, while 
interest in public affairs and the inclination to seek information can independently render 
one informed, the interaction between them enhances the likelihood of being informed. 
 
          Table 3.4 basically reproduces table 3.3 by replacing residence with interest in 
public affairs. It illustrates how the interaction between information-seeking behavior and 
interest in public affairs affects the chances of knowing democracy. I show the aggregate 
level of understanding of democracy among four groups of people (informed-interested, 
informed-disinterested, uninformed-interested and uninformed-disinterested people). 
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Table 3.4 Interest, Information-Seeking Behavior and Knowledge of Democracy 
Information 
status  
Interest in Public Affairs  Effect of 
Interest 
 2  
Significance
 
Disinterested Interested  
Uninformed 
[Don’t seek 
 Information] 
 
40.9% 
 
 
57.5% 
 
 
16.6% 
 
0.03*** 
Informed 
[Seek 
Information] 
 
76.6% 
 
 
91.7% 
 
 
15.1% 
 
0.01*** 
Effect of 
Information 
35.5% 34.2% 1.5% 0.97 
 2  Significance p < 0.01*** p < 0.01*** 0.92 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Conceptualization, 2011. 
 
 
          Table 3.4 shows that someone who is interested in public affairs has higher chances 
of understanding democracy than someone who is disinterested in public affairs. This is 
true for both the informed and the uninformed. Indeed, 91.7% of people who are both 
informed and interested in public affairs know democracy as compared to just 40.9% who 
are neither informed nor interested in public affairs. Moreover, those who are informed 
and interested are 15% more likely to know democracy than those who are only informed 
but disinterested in public affairs. Put differently, if someone who is both uninformed and 
disinterested develops interests, the probability that he will know democracy increases by 
16.6%. However, if he opts to seek information instead, then the chances of knowing 
democracy increase considerably by 35.5%. Alternatively, if he/she seeks information 
while also developing interest in public affairs, then his likelihood of knowing democracy 
will significantly increase by 50.8%. Oddly, interest alone does not significantly reduce 
knowledge gap between uninformed and informed people. Yet, information alone also 
does not significantly reduce knowledge gap between the interested and the disinterested. 
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Thus, the best strategy for enhancing knowledge of democracy is to encourage people to 
seek credible political information and simultaneously develop interest in public affairs. 
 
          It is likely that interest in public affairs predisposes one to engage in information-
enhancing activities, even when they do not primarily seek information. For instance, 
interest in public affairs may encourage engagement in local decision-making, taking 
community leadership roles, joining others in communal tasks, or monitoring community 
projects. Such activities engender interactions that can either expose one to information 
or lead one into contact with those who are better informed.    
 
3.4 Satisfaction with Democracy among Kenyans  
          Another indicator of how well democracy is working is the aggregate level of 
satisfaction with democracy among citizens
22
. Several studies have shown that citizens’ 
evaluation of how well democracy is working tends to mirror the reality so that whenever 
citizens are satisfied, even scholars concur that democracy is functioning well in that 
particular country (Guldbrandtsen and Skaaning, 2010; Norris, 2011b).  
 
          I use satisfaction with democracy as indicator of how well democracy is working in 
Kenya. Table 3.5 shows satisfaction with democracy for various information levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 For detailed justifications of the use of satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of 
how well democracy functions, see Chapter One, section 1.10.3. 
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Table 3.5 Satisfaction with Democracy by level of Political Information 
 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
 
Uninformed 
Citizen 
 
Average 
Citizens 
 
Informed 
Citizens 
 
All 
Citizens 
 
Not at all Satisfied 
 
27 
(8.1%) 
30 
(9.6%) 
50 
(8.2%) 
107 
(8.5%) 
Not Very Satisfied 
 
62 
(18.5%) 
70 
(22.5%) 
162 
(26.6%) 
294 
(23.4%) 
Fairly  Satisfied 
 
98 
(29.2%) 
123 
(39.6%) 
307 
(50.4%) 
528 
(42.1%) 
Very Satisfied 
 
25 
(7.5%) 
36 
(11.6%) 
63 
(10.4%) 
124 
(9.9%) 
Don’t Know  
 
123 
(36.7%) 
52 
(16.7%) 
27 
(4.4%) 
202 
(16.1%) 
Total Valid Observations 
 
335 
 
311 
 
609 
 
1255 
 
 
 
         It is evident from table 3.5 that the number of people who answer ‘Don’t know’ to 
the question testing levels of satisfaction with democracy is disproportionately higher for 
the uninformed people compared to the other information levels. Indeed, as the political 
information level increases, the proportion of those who answered ‘Don’t know’ declines. 
This is not surprising because we already know from chapter two that uninformed people 
tend to be more honest when answering survey questions. In contrast, informed people 
are sophisticated and tend to guess rather than admit information deficit. Of course, this 
does not preclude the possibility that the tendency to honestly admit information deficit 
through ‘Don’t know’ answers may depress the information levels of uninformed people.  
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3.4.1 Levels of Satisfaction with Democracy among Kenyans 
          I begin discussions on levels of satisfaction with democracy by testing hypothesis 
H 2.4 which states that Kenyans generally have high level of satisfaction with democracy. 
For analytical purposes, I reconstructed table 3.5 by omitting ‘Don’t know’ answers.
23
 
The results show that despite differences in sample size, the valid responses to the 
question on satisfaction with democracy tend to be roughly the same across the three 
ordinal levels of political information, as well as for all citizens. Generally, relatively few 
Kenyans are either completely dissatisfied (10.2%) or completely satisfied (11.8%) with 
the way democracy is working in Kenya. Most people tend to be fairly satisfied (50.1%).   
 
          It is apparent that 61.9% of Kenyans are either fairly satisfied or very satisfied with 
the way democracy functions in their country. The aggregate satisfaction level is 63.6% 
among the informed and 58.0% among the uninformed. Thus, the differences in the levels 
of satisfaction between the informed and the uninformed are statistically insignificant (α 
= 0.51). These results imply that Kenyans have fairly modest levels of satisfaction with 
democracy. Moreover, a satisfaction level of 61.9% for a new and emerging democracy is 
a pointer to the fact that democracy is taking root even if it is not fully consolidated. 
 
          In addition, the mean satisfaction level for all Kenyans is 2.64, while the median 
satisfaction level is 3, on a scale of one to four. Given that the level of satisfaction with 
democracy is a categorical rather than continuous variable, it makes more sense to round 
                                                          
23
 I have provided detailed discussion on the need to isolate ‘Don’t Know’ answers from 
concrete responses in the context of political information in chapter two. However, there 
is need to add that even in other contexts like satisfaction with democracy, ‘it is difficult 
to know what “don’t know” means’ (Jamieson, 2000:84). It could imply ignorance, lack 
of clarity about a question, indecision, or just unwillingness to respond (see Jamieson, 
2000). None of these are useful in determining the level of satisfaction with democracy. 
Henceforth, I restrict my analysis to concrete responses and omit ‘Don’t Know’ answers. 
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the mean to 3, or better still, to use the median rather than the mean.  In other words, the 
majority of Kenyans who expressed their feelings about the way democracy functions in 
their country (50.1%) are fairly satisfied with it. 
          The median satisfaction score of 3 on a scale of 1 to 4 seems to be a fair appraisal, 
since Kenya has made significant democratic gains since 2002. Thus, her Freedom House 
Index (FHI) improved from 5.5 in 2001 to 4.0 in 2002 and then to 3.0 from 2003 to 2005 
when the Afrobarometer data was collected (Freedom House, 2006). Yet, the FHI is still 
considered as ‘[the] best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy’ (Diamond, 
1999:12). Indeed, a score of 3 on the FHI scale of 7 to 1 translates into a score of 5 on a 
scale of 1 to 7 or 71.4%. Similarly, a score of 3 on a scale of 1 to 4 is equivalent to 2/3 or 
66.7%. The difference between the two scores is not statistically significant (α = 0.57). 
3.4.2 Political Information and Satisfaction with Democracy in Kenya 
          The primary concern here is to test hypothesis H 2.5 which states that informed 
Kenyans are more likely than the uninformed to be satisfied with how democracy works 
in Kenya. I perform two-sample equality of proportions test, which involves comparing 
the proportions of informed and uninformed Kenyans who are either fairly satisfied or 
very satisfied with democracy. The results show that differences between the proportions 
of informed and uninformed Kenyans who are either fairly satisfied or very satisfied with 
how democracy is working in Kenya are not statistically significant ( 2 = 1.81; α = 0.19). 
More specifically, 58% of uninformed citizens and 63.6% of the informed Kenyans are 
very satisfied or at least fairly satisfied with democracy. Similarly, the mean satisfaction 
level is 2.66 for the informed people and 2.57 for the uninformed. The differences in the 
two mean satisfaction levels is also not statistically significant (t = 1.30; α = 0.20). 
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          Thus, the results do not support the hypothesis that informed Kenyans are more 
satisfied with how democracy works in Kenya than the uninformed. Generally, Kenyans 
are fairly satisfied with democracy, but this satisfaction does not vary significantly by 
level of political information. The uninformed are just as likely to be satisfied as the 
informed citizens. This is surprising since the range of issues that one needs to consider 
to evaluate democracy seems to be beyond the capacity of the uninformed citizens. 
          The question arising from the preceding discussion is: How did Kenyans arrive at 
the apparently accurate appraisal of how well democracy is working, given their very low 
information levels? Or better still: What enabled uninformed Kenyans to arrive at nearly 
the same verdict as informed Kenyans, with respect to how democracy is functioning?          
To address these questions, I take recourse to the political cue theory. I attribute the 
unexpected ability of uninformed citizens to arrive at fairly accurate evaluation of how 
well democracy is doing to their reliance on political cues. If this is true, then satisfaction 
levels would vary even among uninformed citizens, depending on whether or not they are 
partisans. Accordingly, I test hypothesis H 2.6: Uninformed partisans are more likely 
than uninformed non-partisans to be satisfied with the way democracy works in Kenya. 
          Since satisfaction with the way democracy works, which is the dependent variable, 
is an ordered variable with four categories, I fitted two proportional ordered logit 
regression models –for the uninformed and for informed citizens. The three partisanship 
variables- General, Incumbent and Opposition- are the key independent variables. I have 
included ethnicity and living condition and two variables that test for pertinent issues that 
one ordinarily expect citizens to base their assessment of how well democracy is working 
- economic policy approval and freedom of speech. The results are in Table 3.6: 
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Table 3.6 Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
  Uninformed  
Kenyans 
 
Informed  
Kenyans 
 
General Partisanship    0.14   0.47* 
   (0.44) (2.29) 
Incumbent Partisanship         0.61***       0.44*** 
  (3.65) (4.66) 
Opposition Partisanship        -0.25                                              -0.11
  (1.60)                                          (1.11)
Freedom of Speech -0.01     0.35** 
 (0.08) (2.88) 
Government Corrupt  -0.29                                                          -0.40**
 (1.23)                   (2.94) 
Economic Policy Approval      1.04**                                                             0.93*** 
  (2.64)                                               (3.97) 
Relative Deprivation -0.15 -0.02 
 (1.04)                                            (0.25) 
Ethnicity  0.17                                                      0.30 
 (0.40)                                              (1.26) 
Model  2 35.85                                                     114.49 
Pseudo R
2
                                                                                .228 .228 
Observations 154   501 
 
Entries are Proportional Ordered Logit Regression 
Coefficients with t-values in brackets. Cut points are omitted 
for simplicity. Significance: 0 ‘***’0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
 
                                                        
 
  
         Table 3.6
24
 shows that incumbent partisanship and economic policy approval are 
the only variables that have consistent, significant and positive influence on satisfaction 
with democracy for both the informed and the informed people. In fact, the former is the 
                                                          
24
 Both models are fit and statistically significant (α = .05). The model condition indices 
and variance decomposition propositions show that there are no collinearity problems. 
Each independent variable in the models estimates the ordered log-odds of the expected 
level of satisfaction with democracy, if that variable increases by one unit as others are 
held constant. For instance, a change from non-incumbent partisan to incumbent partisan 
raises the log-odds that an uninformed people will be very satisfied with democracy by 
0.61. This crude interpretation suffices, but I also use graphs for refined interpretations.  
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strongest predictor of satisfaction with democracy for both informed and uninformed 
people. It is also notable that while satisfaction with democracy for both informed and 
uninformed people is primarily driven by incumbent partisanship and economic policy 
approval, the former’s satisfaction with democracy is further influenced by freedom of 
speech, general partisanship, and government corruption. This supports the argument 
that informed people tend to pay attention to, and hence anchor their satisfaction with 
democracy on a wider range of issues than uninformed people (Carpini and Keteer, 2005; 
Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010; Bennie, 2001). Moreover, ethnicity and relative deprivation 
have no significant effect on the likelihood of being satisfied with democracy for either 
informed or uninformed people. I discuss these results under the following four subtitles. 
3.4.3 Partisanship and Satisfaction with Democracy 
          In line with the political cue theory, I had expected incumbent partisanship to have 
strong positive influence, and opposition partisanship to have equally strong negative 
influence on satisfaction with democracy. I expected these relations to persist regardless 
of the information levels, or the actual status of democracy. This is because people often 
derive political cues heuristically from political parties, rather than through rational 
calculation of relevant issues, especially when evaluating complex issues like the state of 
democracy. Indeed, ‘empirical findings generally support the prediction that citizens will 
look to source cues more when evaluating hard issues’ (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002:20). 
 
          The results presented in table 3.6 are more complex than hypothesized. Incumbent 
partisanship is the only form of partisanship that significantly influences satisfaction with 
democracy for both the informed and the uninformed. In fact, it is the strongest predictor 
of satisfaction with democracy for both groups. In contrast, opposition partisanship has 
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no significant effect on satisfaction with democracy for either informed or uninformed 
people. Besides, general partisanship has positive influence on the informed, but has no 
effect on the uninformed. It seems that people tend to evaluate democracy in terms of the 
performance of incumbent rather than opposition parties, and thus satisfaction depends on 
where they place themselves on the incumbent rather than opposition partisanship scale.   
 
          For better interpretation of these results, figures 3.6 (a) and (b) shows the predicted 
probabilities of being satisfied with democracy among informed and uninformed people.  
 
 
 
          Figures 3.6 (a) and (b) show that, when other variables in the two models are held 
constant at their medians, the uninformed non-partisans (on the incumbent partisanship 
scale), are more likely to be very dissatisfied with democracy (probability=25%) than the 
informed non-partisans (probability =17%). That is, without the influence of incumbent 
partisanship, the probability that someone who is non-partisan will be very dissatisfied 
with democracy is 8% greater among uninformed than informed people.  
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          Relatedly, the probability of being fairly dissatisfied with democracy is 43%, and 
does not depend on information levels. However, incumbent partisanship reduces the 
probability of being very dissatisfied by 12% for the informed and 20% for uninformed 
people. It also reduces the probability of being fairly dissatisfied by 23% among 
uninformed and 20% among informed people. Thus, incumbent partisanship has a greater 
effect on dissatisfaction with democracy among uninformed than informed people.   
 
          Similarly, the likelihood that non-incumbent partisan will be fairly satisfied is 30% 
among the uninformed and 38% among informed people. A change from non-partisan to 
strong partisan on the incumbent partisanship scale raises the probability of being fairly 
satisfied with democracy by 25% for the informed people, and by 32% for uninformed 
people. A similar change increases the probability of being very satisfied by 6% and 11% 
for informed and uninformed people respectively. On this score, it seems that incumbent 
partisanship has greater positive influence on the uninformed than the informed people.  
 
          In a nutshell, the results show that there is a statistically significant difference in 
the net effect of incumbent partisanship on satisfaction with democracy among informed 
and uninformed people. The effect of incumbent partisanship on satisfaction is greater on 
the uninformed than informed people. This is hardly surprising because, unlike the latter 
whose satisfaction with democracy is also influenced by several other factors (economic 
policy approval, general partisanship, freedom of speech and government corruption), 
the former only relies on the incumbent partisanship and economic policy approval. 
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           Notwithstanding these differences, we noted earlier that the level of satisfaction 
with democracy is the same among both the informed and the uninformed Kenyans. We 
have also noted that incumbent partisanship is the strongest predictor of satisfaction with 
democracy among both informed and uninformed people. On the strength of these results, 
it can be concluded that incumbent partisanship raises the level of satisfaction with 
democracy among uninformed to almost the same level as the informed people. 
 
3.3.4 Economic Policy Approval and Satisfaction with Democracy 
          The performance of government polices and the general economic conditions are 
widely seen as determinants of satisfaction with democracy (Norris, 2011b). In fact, some 
fairly recent studies on Africa have noted that ‘satisfaction with democracy is influenced 
principally by evaluations of government performance’ (Bratton et al, 2005:83). For 
instance, using the case of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), Bratton et al, (2005) 
found strong correlations between economic policy approval and satisfaction with 
democracy across several African countries. Consistent with these earlier findings, table 
3.6 shows that approval of economic policies has a significant positive influence on the 
level of satisfaction with democracy in Kenya among informed and uninformed people. 
          For substantive analysis of the effect of economic policy approval on satisfaction 
with democracy, I use the predicted probabilities in figures 3.7 (a) and (b) 
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          Figures 3.7(a) and (b) show that Kenyans tend to avoid extreme satisfaction levels 
regardless of whether they approve or disprove economic policies. They would rather be 
fairly satisfied or fairly dissatisfied than very satisfied or very dissatisfied. Still, approval 
of economic policy reduces the probability of being very dissatisfied with democracy by 
7% among the informed and 9% among the uninformed. It also reduces the probability of 
being fairly dissatisfied by 14% among the informed and 15% among the uninformed.  
 
          In contrast, the informed and the uninformed who approve economic policies tend 
to be fairly satisfied with democracy than their counterpart who disapproves the policies 
by 16% and 17% respectively. In essence, approval of economic policies substantially 
reduces dissatisfaction, while increasing satisfaction with democracy for both informed 
and uninformed people. However, the effect of policy approval on satisfaction levels of 
the informed and uninformed people is not different in a statistically significant way. 
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          The results should be understood against a backdrop whereby democratic political 
systems are typically expected to make public policies that reflect the preferences, values 
and interests of their citizens (Saward, 1998; Jacoby, 2002; Amy, 2002). In fact, 
democracy is often viewed as ‘[the] necessary correspondence between acts of 
governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to these acts’ 
(Saward, 1998: 51). Better still, ‘the ultimate aim of democracy is to ensure that officials 
pass policies that reflect the political preferences of the citizens’ (Amy, 2002:184).  
 
         Therefore, to the extent that both the informed and uninformed Kenyans base their 
satisfaction with democracy on evaluations of government economic policies, they seem 
to be attentive to the instrumental value of democracy. The ability to link democracy to 
the broader economic policies is critical because the literature suggests that sustainability 
of democracy depend on its ability to spur economic development, and that democratic 
governments derive stability and legitimacy from their tendency to enact and implement 
policies that are congruent with the preferences of the electorate (Lipset, 1959; Krosnick 
et al, 2010). Hence, ‘to evoke compliance and participation, democracy must generate 
substantive outcomes: It must offer all the relevant political forces real opportunities to 
improve their material welfare’ (Przeworski, 1991:32).  
          While the instrumental value of democracy is critical, it should not be overprized to 
the point of misconstruing ‘benevolent dictatorships’ for democracies. It is notable for 
instance that the uninformed Kenyans seem to be guided more by the instrumental rather 
than the intrinsic value of democracy given that they do not pay attention to civil liberties 
inherent in a democracy such as freedom of speech. In contrast, the uninformed Kenyans 
derive their satisfaction from both the instrumental and the intrinsic values of democracy.  
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3.4.5 Official Government Corruption and Satisfaction with Democracy 
          I used corruption as an indicator of bad governance and expected that, regardless of 
political information levels, those who perceive the government to be very corrupt would 
be less satisfied with democracy, compared to those who feel that she is not corrupt. 
However, the results in table 3.6 show that this is only true with regard to the informed 
people, and that perceptions of corruption in government has no significant influence on 
satisfaction with democracy among the uninformed. Yet, surprisingly, the differences in 
the mean levels of official corruption in government as perceived by the informed (1.37) 
and uninformed Kenyans (1.41) are statistically insignificant. Moreover, 41.5% of the 
informed feel that either most or all government officials are corrupt compared to 39.4% 
of the uninformed. This difference is also statistically insignificant. 
          The fact that the perceptions about corruption in government influences the level of 
satisfaction with democracy among the informed but has no effect on the uninformed is 
not merely an artifact of the distribution of respondents in the two information groups. 
This is because the informed and uninformed Kenyans have nearly congruent perceptions 
about the prevalence of corruption in government circles. But while the former uses this 
as a basis for evaluating how democracy is functioning in Kenya, the latter does not.   
          A possible explanation why the uninformed Kenyans appear to ignore corruption is 
that they tend to appeal to a very narrow range of factors when forming perceptions about 
democracy, and as long as those factors enable them to make satisficing decisions, they 
do not seem inclined to employ all information at their disposal. For instance, besides not 
being bothered about corruption, uninformed incumbent partisans, or those who approve 
their policies, also do not worry about civil liberties such as freedom of speech. However, 
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the informed do surmount this apparent deficiency given that ‘political knowledge seems 
to increase citizen’s ability to consistently connect their policy views to evaluations of 
public officials and political parties and to their political behavior’ (Carpini, 2009: 26).           
Alternatively, it is possible that corruption has been so prevalent that people hardly pay 
attention to it. Indeed, it has been noted that ‘Corruption is deeply engrained in Kenyan 
society so much so that in some cases it has been seen as a way of life’
25
, and yet as I 
have argued elsewhere, ‘when corruption runs in the veins, it takes time to tackle it’.
26
 
          It should also be noted that the mean corruption levels in Kenya noted earlier is 
very modest given that the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
ranked Kenya 144 out of 169 countries, while the 2005 Kenya Bribery Index showed that 
corruption was rampant even in public institutions like the judiciary (Freedom House, 
2006). Furthermore, the 2005 International Commission of Jurists report directly noted 
the link between corruption and democracy, stating that ‘corruption in the administration 
of justice as well as in the judiciary remains a serious impediment to the rule of law in 
Kenya’ (ibid, 385). Thus, Kenyans tend to report lower corruption levels in government 
that do not seem to match the objective evaluations by experts. This does not necessarily 
imply dishonest evaluations, but perhaps lack of information on the extent of corruption 
in government, which lead them to merely report personal experiences or perceptions.  
 
                                                          
25
 Government of Kenya. 2009. ‘The Kenya Anticorruption and Economic Crimes Act’. 
The Kenya Gazette Notice.  Number 268. Vol. CXI. (4). January 9, 2009. p. 120. 
 
26
 Report on an interview I gave to the BBC on the fight against corruption in Kenya in 
May 2004:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3648885.stm 
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          Lack of information on corruption in government may be a product of the Official 
Secrets Act which, at least up to the period under review, prohibited public officers from 
releasing information relating to government transactions, and thus they cannot blow the 
whistle when they notice corrupt activities within government. Indeed, the Kiswahili
27
 
word for government is Serikali (deep secrets). The fate of civil servants who have blown 
the whistle in corruption cases is well depicted by Schroder who notes that (2009:31): 
David Munyekei who exposed the infamous Goldenberg 
[corruption] scandal by detailing how 24 billion Kenya 
shillings [about 0.3 billion US Dollars] was siphoned off 
from the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) within a week in 
1993 through the bank’s pre-shipment finance scheme was 
consequently immediately sacked from the CBK.
28
 
 
          Alternatively, people may deliberately underreport corruption either because they 
are co-ethnics of those implicated in mega corruption cases in Kenya or because they are 
political clients who benefit or expect to benefit from the proceeds of corruption. Either 
way it has been pointed out that, ‘in principle, African populace support anticorruption 
campaigns but when it snags their prebendal office holder, the attitude is different’ 
(Ibelema, 2008:51). Indeed, there have been cases when Kenyans protest in support of, 
rather than against, people (especially politicians and senior bureaucrats) who have been 
implicated in corruption simply because they share ethnic identity with that person.   
                                                          
27
 Kiswahili is the national language, while English is the official language in Kenya. In 
other words, since Kenya comprise of forty two distinct ethnic groups, each speaking its 
own language, Kiswahili is the recognized language with which all Kenyans identify, and 
through which they communicate with each other. On the other hand, English is the 
language through which Kenya and Kenyans communicate with the rest of the world. 
 
28
 The Goldenberg corruption scandal still hits headlines partly because of its devastating 
effects on the economy, and partly because its key architects are still in government. 
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          Besides, since those who engage in corruption, especially high level corruption, are 
usually well connected in government circles, ordinary Kenyans may rate corruption low 
just for fear that subsequent questions in the questionnaire may require them to name 
corrupt people, thus exposing them to reprisals. This argument is anchored on the fact 
that 41.7% of respondents in the 2005 Afrobarometer survey for Kenya actually believed 
that the survey was sponsored by the Kenya government. 
          Yet, although Kenyans tend to undervalue the extent of corruption in government, 
they still match their feelings about corruption with reasonable levels of satisfaction with 
democracy that one would expect if they had made correct evaluations. The results show 
that satisfaction declines as the feeling that the government is corrupt increases. This is 
the same conclusion reached by some recent cross-national studies. For instance, Norris 
(2011a) found ‘a strong and significant relationship between each society’s perceived 
level of corruption and how satisfied citizens felt about the performance of democracy in 
their own country’ (p. 178). She observes that countries with high corruption levels have 
low satisfaction levels, while those with low corruption levels have high satisfaction 
levels (Norris, 2011a). What she overlooks, but which this study show, is the fact that the 
corruption only influence satisfaction with democracy significantly among the informed. 
3.4.6 Freedom of speech and Satisfaction with Democracy 
          I expected that both the informed and the uninformed Kenyans who feel that there 
is greater freedom of speech now than before would be more satisfied with democracy 
than those who feel that there is less freedom of speech now than before. This expectation 
is based on the fact that civil liberties and personal freedoms were the most frequently 
mentioned indicators of democracy by respondents (46.0%) when asked the meaning of 
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democracy. Indeed, a meta-analysis of nearly 50 recent national public opinion surveys 
by Dalton et al (2008) found that in a significant majority of those studies, ‘democracy is 
broadly identified in terms of freedoms and liberties’ (p. 6) even by ordinary citizens in 
countries with limited media access. Moreover, recent cross-national studies on Africa 
found that Africans often tend to define democracy in liberal terms, by ‘valuing above all, 
freedom of speech’ (Bratton et al, 2005:347). It has even been argued that due to the 
tendency by most Africans to reduce democracy to freedoms, ‘many citizens fall prey to 
a fallacy of liberalization in which they too readily mistake the availability of a few new 
freedoms for fully functioning democratic regimes’ (Bratton et al, 2005:345). 
 
          The results in table 3.6 only provide partial support for these expectations. While 
freedom of speech significantly influences satisfaction with democracy among informed 
citizens, it has no statistically significant influence among the uninformed citizens. These 
results are particularly interesting given that recent cross-national studies on Africa show 
that suppression of the freedom of speech does not affect satisfaction with democracy 
(Guldbrandtsen and Skaaning, 2010). The results in table 3.6 update these earlier results 
by suggesting that the effect of freedom of speech on satisfaction with democracy varies 
with the level of political information. Even more substantively, the results underscore 
the inattentiveness of the uninformed citizens on the intrinsic values of democracy such 
as freedom of speech. Yet freedom is important ingredient of democracy that one would 
expect to guide opinion formation with respect to whether democracy is functioning well.   
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3.4.7 Ethnicity and Satisfaction with Democracy 
          The results in table 3.6 also show that ethnicity does not significantly influence the 
satisfaction with democracy either among the informed or the uninformed Kenyans. This 
is inconsistent with part of the heuristic cues literature which portrays ethnicity as a major 
source of heuristic cues especially for uninformed citizens (Squire and Smith, 1988). The 
mere fact of sharing ethnic identity with the president (Kikuyu) may not necessarily make 
one satisfied with democracy. Figure 3.8 shows the level of satisfaction with democracy 
among five largest ethnic groups in Kenya. It also illustrates how the level of satisfaction 
among these ethnic groups varies with the political information levels.   
 
 
 
 
          Beginning with the Kalenjin, there is a statistically significant difference in levels 
of satisfaction with democracy between the informed and the uninformed, signifying 
some kind of disconnect between the two groups in terms of how they form perceptions 
about democracy. On the one hand, informed Kalenjins are not just very satisfied with the 
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way democracy works, but are in fact the most satisfied of the ethnic groups considered 
here. In contrast, the uninformed Kalenjins are the least satisfied with the way democracy 
is working. Besides, while satisfaction with democracy is significantly lower among 
uninformed Kalenjins than uninformed Kikuyus, the difference in the levels of 
satisfaction among their informed counterparts is statistically insignificant.  
          A similar pattern of intra-ethnic group disconnection between the informed and the 
uninformed is also evident among the Luos, so that the former have a significantly higher 
probability of being satisfied with democracy than the latter. Also, while the satisfaction 
levels among informed Luos and informed Kikuyus are not much different, uninformed 
Kikuyus have a significantly greater probability of being satisfied than uninformed Luos. 
          However, a comparison of satisfaction levels among Kikuyus, Kambas and Luhyas 
yields a reverse pattern from the one observed above. Satisfaction levels among informed 
and uninformed Kambas are not significantly different. The same applies to Luhyas and 
Kikuyus. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the satisfaction levels between 
uninformed Kikuyus and Kambas, or uninformed Kikuyus and Luhyas. Yet, uninformed 
Kikuyus have significantly higher satisfaction levels than uninformed Kambas or Luhyas.   
           Taken together, the results suggest a very complex relationship between ethnicity 
and satisfaction with democracy. When we limit the focus to the informed Kenyans, it is 
notable that Kikuyus are more satisfied with democracy than Kambas and Luhyas, but just 
as satisfied as Luos and Kalenjins. Yet, when we shift focus to the uninformed, then the 
pattern is reversed so that Kikuyus are more satisfied than Luos and Kalenjins, but just as 
satisfied as Kambas and Luhyas. Further analysis reveals that, at least at the time of the 
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survey, the Luos and Kalenjins were less attached to the incumbent party, while Kikuyus, 
Kambas and Luhyas tended to be relatively more attached to the incumbent party.
29
 
          What emerges is that the non-Kikuyus who are less attached to the incumbent party 
(Luos and Kalenjins) tend to rely on the objective information at their disposal. If they are 
sufficiently informed, they are likely to be just as satisfied with democracy as the Kikuyu. 
However, if they lack information then they tend to have very low levels of satisfaction. 
On the other hand, non-Kikuyus who are strongly attached to the incumbent party do not 
need information in order to be satisfied with democracy. Incumbent partisanship itself is 
sufficient to raise their satisfaction levels close to that of the Kikuyus. In fact, political 
information appears to weaken their satisfaction levels well below that of the Kikuyus. 
Thus, the influence of ethnicity on satisfaction with democracy is significantly moderated 
by both by the level of political information and the strength of incumbent partisanship. 
3.4.8 Relative Deprivation and Satisfaction with Democracy 
          I had expected that relatively deprived people would be less satisfied with the way 
democracy works in Kenya, particularly if they are uninformed. This expectation is based 
on a definition of relative deprivation as a sort of frustration that arises out of unfulfilled 
expectations. This frustration generates disaffection and anger which is typically directed 
to those in charge of government. Consequently, when people with a sense of deprivation 
have a double tragedy of lacking information, and are asked to evaluate democracy, they 
are expected to use the opportunity to vent their frustrations through negative evaluations. 
                                                          
29
 The actual distribution of those who are either partisan or strong partisans on 
incumbent partisanship scale are: 20% of uninformed and 23.3% of informed Luos; 26.3% 
of uninformed and 25.4% of informed Kalenjins; 48.7% of uninformed and 43.3% of 
informed Luhyas; 53.2% of uninformed and 44% of informed Kambas; and 62.5% of the 
uninformed and 71.5% of informed Kikuyus. 
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          Contrary to these expectations, the results presented in table 3.6 show that relative 
deprivation has no significant influence on satisfaction with democracy either among the 
informed or the uninformed Kenyans. A possible explanation of these results is that the 
sense of deprivation may not be strong enough, even among those who appear to be very 
deprived, to generate destructive frustrations. For instance, it is possible that people do 
not necessarily attribute their deprivation to the incumbent party or government. Indeed, 
there is no significant difference between the proportion of those who are not deprived at 
all and those who are very deprived, who still profess to be strong incumbent partisans.  
          Alternatively, it is also possible that even when people attribute their deprivation to 
the incumbent party, there may be other compelling factors like ethnicity, or even lack of 
viable alternatives, which still make them less inclined to adopt a negative attitude 
towards the incumbent party. More importantly, it is also likely that people look beyond 
material benefits that may accrue from democracy, and therefore whether their material 
conditions improve or worsen has no significant effect on their evaluations of democracy.  
 
3.5 Support for Democracy among Kenyans  
          Support for democracy is usually considered as a measure of the extent to which 
people embrace democracy as a form of government rather than an empirical verification 
of how well democracy works in reality. Nonetheless, being supportive of democratic 
principles is a vital attitude for a democratic citizen. I argue that while support for 
democratic ideals may not necessarily mean that democracy is working well, it is unlikely 
that a democracy would function well without a citizenry that embrace democratic values 
and attitudes. It is more likely that, ‘citizens may be dissatisfied with the way democracy 
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works in their country but still be deeply committed to the principle of democracy and 
willing to countenance any other form of government’ (Diamond, 1999:169). 
 
          As Boxil et al (2007:35) have rightly argued: 
 
Indeed, history has taught us that even staunchly democratic 
regimes can become vulnerable if anti-democratic opposition 
forces are successful at undermining citizen support for that 
system of government. Keeping track of citizen support can 
therefore be an effective means of assessing the state of a 
democracy – gauging the extent to which the system is in the 
process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidating  
 
3.5.1 How Much Support Does Democracy Enjoy in Kenya? 
          In this section I tested hypothesis H 2.7: Kenyans generally have a high level of 
support for democracy. The results support this hypothesis, so that 85.6% of Kenyans 
support democracy. The high level of support for democracy may be a result of perceived 
instrumental rather than intrinsic value of democracy. Indeed, past studies in new and 
emerging democracies have reported that ‘mass support for democracy is not intrinsically 
motivated but reflects instrumental motives, such as the belief that democracy will bring 
prosperity like that of the established democracies’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:119). But 
it is also possible that support for democracy may be due to lack of viable alternatives. 
          More substantially, Kenya’s history may explain the high level of satisfaction with 
democracy. In a study of the democratic experiences of several African countries up to 
2005, Bratton (2010) found that countries which had just held elections in which the 
incumbent party lost, specifically Ghana, Senegal and Kenya, had the highest support for 
democracy. In the case of Kenya, democracy made it possible to cut links with very long 
160 
 
periods punctuated by three different versions of authoritarianism- traditional, colonial, 
and modern. Of course some can argue that traditional African societies were democratic.   
 
          However, as explained elsewhere (Asingo, 1995:15-16): 
 
Both the [African] traditional and the colonial administrative 
structures were far from being democratic….The very 
structure of the traditional African societies militated against 
democratic ideals. Never were leaders determined by the 
consensus of the majority and never were decisions 
collectively made. By and large, leadership was hereditary 
and based on social status rather than the will of the majority. 
Decision-making on the other hand was the preserve of a few 
clan elders – the community sages assumed to be some sort 
of Platonic Philosopher-kings.  
 
 
          The Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania provide an example of how history promotes 
or undermines support for democracy. A study of the Maasai of Tanzania revealed deep 
competing interpretations of democracy, pitting the youths against elders. Many young 
Maasais regard democracy as freedom from the chains of their age-old customs, and the 
authoritarian claws of their traditional elders. Hence, a large segment of the youth voted 
for the opposition NCC-Mageuzi presidential candidate as part of the quest to break from 
the past which has politically been dominated by the incumbent Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM). As the relatively liberal youths view democracy as freedom to rebel against 
elders and customs, and thus shift support to the opposition, the conservative elders view 
it as an affront to their authority, and support the incumbent (Cowen and Laakso, 2002). 
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3.5.2 Political Information and Support for Democracy in Kenya 
          The primary objective of this section is to test hypothesis H2.8: Informed citizens 
are more likely than uninformed citizens to support democracy. The two-sample test for 
equality of proportions shows statistically significant difference between the proportions 
of the informed and uninformed citizens who support democracy. Specifically, 71.6% of 
uninformed and 92.3% of informed citizens support democracy. Hence, the informed are 
20.7% more likely to support democracy than the uninformed. 
         I construct a Conditional density plot (Cd plot) to further explore the relationship 
between political information levels and support for democracy in Kenya. It shows the 
conditional distribution of support for democracy over different political information 
levels as depicted in figure 3.9 
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          Figure 3.9 shows that as the level of political information increases, the proportion 
of Kenyans who support democracy also increase consistently, as those who do not 
support it declines. 95% of those who are extremely well informed (PII Index = +1) 
support democracy, while only 37.5% of those who are completely uninformed (PII 
Index = -1) support it. Thus, informed respondents are 57.5% more likely to support 
democracy than the uninformed. On the flipside, the finding that a non-trivial proportion 
of uninformed Kenyans (37.5%) also support democracy underscores the fact that besides 
information levels, there are other factors that drive support for democracy in Kenya. One 
such factor suspected to influence support for democracy is partisanship. 
3.5.3 Partisanship and Support for Democracy in Kenya 
          This section test hypotheses H 2.9: Partisans are more likely than non-partisans to 
support democracy. I perform three different tests for each of the three partisanship 
variables. – Incumbent, Opposition and General Partisanships. Since the former two are 
polytomous variables with four ordered categories I reduce them to dichotomous forms to 
be able to compare partisans with non-partisans in each case. Accordingly I retain the 
first category as non-partisans and combine the last three categories into partisans. For 
each partisanship variable, I perform the two-sample test for equality of proportions in 
order to establish their influence on the likelihood of supporting democracy. 
 
          The results for the two-sample test for equality of proportions show that the 
proportion of the incumbent partisans uninformed that support democracy (86.1%) is 
identical to that for the uninformed (86.2%). Hence, incumbent partisanship has no 
statistically significant influence on the likelihood of supporting democracy. Similarly, 
86.6% of the uninformed and 85.9% of the informed opposition partisans support 
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democracy. Once again, the proportions of the opposition partisans who support 
democracy are not different from that of opposition non-partisans who support it. Hence, 
opposition partisans are just as likely as opposition non-partisans to support democracy.  
 
          However, this picture changes with regard to general partisanship. The test results 
show that 58.3% of non-partisans and 69.7% of the partisans on the general partisanship 
scale support democracy. The fact that the 11.4% difference between the two proportions 
is significant ( 2 = 7.24, α < 0.01), suggest that the general partisans are more likely to 
support democracy than the general non-partisans. In a nutshell, the effect of partisanship 
on citizen’s support for democracy depends on the type of partisanship. While opposition 
and incumbent partisanship have statistically insignificant influence, general partisanship 
has statistically significant positive influence on citizen support for democracy.  
 
3.5.4 Information, Partisanship and Support for Democracy  
          In this section, I test hypotheses H 2.10 which states that: Uninformed partisans 
are more likely than uninformed non-partisans to support democracy. While uninformed 
partisans are the primary focus of the present study, informed partisans serve as controls. 
For both uninformed and informed respondents, I cross-tabulated support for democracy 
with each of partisanship variable (general, incumbent and opposition). The results were 
used to perform two-sample proportions test to determine the significance of the effect of 
partisanship on informed and uninformed Kenyans. The results are shown in table 3.7.
30
 
                                                          
30
 Table 3.5 shows three 2 X 2 tables for each type of partisanship - General, Incumbent 
and Opposition Partisanships. Each of the 2X2 tables correspondents to the four types of 
voters initially developed by Dalton (1984) and later modified by Lutz (2006). These are 
the Cognitive Partisans (informed partisans); Ritual Partisans (uninformed partisans); 
Apartisans (informed non-partisans); and the Apolitical (uninformed non-partisans). 
164 
 
Table 3.7: Effect of Information and Partisanship on Support for Democracy   
Type of  
Partisanship 
Level of  
Political 
 Information  
Level of Partisanship 
 
Test of Proportions of Kenyans 
who support Democracy 
Non-
Partisans 
Partisans Effect of 
Partisanship 
 2 Statistical 
significance
 
General 
Partisanship 
Uninformed 67.6%  76.0% 8.4% 0.24 
Informed  91.6% 92.7% 1.1% 0.81 
Incumbent 
Partisanship 
Uninformed 64.3% 73.9% 9.6% 0.28 
Informed 94.7% 91.8% -2.9% 0.35 
Opposition 
Partisanship 
Uninformed 75.0% 71.4% -3.6% 0.67 
Informed 93.8% 91.7% -2.1% 0.44 
 
 
          Two important observations can be made from table 3.7. First, it is notable that the 
effect of partisanship on support for democracy appear to be greater among uninformed 
than informed people. This is true across all three forms of partisanships. However, these 
differences are not only small but also statistically insignificant. In essence, these results 
do not support the hypothesis that uninformed partisans are more likely than uninformed 
non-partisans to support democracy. For instance, incumbent partisanship appears to 
have the strongest effect on support for democracy among the uninformed, it accounts for 
only 1.4% of the variance in the levels of support for democracy.  
 
          Second, the informed tend to exhibit higher levels of support for democracy than 
uninformed people, regardless of whether they are partisans or non-partisans. On the 
incumbent partisanship scale for instance, someone who is neither informed nor partisan, 
has a 64.3% chance of being supportive of democracy. If the person becomes incumbent 
partisan, but remains uninformed, the chances become 73.9%. If instead, the person 
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becomes informed, but remains non-partisan, the chances radically increases to 94.7%. In 
other words, while incumbent partisanship modestly increases levels of support for 
democracy by 9.6%, political information increases it even more significantly by 30.4%. 
Thus, people need information more than partisanship to be supportive of democracy. 
 
          The fact that partisanship has no significant effect on support for democracy can be 
attributed to lack of internal party democracy in Kenya. As already explained, political 
parties, at least in Kenya, are not effective in terms of inculcating democratic values on 
those who rely on them for cues. That is, general political information does not emanate 
from parties. Partly due to lack of capacity to organize credible elections on a national 
scale, and partly due to the desire by party leaders to secure the election of those who will 
not question their actions, internal party elections in Kenya are almost always chaotic. In 
fact, filling party posts through elite compromises and consensus yields more acceptable 
results than filling them through competitive elections, due to emerging political culture 
in Kenya where losers and their supporters never concede defeat. Yet, elections are a 
major cornerstone of democracy. Being closer to political parties under the circumstances 
does not make one acquire values that are supportive of democracy. 
3.6 Consistency of Democratic Attitudes among Kenyans 
          In this section, I proceed from the premise that democratic citizens are informed 
and that informed citizens are more likely to embrace democratic values, ‘to hold more 
intense opinions, to hold more stable opinions over time, and to hold opinions that are 
more ideologically consistent with each other’ (Carpini, 2009:25). Consequently, if 
democracy becomes “the only game in town”, then it is reasonable to expect citizens to 
fit these descriptions. Thus, the consistency with which citizens hold democratic attitudes 
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show how much they embrace democratic values, which in turn indicates of how well 
democracy has taken root. Indeed, ‘to truly commit themselves to democracy, people 
must not only say they prefer it as the best form of government, but they must 
simultaneously abandon nostalgia for authoritarian alternatives’ (Bratton et al, 2005:28). 
 
         I test the internal consistency of democratic attitudes
31
 to determine whether and the 
extent to which citizen evaluations of democracy are consistent with appraisals of related 
democratic attitudes. In particular, I compare the consistency of attitudes of uninformed 
with those of informed citizens with a view to establish whether information deficit 
among citizens undercut this consistency. I test hypothesis, H 2.11: The uninformed are 
more likely to develop inconsistent attitudes towards democracy than the informed. That 
is, the uninformed are more likely to support democratic and nondemocratic ideals.  
          The literature suggests that the best way to do this kind of test is to identify and 
measure several characteristics of the underlying variable/concept and perform factor or 
cluster analysis (Olson and Maio, 2003). Consequently, I perform item cluster analysis 
for both the informed and the uninformed citizens. For each of them, I use a set of seven 
variables which are ordinarily assumed to constitute democratic attitudes - support for 
democracy, support for universal adult suffrage, support for the rule of law, support for 
free and fair elections, opposition to one-man rule, opposition to one-party system and 
opposition to military rule. I expected these variables to be correlated with each other so 
                                                          
31
 The term attitudes as used here refer to ‘the approval or disapproval of certain types of 
regime principles and ideals, such as whether governments derive legitimate authority 
from the ballot box, from spiritual authority, or from monarchical descent’ (Norris, 2011). 
Thus, democratic attitudes refer to approval of democratic principles and ideals, as well 
as the disapproval of other principles and ideals that are contrary to democracy.  
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that those who support democracy should ipso facto support most if not all of the others. 
The Item cluster analysis
32
 results for democratic attitudes are in Figures 3.10 (a) and (b).  
 
 
                                                          
32
 I performed the Item Cluster Analysis using the iclust function in the pysch Package of 
the R program for statistical Computing, developed by William Revelle (2010:91), and 
available at: (http://personality-project.org/r/psych_manual.pdf). I corrected correlations 
for reliability, and weighted intercluster correlation by the size of the two constituting 
clusters. I set minimum clustering for beta at 0.2, with 3 iterations to purify clusters.  
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           In line with the stated hypothesis, the results in figure 3.10 (a) and (b) show that 
informed citizens tend to have slightly greater attitudinal consistency towards democracy 
(α = 0.51) than uninformed citizens (α = 0.45). Both scores are statistically significant at 
95% confidence level. The results also reveal that attitudes towards universal adult 
suffrage and the rule of law constitutes the least consistent cluster of variables for both 
the informed citizens (α = 0.21) and for the informed citizens (α = 0.20).  
          This low consistency level implies that the two variables do not measure the same 
latent trait, and are not motivated by the same considerations. It is evident from figures 
3.10 (a) and (b) that support for universal suffrage and the rule of law significantly 
weakens the overall consistency of the evaluative attitudes to democracy. Indeed, when 
the two variables are removed from the analysis, the overall consistency improves a great 
deal for both the uninformed (α = 0.50) and the informed citizens (α = 0.59). These 
improved consistency scores are shown in cluster 5 of figures 3.10 (a) and (b).  
          An equally important observation from the analysis results is that attitudes towards 
non-democratic values (one party system, military rule and one-man rule), not only 
cluster together but actually constitute clusters with the greatest level of consistency. 
Opposition to both military rule and one-man rule constitutes the strongest cluster for the 
uninformed citizens (α = 0.55), and an even stronger, though not the most consistent 
cluster, for informed citizens (α = 0.62). In both cases, attitudes to one-party system join 
this cluster to form the second most consistent cluster for uninformed citizens (α = 0.54) 
and the informed citizens (α = 0.65). 
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          It is also notable that while support for democracy clusters directly with support for 
elections among the uninformed (α = 0.33; β = 0.33), this is not the case among the 
informed. In the latter, elections first join with opposition to the three non-democratic 
values (one-man rule, one-party system and military rule) before linking with support for 
democracy to create cluster C5 (α = 0.59). Thus, support for democracy by the informed 
citizens, is consistent with their attitudes towards a larger set of variables (four in total), 
suggesting that they tend to have a much broader view of democracy that goes beyond 
mere elections. This reinforces the earlier observation that informed people tend to pay 
attention to a relatively wider range of considerations when making political evaluations 
and decisions (Carpini and Keteer, 2005; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010; Bennie, 2001).  
 
          On the contrary, uninformed citizens seem to associate democracy with elections 
so that those who support for democracy as the best form of government are also highly 
likely to support elections as the best way to select leaders. This in itself does not mean 
necessarily that their support for democracy is merely instrumental. It only underscores 
the fact that they support democracy because it accords them the opportunity to elect their 
leaders. Moreover, although they support elections, they are less bothered by the extent to 
which universal suffrage is entrenched, yet this is an integral part of credible elections.  
 
          Taken together, the cluster analysis above reveals that disdain for the authoritarian 
alternatives to democracy (one-man rule, one-party system and military rule), is much 
stronger than the actual support for democracy. Among the uninformed for instance, there 
is greater consistency in the dislike for one-man rule, one-party system and military rule 
(α = 0.54), than either support for universal adult suffrage or the rule of law (α = 0.21), 
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or even support for free and fair elections and democracy (α = 0.33). It is thus, possible 
that support for democracy is driven more by the disdain for the alternatives to it than by 
a genuine commitment to democratic values and practices. 
 
          To have a better sense of the item cluster analysis results above, I present the 
correlations between support for democracy and the other six variables in table 3.8. 
 
 
Table 3.8 Correlation between democratic attitudes and support for democracy 
 
  Uninformed  
Kenyans 
 
Informed  
Kenyans 
 
Support Elections     0.20**    0.09* 
 (3.07)  (2.20) 
Support Rule of Law 0.12 -0.07 
 (1.76) (1.59) 
Support Universal Suffrage            -0.05                                              0.01
 (0.72)                                          (0.13)
Oppose Military Rule 0.09     0.13** 
 (1.44) (3.26) 
Oppose One-man Rule   0.14*                                                       0.17***
 (2.19)                   (4.25) 
Oppose One-Party System 0.12 0.07 
  (1.77)                                               (1.58)
Observations 337   612 
 
Entries are Pearson Product Moment correlation Coefficients with the associated t-
values in brackets. Significance:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.0. 
 
 
          Table 3.8 shows that, of all the indicators of democracy included in the item cluster 
analysis in figures 3.10 (a), support for elections has the greatest correlation with support 
for democracy among uninformed citizens. The more the uninformed citizens believe in 
elections as the best mode of selecting political leaders, the more they are likely to 
support democracy as the best form of government. This is hardly surprising as it was 
already evident in the cluster analysis, where the two variables formed cluster C2.  
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          Opposition to one-man rule is another indicator of democracy that has statistically 
significant correlation with support for democracy among uninformed citizens. Thus, the 
stronger the opposition to one-man rule (authoritarianism), the greater the likelihood of 
supporting democracy. The two variables also significantly correlate with support for 
democracy among informed citizens, alongside opposition to military rule. The fact that 
three of the indicators of democracy (support for rule of law; support for universal adult 
suffrage; and opposition to one-party system) are not significantly correlated with support 
for democracy reinforces the idea that the consistency of the evaluative attitudes towards 
democracy is generally weak, and even much weaker among uninformed citizens. 
          These results need to be interpreted in the context of Kenya’s political history. At 
independence in 1963, Kenya was a liberal democracy with parliamentary system of 
government, headed by an executive Prime minister, and characterized by federalism, 
bicameralism and multipartism. However, within the first six years of independence, 
these institutions were systematically dismantled and supplanted with centralized one-
party authoritarianism. The first president, Jomo Kenyatta, used political rather than legal 
means to create, sustain and preside over defacto one-party authoritarianism. By 1970 he 
had completely dismantled the institutions of federalism and bicameralism, and created a 
powerful executive president. This drift towards authoritarianism was accelerated by his 
successor, Arap Moi, who took the legal route, by engineering constitutional amendment 
in 1982 which transformed Kenya into a dejure one-party state.  
 
 
 
172 
 
          Despite these changes, Kenya remained in a league of few African countries that 
have never been under military rule, and which have held elections every five years since 
independence, even at the peak of authoritarianism in the 1970s and 1980s. Some 
scholars have noted that ‘Kenya [was] probably the most unrestricted of Africa’s one-
party democracies, where [parliamentary] elections regularly result in a high level of 
participation and a large turnover of elected politicians’ (Jackson and Rosberg, 1998 :38). 
It is against this backdrop that multiparty democracy was restored in Kenya in 1991. 
 
          It is evident that the apparent inconsistency in democratic attitudes may be a 
product of these historical developments. For instance, even under a one-party regime, 
Kenyans still had elections under universal suffrage. While only those who were viewed 
to be sufficiently loyal to the ruling party and the president could be candidates for 
political office (in both legislative and civic authority elections), all Kenyans of voting 
age were allowed to vote for any of the ‘loyalist’ candidates. It is thus understandable if 
the level of support for universal suffrage does not correlate with that for democracy. 
This historical interpretation should not be misconstrued to imply that older people who 
lived under authoritarianism are more likely to exhibit greater inconsistency than the 
youth. Just as the older people lived this experience, educated and or attentive youths are 
also able to learn about them through education and related experiences. 
 
          On the other hand, opposition to the excesses of one-man rule (authoritarianism) 
was a key motivating factor in the struggle for democracy in Kenya in the early 1990s. It 
is thus not surprising that opposition to one-man rule is significantly correlated with 
support for democracy regardless of the level of political information. Also, since Kenya 
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has never had military regime, the fact that opposition to military rule correlates strongly 
with opposition to one-man rule, and strongly cluster with it for both uninformed citizens 
(r = 0.38; | α = 0.55) and informed citizens (r = 0.45| α = 0.62) suggests that one-man rule 
may be the closest experience that Kenyans can compare with military rule. 
 
          In the final analysis, and consistent with hypothesis 2.11, the results of item cluster 
analysis in figure 3.9 which is summarized in table 3.8 and discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs show that informed people tend to have slightly greater attitudinal consistency 
towards democracy than the uninformed people.  
3.7 Chapter Conclusions 
          The primary objective of this chapter was to determine whether democracy works 
well even when there is a huge political information deficit among citizens, or whether an 
information deficit can harm democracy as suggested by Gans (2004). I focused on three 
indicators of a well functioning democracy - Knowledge of democracy, Satisfaction with 
democracy, and Support for democracy. I found that Kenyans understand democracy 
fairly well, so that three in every four Kenyans can correctly define it. Also, the informed 
tend to be more knowledgeable of democracy than the uninformed, reinforcing the idea 
that citizens tend to be generalists rather than specialists with respect to knowledge. Also, 
since political cue theory suggests that partisanship enables the uninformed to make up 
for information deficit, I tested if uninformed partisans are more knowledgeable about 
democracy than the uninformed non-partisans. The results show that partisanship has no 
significant effect on knowledge of democracy among the uninformed. Uninformed 
partisans are as likely as uninformed non-partisans to understand democracy.  
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          The study also found that Kenyans are fairly satisfied with how democracy works 
in the country. These satisfaction levels seem to be fairly consistent with evaluations by 
the Freedom House. While satisfaction levels do not vary much with political information 
levels, they are significantly influenced by partisanship. Indeed, incumbent partisanship 
and economic policy approval are the only variables with consistently significant effect 
on satisfaction with democracy for both informed and uninformed people. In particular, 
incumbent partisanship increases satisfaction levels among the uninformed to nearly the 
same level as the informed. However, the informed are further influenced by general 
partisanship, government corruption and freedom of speech, suggesting that the informed 
are attentive to, and thus base satisfaction on a wider range of issues than the uninformed.  
          The ensuing question that lies at the heart of the dissertation puzzle is: what makes 
it possible for the uninformed to be equally satisfied with democracy as the informed? 
This question underscores the fact that ‘one intriguing political research puzzle is that 
people can make seemingly informed political decisions even though they appear to lack 
the requisite levels of political information to do so’ (Lewkowicz, 2006:52). 
          Finally, the study found that the level of support for democracy among Kenyans is 
generally very high. Moreover, the level of support consistently increases with the level 
of political information. However, the effect of partisanship on support for democracy 
depends on the type of partisanship. While opposition and incumbent partisanship have 
no significant effect, general partisanship has a significant positive influence on support 
for democracy. On the whole, information has a much greater influence on support for 
democracy than partisanship. Moreover, informed people seem to have more consistent 
democratic attitudes than the uninformed citizens. Further analysis also reveals that 
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disdain for the authoritarian alternatives to democracy (one-man rule, one-party system 
and military rule), appear to be much stronger than the actual support for democracy. 
 
          Taken together, the chapter findings show that democracy, as viewed by citizens, 
works fairly well in Kenya despite the huge information deficit. These results also raise a 
very critical question which forms the basis of the next chapter: How can uninformed 
people with relatively poor understanding of democracy, poor attention to critical issues, 
and inconsistent democratic attitude, make the same evaluations of democracy as the 
informed who have better knowledge of democracy, are attentive to pertinent issues, and 
have relatively more consistent evaluative attitudes towards democracy? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HOW KENYANS OVERCOME POLITICAL INFORMATION 
DEFICIT: PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
          One key finding in chapter three was that uninformed Kenyan respondents usually 
have relatively poor understanding of democracy, are inattentive to pertinent issues in the 
democratic process, and have inconsistent attitudes towards democracy. In contrast, well 
informed Kenyans understand democracy better, are attentive, and have fairly consistent 
democratic attitudes. Nevertheless, both informed and uninformed respondents arrive at 
nearly the same verdict regarding how well democracy is working in Kenya. Moreover, 
their evaluation of how well democracy is working is accurate to the extent that it is 
corroborated by expert assessment from the Freedom House reports. Indeed, ‘in recent 
decades, until the fateful elections of December 2007, Kenya was viewed as one of 
Africa’s most stable democratic countries’ (Semetko, 2010:167). Thus, democracy seems 
to work fairly well in Kenya despite the acute information deficit noted in chapter two. 
          It is therefore puzzling how democracy works well in Kenya despite the generally 
low political information levels. It is particularly puzzling that uninformed Kenyans are 
able to behave as though they are informed, to the point that their evaluation of how well 
democracy is working seems to be just as good as those of informed citizens.  To unravel 
this puzzle, I take recourse to political cue theory, from which I draw two important clues. 
First, uninformed people tend to think heuristically rather than ideologically about 
political issues. They typically rely on readily available heuristic cues from trusted and 
better informed sources to abridge the information gap between them and the informed 
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citizens (Oskamp and Schultz, 2005). To this end, ‘one mechanism that has been offered 
as the bridge between the public’s general ignorance of relevant information and the 
“rational” behavior of its collective opinion is the use of information shortcuts or 
heuristics’ (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002:33). Incidentally, the literature presents a strong 
and compelling case for partisanship as the most vital heuristic cue that people use (Lau 
and Redlawsk, 2006), and suggests that, ‘as a general rule, political parties are more 
enduring source cues than individuals’ (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002:33).  
          The second important clue which I draw from political cue theory is that it is 
subjective political perceptions rather than objective facts that drive political behavior 
(Cassino et al, 2007; Morris, 2008). Hence, to understand why uninformed people seem 
to be able to evaluate democracy just as well as informed citizens, it is imperative to 
focus on how uninformed citizens form political perceptions. Given these two clues, I 
proceed from the premise that uninformed people typically develop perceptions that 
guide their political decisions and actions from partisan cues that they derive from trusted 
political parties. Accordingly, this chapter addresses the third study research question: 
What makes it possible for ‘politically uninformed’ Kenyans to develop ‘politically 
informed’ perceptions that guide their actions and decisions in the democratic process?   
          The rest of the chapter is organized into five sections, with the first two sections 
addressing two critical preliminary concerns. In the first place, since this chapter uses the 
perceptions about democracy and the economy to show how the uninformed make up for 
information deficit, it is imperative to offer a justification for selecting democracy and the 
economy as the two issue-areas on which to focus. In this regard, attempts are made to 
answer the question: why focus on perceptions about democracy and the economy? 
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           In the second section, I examine whether it is only uninformed people who rely on 
political party cues, or whether informed citizens also use the cues. This is an important 
starting point, since it enables us to understand from the onset if uninformed people, who 
are the principal focus of this chapter, disproportionately rely on cues than the informed. 
At this point, I limit the analysis to perceptions about the extent of democracy in Kenya. 
          In the third part of this chapter, I introduce the issue-area dimension of political 
perceptions discussed in chapter one. I focus on the influence of each of the three forms 
of partisanship (general, incumbent, and opposition partisanships) on the perceptions of 
uninformed citizens about the extent of democracy and the state of the Kenyan economy 
at the time of the interview in 2005. The primary goal in this regard is to test whether the 
effect of partisanship on political perceptions varies across the two issue-areas. This task 
involves comparisons at two levels. In the first place, I test whether there are significant 
differences in the factors that influence perceptions of the informed and the uninformed 
people. That is, do they pay attention to the same set of factors when forming political 
perceptions?  At the second level, which is even more critical, I test whether the factors 
that influence perceptions of uninformed people about the extent of democracy are the 
same ones that influence their perceptions about the economy.  
          In the fourth section, I move the analysis further by introducing the issue-timeline 
dimension of political perceptions outlined in chapter one. I examine how the influence 
of each of the three forms of partisanship varies for each of the three perception timelines 
- the past (retrospective perceptions), the present (present perceptions), and the future 
(prospective perceptions). Since by default, the present perceptions are addressed in 
section two, the focus here is only on retrospective and prospective perceptions. As was 
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the case in section two, the analysis is restricted to the perceptions of uninformed people 
about the extent of democracy and the state of the economy. Nonetheless, I also examine 
the perceptions of informed people who constitute the control group. 
          In the final section, I draw from the findings of all the other sections to check for 
any emerging patterns in the formation of political perceptions by the uninformed people. 
The primary concern here is to determine whether there is sufficiently robust evidence to 
sustain the thesis that partisanship influences political perceptions, and whether its effect 
varies along the two suggested dimensions - issue-area and issue-timeline. Thus, besides 
testing the central hypothesis of political cue theory, the other concern is whether there is 
evidence to sustain my proposition that the influence of partisanship on political 
perceptions depends on the issue in question and its time-line. 
4.2 Why focus on Perceptions about Democracy and the Economy?  
          This chapter recognizes the distinction between objective political reality and the 
subjective political perceptions, and note that it is the latter that has significant influence 
on political behavior (Morris, 2008). For instance, it has been noted that ‘voters base their 
decisions on their perceptions of the world (e.g., state of the economy)’ (Benoit, 2007:4), 
even though, ‘these perceptions may not necessarily be an accurate reflection of reality’ 
(ibid). For instance, Bartels (2008) found that ‘public perceptions of economic inequality 
bare so little relationship to actual trends in inequality’ (p. 146), but correctly adds that ‘it 
does not follow that perceptions of economic inequality are meaningless or politically 
inconsequential’ (ibid). Hence, to understand the political behavior of uninformed people, 
we need to know how they form perceptions that shape their decisions and actions.  
180 
 
          Evidence shows that perceptions about democracy and the economy substantially 
influence democratic attitudes and their concomitant political behavior (Camp, 2001). For 
instance, it is widely agreed that perceptions about the extent of democracy influences the 
electoral or voting decisions. Studies have found that people who believe that the country 
is undemocratic are likely to abstain from voting (Herron, 2009). Indeed, there are critical 
differences in the voting intentions of those who regard Kenya as a strong democracy and 
those who feel that she is not, so that if elections were held at the time of the survey, 
those who feel that Kenya is a democracy are 12.5% more likely to vote than those who 
do not. The rationale for this difference is that, ‘if the democratic quality is poor, then 
participation in elections is likely to be viewed as less meaningful’ (Herron, 2009:70). 
           There is also considerable consensus in the extant literature that perceptions about 
economic conditions influence individual and collective political behavior. To start with, 
it has been noted that ‘support for democracy rests upon mass satisfaction with a range of 
past, present and future economic conditions’ (Bratton et al, 2005:225). Other studies 
also show that ‘economic dissatisfaction undermines regime support under democracy, 
but generates demand for democratization under dictatorship’ (ibid. p. 228). Besides, past 
studies have converged on the conclusion that ‘public opinion about the economy goes a 
long way towards explaining electoral outcomes’ (Arceneaux, 2004:211).  
          Indeed, economic voting theories cast voting decisions as a function of economic 
conditions, so that the incumbent parties win or lose elections depending on the state of 
the economy (Kramer, 1971; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). More specifically, when voters 
feel that their personal or national economic conditions are less than satisfactory, they 
tend to blame the incumbent party and vote against it (Bratton et al, 2005; Lindberg and 
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Morrison, 2008). Therefore, in advanced democracies, where political contests revolve 
around issues, ‘incumbents often pay the price for unpopular policies associated with 
their party’ (Dona-Gine, 2009:111). Similarly, the literature shows that ‘disenchantment–
reflected in prospective and retrospective economic evaluations–affects the likelihood of 
[political] participation’ (Herron, 2009:71). In a nutshell, as Dalton (2004:115) observes: 
It would be problematic for democracy if poor government 
performance did not generate disaffection and pressure for 
political change among the public (since) this is the logic of 
electoral competition  
 
          Nonetheless, these past studies have tended to ignore the fact that political behavior 
is not necessarily motivated by what people know, but by what they believe or think they 
know. More specifically, ‘public opinion is largely a function of perceptions. People form 
perceptions about the economy on the basis of how they think the economy is doing’ 
(Arceneaux, 2004:202), and hence, ‘what really matters are voters’ own perceptions, not 
the economic realities’ (Blais et al, 2002: 129). 
 
          Since perceptions about the economy influence political behavior, it is imperative 
to understand how these perceptions are developed, particularly whether the informed 
and uninformed people are guided by the same factors when making them. Indeed, the 
central thesis of this dissertation is that partisanship intervenes in the process of forming 
political perceptions in ways that enable uninformed people to either close the political 
information gap between them and their informed colleagues or simply draw useful cues 
which enable them to behave as if they are well informed. 
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4.3 Who Uses Partisan Cues: Informed Or Uninformed Kenyans?  
          One of the unwinding debates in political behavior is whether only uninformed 
people use political cues or whether the informed people also rely on cues. According to 
Popkin and Dimock (1999), the uninformed people are more likely to use cues than the 
informed. However, Lutz (2006) found that the reverse is true, and hence, ‘the better 
people are informed, the more they use cues and heuristics to make a political choice’ 
(Lutz, 2006:96). Yet, Lau and Redlawsk (2006) found that in fact, all people use the 
heuristic cues, and concluded that: ‘political heuristic use is nigh onto universal’ (p. 236). 
Therefore, my contribution in this debate is to compare the effect of partisan cues on the 
perceptions of informed and uninformed people regarding the extent of democracy.  
 
4.3.1 Do Partisan Cues affect Perceptions of the Uninformed than Informed Kenyans?   
          In this section, I test hypothesis H 3.1 that partisan cues have a greater effect on 
the perceptions of the uninformed than the informed people. I measured the effect of 
partisanship on the perception that Kenya is a strong democracy in terms of the difference 
between the proportion of the partisans and non-partisans who feel that Kenya is a strong 
democracy.
33
 I also measured the effect of political information as the difference between 
the proportion of the informed and uninformed Kenyans who feel that Kenya is a strong 
                                                          
33
 As shown in appendix 1, the extent of democracy is an ordered categorical variable 
with four response categories. The term strong democracy combines its upper two 
response categories (democracy with minor problems, and full democracy). For purposes 
of this analysis, I reduced opposition and incumbent partisanships to their dichotomous 
forms by treating their first categories as non-partisans, and labeling the rest as partisans. 
I cross- tabulated incumbent partisanship with each of the three forms of perceptions 
about democracy. I then used the two-sided test of equality of proportions to compare the 
proportions of informed and uninformed Kenyans who feel Kenya is a strong democracy.  
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democracy. The focus of the analysis at this point is more about the magnitude rather 
than the direction of the differences. The results are shown in table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Effect of Partisan Cues on the Perception that Kenya is Strong Democracy 
 
Type of 
Partisanship 
 
Level of 
Information 
Partisanship Test of Equality of Proportions for 
“Kenya is a Strong Democracy” 
 
Partisans 
Non-
Partisans 
Effect of 
Partisanship 
 2  Significance 
 
General 
Partisanship 
Informed 65.1% 60.0% + 5.1% 0.32 
 
Uninformed 57.9% 54.0% + 3.9 % 0.69 
 
  
Incumbent 
Partisanship 
Informed 71.9% 56.9% +15.0% p < 0.01*** 
 
Uninformed 60.2% 33.3% + 26.9% p < 0.01*** 
 
 
Opposition 
Partisanship 
Informed 59.4% 70.9% -11.5% p < 0.01*** 
Uninformed 52.0% 60.3% -8.3% 0.34 
 
 
           The table shows that general partisanship has a 5.1% effect on the perceptions of 
the informed and 3.9% effect on the perceptions of the uninformed. Evidently, not only is 
the effect of general partisanship on the perceptions about the extent of democracy very 
small, but even more importantly, its effects on the perceptions of the informed does not 
significantly differ from its effects on the perceptions of the uninformed Kenyans. 
          On the other hand, incumbent partisanship has a statistically significant positive 
effect on the perception that Kenya is a strong democracy among both the informed and 
uninformed Kenyans. Uninformed incumbent partisans are 26.9% more likely to view 
Kenya as a strong democracy compared to uninformed non-(incumbent) partisans. Also, 
informed incumbent partisans are 15.0% more likely to view Kenya as a strong 
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democracy than the informed non-(incumbent) partisans. Thus, the effect of incumbent 
partisanship on the perceptions of the uninformed is 11.9% greater than that for informed 
Kenyans. These results are robust to the extent that the effect of incumbent partisanship 
on informed and uninformed Kenyans are individually statistically significant, while at 
the same time, the difference between these effects is also statistically significant. 
         On the other hand, opposition partisanship has mixed effects on the perception that 
Kenya is a strong democracy. It has a strong and statistically significant effect of -11.5% 
on the perception that Kenya is a strong democracy among informed Kenyans. That is, 
opposition partisanship reduces the likelihood that an informed Kenyan would view the 
country as a strong democracy by 11.5%. However, its effect on the perceptions of the 
uninformed is statistically insignificant. These particular results suggest that, contrary to 
hypothesis H3.1, the effect opposition partisanship on perceptions about the extent of 
democracy is greater among the informed than the uninformed Kenyans.  
          The preceding analysis show that the influence of partisanship on the perception 
that Kenya is a strong democracy, vary from one type of partisanship to another, and also 
depends on whether one is informed or uninformed. For instance, both incumbent and 
opposition partisanships exert nearly the same degree of influence on the perceptions of 
informed people. While the former increases the chances of viewing Kenya as a strong 
democracy among the informed by 15.0%, the latter diminishes it by 11.5%.  
          These details have largely been missing in the political behavior literature because 
past studies have treated partisanship as a unidimensional variable from partisans to non-
partisans, without distinguishing between incumbent and opposition partisans. The results 
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show that if I had used only general partisanship, then like Lau and Redlawsk (2006), I 
would have concluded that the effect of partisanship on the perception that Kenya is a 
strong democracy is not significantly different among the informed and the uninformed. 
But, if only opposition partisanship is used, then like Lutz (2006), the conclusion would 
be that the informed are more likely to use cues than the uninformed. Still, if incumbent 
partisanship is used then, like Popkin and Dimock (1999), I would have concluded that 
the uninformed are more likely to use cues and heuristics than the informed. 
          Thus, all the three groups of scholars are correct in their conclusions even though 
their results are different. A possible explanation for the differences could be the structure 
of the sample. It would appear that the partisans in the Popkin and Dimock (1999) study 
may have been mostly allied to the incumbent party; those in the Lutz (2006) study may 
have been mostly allied to the opposition; and those in the Lau and Redlawsk (2006) 
sample may have been uniformly distributed between incumbent and opposition parties. 
This justifies the very decision to isolate the three forms of partisanships in this study. 
          I have demonstrated that the way the masses understand democracy determines 
what they expect from it, and how they evaluate it (Camp, 2001). I further observed that 
at least in Africa, the masses tend to define democracy in terms of liberal values whose 
propagation or infringement are easier to observe in the incumbent than in the opposition 
parties. These observations, coupled with the fact that most people tend to be motivated 
by ‘group-serving attribution bias’ (Rudolph, 2003) in making decisions, accounts at least 
in part, for the effect of the incumbent and the opposition partisanships explained above. 
It seems that incumbent partisans tend to take up perceptions that are favorable to the 
incumbent party, and are ipso facto relatively more optimistic about democracy. This 
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view is bolstered by the fact that informed incumbent partisans have a larger proportion 
of people who view Kenya as a strong democracy compared to the informed opposition 
partisans and general partisans. Even among uninformed people, incumbent partisans 
still have the highest proportion of people who are optimistic about democracy.  
          It is also notable that regardless of the type and strength of partisanship, informed 
Kenyans generally tend to be more optimistic that Kenya is a strong democracy than the 
uninformed. For instance, when uninformed non-(incumbent) partisan becomes partisan, 
then the probability that he/she will form the perception that Kenya is a strong democracy 
increases by 26.9%; when he/she becomes informed, it increases by 23.6%; and if he/she 
becomes both informed and partisan, it increases by 38.6%. All these increments are 
statistically significant, suggesting that incumbent partisanship increases optimism about 
democracy slightly more than political information does.   
          On the other hand, when uninformed non-(opposition) partisans become partisans, 
the likelihood that they will view Kenya as a strong democracy increases by 10.6%, but if 
instead, they become informed, then it reduces by 8.3%. Whereas none of these changes 
is statistically significant, they are indicative of the fact that instead of being opposition 
partisan, one would rather seek political information if he/she is to be optimistic about 
democracy, and by extension, if he/she is to align his/her perceptions with the actual/real 
extent of democracy. Otherwise, one risks being misled by false opposition propaganda. 
          These results suggest that incumbent partisanship could be bridging the perception 
gap between the informed and uninformed so that the latter inches closer to behaving like 
the former. Moreover, the fact that incumbent partisanship and political information have 
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virtually the same effect on perceptions about democracy, suggests that if one cannot get 
both, then one would still be better off with either. Therefore, incumbent partisanship can 
be an effective substitute for political information. However, opposition partisanship and 
information produces diametrically opposed effects and thus cannot substitute each other.  
          An alternative explanation of the apparent congruence in the effects of incumbent 
partisanship and political information on perceptions about the extent of democracy is 
that incumbent partisans actually derive valuable information from their preferred party 
rather than just adopting positions that portray it in good light. Indeed, past studies have 
noted that partisan cues significantly narrow the information gap between informed and 
uninformed citizens to the extent that they exhibit similar voting behavior (Sekhon, 2004). 
For example, in a study of voting behavior in California, Luppia (1994) found that those 
who lacked information on the insurance reforms which were subjected to a vote relied 
on elite endorsements. This act of emulating the behavior of informed voters led them to 
vote the same way as those who had information.  
           This explanation would be difficult to sustain since we already saw in chapter two 
that incumbent partisanship is in fact, the only form of partisanship with no statistically 
significant effect on political information levels. We also saw in chapter three that all the 
three forms of partisanship, including incumbent partisanship do not have a significant 
influence on an individual’s understanding of the meaning of democracy. It would appear 
from these results that incumbent partisanship does not produce information-enhancing 
cues, and therefore cannot be a source of valuable political information for the partisans. 
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          An equally important conclusion that emanates from table 4.1 is that it is not just 
uninformed citizens who rely on partisan cues to shape their political perceptions. Even 
informed citizens use partisan cues. Whether the informed and uninformed citizens use 
cues for the same purpose is beyond the scope of this analysis. Yet, it is possible that the 
motives are different since informed voters already have requisite information to make 
rational decisions and possibly needs no reference to partisan ties unless such reference 
helps to align their beliefs with group (party) interest. However, the uninformed lack and 
needs information from trusted and better informed allies (Oskamp and Schultz, 2005).  
          While I reserve investigations into these matters for future studies, it is notable that 
the study by Lau and Redlawsk (2006) found that informed and uninformed citizens tend 
to be attentive to different cues. Specifically, they found that informed voters are more 
attentive to group endorsements and party ideology, while the uninformed pay attention 
to candidate appearance and party image. Consistent with these results, Lutz (2006) also 
found that ‘voters with high knowledge and strong party attachment use different cues 
most; voters with no partisanship and low knowledge use different cues least’ (p. 93).  
          Additionally, Gilens and Murakawa (2002) report a 1982 study done by Kuklinski, 
Metlay and Kay, about public preferences on California anti-nuclear energy initiative. 
The study found that while both the informed and the uninformed derived cues from the 
same labor unions and lobby groups, they utilized these cues differently. They note that: 
‘better informed citizens responded to elite cues like those with less information, but 
because they made use of a wider range of information, the better informed depended less 
on elite cues in forming their preferences’(Gilens and Murakawa, 2002:23). 
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4.3.2 Why Care About Partisan Cues if all Partisans use them?  
          If both the informed and the uninformed people use partisan cues, as the preceding 
analysis reveals, then one may wonder why we should even care about partisan cues. I 
argue that the fact that both informed and uninformed people use the same cues does not 
necessarily reduce partisanship into a constant. Yet, to the extent that it is not a constant, 
it is imperative to understand why and how it varies. For instance, Table 4.1 reveal that 
although incumbent partisans draw cues from the same party (incumbent party), they still 
form different perceptions. In particular, informed incumbent partisans tend to form more 
optimistic perceptions about the extent of democracy, than the uninformed partisans.  
          Even more revealing is the fact that differences between uninformed and informed 
incumbent partisans, seem to translate into dissimilar patterns of political behavior. In 
fact, there is a statistically significant difference in the voting behavior of informed and 
uninformed incumbent partisans, where informed are 20.1% more likely to have voted in 
2002 than the uninformed. More precisely, 72.9% of the informed incumbent partisans 
indicated that they had voted in 2002, while only 52.8% of the uninformed incumbent 
partisans did so. The difference in the political behavior of the informed and uninformed 
incumbent partisans is not limited to conventional politics but is statistically significant 
even for contentious political activities like protests. Indeed, 52.0% of the informed 
incumbent partisans indicated that they have participated or can participate in protests if 
they had the chance to do so as compared to 42.1% of uninformed partisans.  
          Hence, we care about partisan cues because, even when informed and uninformed 
incumbent partisans rely on the same cue source (in this case the incumbent party), the 
uninformed citizens still appears to be politically less active. This means that there is a lot 
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more that could be going on in the processing of cues into political perceptions, beyond 
the mere fact of being a member of or trusting a political party. This makes it compelling 
to seek to understand the specific mechanisms by which partisanship influences the 
formation of perceptions. For instance, the differences between informed and uninformed 
partisans observed so far, may be attributed to either differences in their attentiveness to 
cues, or differences in the processing of the cues into relevant political perceptions. In 
short, we care about partisanship because the political cue theory which guides this study 
elevates it above other factors that influence the formation of political perceptions.  
4.4 Perceptions about the Extent of Democracy and State of the Economy 
          In the rest of this chapter, I run a series of ordered logit regression models for more 
detailed analysis of the influence of partisanship on political perceptions. Specifically, I 
seek to establish whether the effect of partisanship on political perceptions noted so far, 
persist even when other key variables are controlled, and whether this effect varies with 
the issue in question, and or the timeline under review. In all the models, the focus is on 
the uninformed, while the informed people are the control group against which to assess 
the behavior of the uninformed. All models are significant, with no collinearity problems. 
          In this section, I test hypothesis H3.2: The influence of partisanship on perceptions 
of uninformed citizens varies with issue-area. I focus on the influence of partisanship on 
perceptions about the extent of democracy and national economic conditions in Kenya.
34
 
                                                          
34
 These two political perception variables are explained in appendix 1, and descriptive 
statistics shown in table 1.4. In addition, the model used in this section will be replicated 
in the subsequent sections of this chapter for meaningful comparisons between perception 
issues (democracy and the economy); perception time-lines (past, present and future) and 
between the two political information levels (informed people and uninformed people). 
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I include some control variables from the literature (Squire and Smith, 1988; Alberg, 
2003; Visser et al, 2008).  The ordered logit model results as shown in table 4.2. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Determinants of perceptions about Democracy and National Economy 
 
 Current state of Democracy 
 
Current state of Economy 
 
 Uninformed 
Kenyans 
 
Informed 
Kenyans 
 
Uninformed 
Kenyans 
 
Informed 
Kenyans 
 
General Partisanship        -0.17 0.11 -0.13 0.01 
 (0.58) (0.55)  (0.56) (0.03) 
Incumbent Partisanship       0.78***        0.37***     0.23*       0.40*** 
 (5.11) (4.29) (2.01) (5.07) 
Opposition Partisanship 0.14   -0.32** -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.96) (3.41) (1.15) (1.45) 
Education -0.11     -0.15**     0.22**        0.20*** 
 (1.11) (2.98) (2.94) (4.25) 
Ethnicity 0.47 0.22 0.42  0.40* 
 (1.20) (0.98) (1.29) (1.99) 
Patriotism 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.03 
 (0.10) (0.66) (0.72) (0.41) 
Relative Deprivation -0.17 -0.16    -0.31**       -0.49*** 
 (0.90) (1.70) (2.73) (5.56) 
Gender: Female -0.51 -0.24 -0.48 0.05 
 (1.61) (1.34) (1.85) (0.33) 
 2 Likelihood Ratio 39.8 61.19 36.74 108.47 
Observations 179 542 266 564 
 
Entries are Proportional ordered logit regression coefficients with t-values in brackets. 
Cut points are omitted for simplicity. Significance: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
 
 
 
           In discussing the results in table 4.2, I begin by focusing on perceptions about the 
extent of democracy, proceed to examine the perceptions about the current state of the 
national economy, and finally undertake a comparison of the two perceptions.  
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4.4.1 Partisanship and Perceptions about the Extent of Democracy 
         The general picture emerging from Table 4.2 is that uninformed Kenyans typically 
form perceptions about the extent of democracy solely on the basis of where they place 
themselves on the incumbent partisanship scale. In contrast, the perceptions of informed 
people about the extent of democracy are further refined by education and modified by 
their position on the opposition partisanship scale. Furthermore, since the informed and 
uninformed people seem to use different criteria when forming perceptions about the 
extent of democracy, it is not surprising that they form statistically significantly different 
perceptions about the extent of democracy. Indeed, 55.8% of uninformed and 64.1% of 
informed people feel that Kenya is a strong democracy.   
          More specifically, Table 4.2 shows that incumbent partisanship is the only form of 
partisanship that is consistently significant in all the four models. Incumbent partisans are 
more likely than non-(incumbent) partisans to form the perception that Kenya is a strong 
democracy, as opposed to a non-democratic country. In contrast, opposition partisanship 
only has a significant influence on the perceptions of the informed but not the uninformed 
people. Moreover, this influence is negative suggesting that strong opposition partisans 
are less likely than non-(opposition) partisans to view Kenya as democratic. Furthermore, 
general partisanship has no effect on the perceptions of informed or uninformed people. 
These results seem to suggest that an individual’s perceived level of democracy in Kenya 
depends on whether the individual’s party is in power or not.  
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          For a closer examination and comparison of the specific influence of the incumbent 
partisanship on the perceptions of uninformed and informed people, I use the predicted 
probabilities shown in figures 4.1(a) and (b). The predicted probabilities are calculated 
with all the other variables in the respective models held constant at their medians.  
 
 
 
          Figures 4.1(a) and (b) shows that the uninformed non-partisans (incumbent) are 8% 
more likely to feel that Kenya is a non-democratic country than informed non-partisans 
(incumbent), and these uninformed non-partisans are also 17% more likely to feel that 
Kenya is a weak democracy. This suggests that without the intervention of incumbent 
partisanship, uninformed Kenyans tend to form more pessimistic perceptions about 
democracy in Kenya than informed Kenyans. 
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          Strong incumbent partisanship reduces the perception that Kenya is not democratic 
by 11% among the uniformed, but has no significant effect among the informed. It also 
reduces the perception that Kenya is a weak democracy by 56% among the former, and 
23% among the latter. In contrast, Strong incumbent partisanship increases the chances 
of forming the perception that Kenya is a democracy by 30% among the uninformed and 
16% among the informed Kenyans. It also increases the perception that Kenya is a strong 
democracy by 23% among uninformed and 9% among the informed. The general picture 
that emerges is one where the effect of incumbent partisanship on perceptions about the 
extent of democracy in Kenya is greater among the uninformed than informed Kenyans. 
In fact, this was already evident even without the use of any control variables in table 4.1. 
4.4.2 Partisanship and Perceptions about the State of the Economy  
          When it comes to perceptions about the current state of the Kenyan economy
35
, it is 
clear that both informed and uninformed Kenyans are influenced by nearly the same set 
of factors. When evaluating current state of the economy, both uninformed and informed 
people tend to be guided by the incumbent partisanship, their education and whether their 
individual living conditions have changed for the better from what it was in the previous 
                                                          
35
  In order to appreciate the influence of partisanship on perceptions about the state of 
the economy, it is imperative to sketch Kenya’s economic outlook at the time of survey in 
2005. Kenya registered an impressive real GDP growth rate of 5.8% in 2005 compared to 
4.9% in 2004. The agricultural sector, which is a key pillar of the country’s economy, 
grew by 6.7% in 2005 compared to a slower growth of 1.4% in 2004. Significant growth 
was reported in tourism, manufacturing, transport and communication, as well as building 
and construction sectors. Moreover, there was 5.9% increase in new jobs created in 2005, 
compared to the previous year. These improvements resulted from changes in the 
country’s macroeconomic policy from 2003. The Human Development Reports 
summarizes these changes so that country’s Human Development Index in 2005 was 
0.532 compared to 0.520 in 2004 and 0.474 in 2003 (for details see The Kenya Human 
Development Reports
 
2006 available and accessed online on January 5 2012, at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/africa/kenya/KENYA_2006_en.pdf ). 
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year (relative deprivation). The only noteworthy difference is that the perceptions of the 
informed Kenyans are further influenced to a lesser extent by ethnicity.  
          Since informed and uninformed Kenyans focus on nearly the same mix of factors, 
it is hardly a surprise that the difference between informed and uninformed Kenyans who 
feel that the national economic conditions are either fairly good or very good is just 4.7%, 
and thus statistically insignificant. Only 24.5% of uninformed and 29.2% of informed 
people feel that the economy is either fairly good or very good. 
          The predicted probabilities for the effects of incumbent partisanship on perceptions 
of informed and uninformed Kenyans about the economy are shown in figures 4.2 (a) and 
(b). Once again, all other variables in the models are held constant at their medians. 
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         According to figures 4.2 (a), the predominant perception among the uninformed, 
regardless of the strength of incumbent partisanship is that the Kenyan economy is fairly 
bad. Although this perception is dominant even among informed non-partisans and weak 
partisans, this changes a great deal among informed Kenyans as the strength of incumbent 
partisanship increases. In essence, while partisanship has no effect on the likelihood that 
uninformed Kenyans would hold these perceptions, it considerably influences the 
likelihood that informed people would form the same perceptions.  
          More precisely, the uninformed non-partisans are 6% more likely to feel that the 
Kenyan economy is very bad as compared to the informed non-partisans. However, they 
have an equal probability of perceiving the economy to be good or very good, just as the 
informed Kenyans. While incumbent partisanship reduces the perception that the 
economy is very bad by 16% among the informed and 13% among the uninformed, it 
raises the perception that the economy is fairly good by 20% among the former and 11% 
among the latter. Thus, incumbent partisanship has a greater influence on the perceptions 
of the informed than uninformed Kenyans regarding the state of the national economy. 
          A tentative conclusion from the preceding discussion is that when the informed and 
uninformed people focus on the same set of factors, as is the case with perceptions about 
the state of the national economy, they are more likely to form similar perceptions. 
However, when they are attentive to different issues, as is the case with perceptions about 
democracy, then they are likely to form different perceptions. Therefore, if perceptions 
influence political behavior as I have argued, then the documented differences in political 
behaviors of the informed and the uninformed (Aalberg, 2003; Lutz, 2006; Carpini, 2009; 
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Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010), may be due to differences in their perceptions, which in 
turn reflect differences in the range and mix of issues that shape those perceptions.  
          For instance, my analysis shows that the proportion of uninformed people who feel 
that Kenya is undemocratic but still intend to vote for the incumbent party is extremely 
low (16.7%), and significantly different  from that of the informed people with similar 
perceptions and voting intentions (50%). Yet, when the uninformed feel the economy is 
very bad, they are just as likely as the informed to expression the intention to vote for the 
incumbent party if elections were held now. That is, the differences in the perceptions of 
informed and uninformed people about democracy translate into differences in their 
likelihood of voting for the incumbent party, while similarities in their perceptions about 
the economy translate into similarity in their likelihood of voting for the incumbent party. 
4.4.3 Education and perceptions about Democracy and the Economy  
          Education enhances optimistic perceptions about the state of the national economy 
among both the informed and uniformed Kenyans. However, when it comes to the extent 
of democracy in Kenya, education promotes pessimistic perceptions among the informed 
people, but has no significant effect on the perceptions of the uninformed. This suggests 
that the effect of education on political perceptions also vary with the level of political 
information. Hence, studies which lump together informed and uninformed people may 
not yield accurate results. It is notable for instance that using more or less the same data, 
Bratton et al (2005) concluded that higher levels of educational attainment positively 
affects perceptions about the quality of democracy and the state of the national economy. 
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          The effect of education on perceptions of informed people is of particular interest. 
Since Kenya posted the best democracy score in over ten years in 2005,
36
 I expected that 
informed people who are highly educated would be sufficiently empowered with 
information to overcome partisanship, recognize the democratic gains that the country 
has made over the years, and correctly judge her as fairly democratic, if not a strong 
democracy. This expectation is born out of the fact that, ‘knowledge equips people with 
the information they need to plan and execute effective behavioral strategies, enabling 
them to engage in attitude-expressive behaviors efficiently’ (Visser et al, 2008:133). 
           It is therefore surprising that even the highly educated people failed to overcome 
the influence of incumbent partisanship, and hence could not make unbiased evaluation 
of democracy. Indeed, the uneducated people, whose only information lifeline is party 
cues, made more accurate appraisal of democracy than the highly educated people. These 
results are consistent with those from past studies which show that ‘individuals often do 
not use the knowledge they acquire in the context of education, even when the tasks they 
perform would seem to require it’ (Johnson, 2009:57). They also attest to Berinsky’s 
view that ‘in the battle between facts and partisanship, partisanship always win’ (p. 124). 
Indeed, most scholars tend to concur on the fact that ‘partisanship seems to be a stronger 
overall predictor of the use of other cues than knowledge’ (Lutz, 2006:93). 
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 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 382-387. 
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          It should also be recalled that in addition to posting the best democracy score in ten 
years, Kenya also had her best economic performance in five years in 2005.
37
  It is hardly 
surprising that both the informed and the uninformed Kenyans with higher educational 
attainments were able to recognize this and form the correct perception that the Kenyan 
economy was fairly good or very good. While these results suggest that education raises 
optimism about the economy but reduces optimism about democracy, it may be the case 
that highly educated Kenyans are more likely to accurately assess the economy, but less 
likely to make equally accurate assessment of democracy, and vice versa. Even more 
radically, it is possible that educated Kenyans are more attentive to the economy than to 
politics, while the uneducated are more attentive to politics than to the economy. These 
are issues that require more detailed investigations beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
4.4.4 Relative Deprivation and perceptions of Democracy and the Economy  
          As expected, the results also show that relatively deprived Kenyans, regardless of 
whether they are informed or uninformed, are less likely than those who are not deprived, 
to form the perception that the national economic conditions are very good. Since Kenya 
registered her best economic performance in five years in 2005, it would appear that the 
relatively deprived people may have been blinded by their individual living conditions to 
believe that since their individual economic fortunes had changed for the worse, then the 
national economic conditions must have also taken a similar turn.  Indeed, other recent 
studies have also reached the conclusion that ‘if one believes that his or her personal 
situation has improved over the past year, then he or she is also more likely to think that 
the national economy has done well in the past’ (Anderson, 2010:150). 
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 See the various issues of the Human Development Reports, from 2000 to 2006. 
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          These findings do not necessarily imply that those who are not deprived are more 
attentive to economic indicators and hence more knowledgeable about the economy than 
those who feel deprived. It is possible that even those who are not deprived arrived at the 
right evaluation of the economy not because they pay attention to the right indicators of 
the national economy, but because they based their evaluations on their individual living 
conditions, which in this case, happened to coincide with the national living conditions.  
          Moreover, economic voting theories predict that if elections were held in Kenya in 
2005 when the survey was done, those whose economic fortunes have changed for the 
worse and are hence relatively deprived, would be less likely to vote for the incumbent, 
compared to those who do not feel deprived. Consistent with this prediction, my analysis 
reveal that whereas 33.3% of those who do not feel deprived expressed the willingness to 
vote for the incumbent NARC party, only 19.1% of relatively deprived people expressed 
similar voting preference if elections were held at the time of the survey. Either way, the 
tragedy is that these voting intentions are based on wrong perceptions. This underlines a 
major point in this dissertation: perceptions are key to understanding political behavior.  
          Ordinarily, it is expected that perceptions about the economy can either stimulate 
grievance-driven political participation aimed at “throwing the rascals out”, or encourage 
withdrawal from politics if ‘economic deprivation renders politics a remote concern’ 
(Herron, 2009:70). In the latter case for instance, it has been argued that ‘a hungry 
stomach has an angry mind that has no time for popular participation in decision-making. 
The concern of a hungry stomach is not how decisions are made, but whether the 
decisions made, will put something in it’ (Oyugi and Gitonga, 1987:106). Besides, some 
studies on Africa have found that relative deprivation influence democratic commitments 
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(Bratton et al, 2005). In contrast to these expectations, table 4.2 shows that deprivation 
has no significant effect on perceptions about the extent of democracy in Kenya.  
          It will be recalled from chapter three that relative deprivation also had no influence 
on satisfaction with democracy among informed and uninformed Kenyans, and that those 
who feel deprived are just as likely to be strong incumbent partisans as those who are not 
deprived. Since the incumbent party (NARC) just assumed power three years earlier, 
after decades of misrule, it is likely that even those who felt deprived may have taken it 
as part of short term painful sacrifices necessarily for long term economic stability. These 
results are comparable to those of Bratton et al (2005) who found no relation between 
economic dissatisfaction and public support for economic reforms in Africa. They noted 
that dissatisfaction with economic reforms does not necessarily lead to disapproval of the 
economic policies. Bratton et al (2005: 225) suggest that this may be due to the fact that: 
African supporters of economic reforms correctly recognize 
that, under an adjustment regime, economic conditions 
often worsen before they get better; accordingly, they are 
willing to wait patiently for eventual economic recovery. 
 
          While the resultant sense of deprivation may be sufficient for them to conclude that 
the national economy is not doing well, it may be neither strong enough to generate anti-
incumbent party sentiments, nor sufficient to use as a criteria for evaluating the extent of 
democracy. Moreover, it is also likely that people look beyond material benefits that may 
accrue from democracy, and hence whether their material conditions improve or worsen 
has no significant effect on their evaluations of the extent of democracy in Kenya.  
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4.4.5 Patriotism and Perceptions of Democracy and the Economy  
          I had expected that those with greater sense of patriotism would be proud of their 
country and thus form optimistic perceptions about both the state of the national economy 
and the extent of democracy in Kenya. This expectation was grounded on the fact that 
patriotism places national honor and pride ahead of all else. Patriotism in this sense is a 
political cue that people take not necessarily because they lack information, but for the 
need to show one’s love for country by always striving to portray her in good light.  
          Contrary to these expectations, the results show that patriotism has no significant 
effect on perceptions about the state of the economy or the extent of democracy in Kenya. 
This implies that the patriotic cue is not very strong among Kenyans, particularly with 
regard to current issues about which facts may still be available. Patriotic cues neither 
translates readily into unquestioned loyalty, nor yield to suspension of rational judgments 
in order to portray Kenya in positive light as very democratic and with a strong economy. 
To use Berinsky’s (2009) phraseology, in the battle between patriotism and partisanship 
among both the informed and the uninformed Kenyans, partisanship always win. In fact, 
patriotism does not influence any of the six forms of political perceptions examined in 
this chapter; it simply is not an important consideration for Kenyans.  
          Lack of patriotism among Kenyans is a historical problem. During the one-party 
era (1969-1991), the ruling party (KANU) promoted a perverted form of patriotism, 
where patriotism was defined in terms of fawning loyalty to KANU and the president, 
rather than to the nation. In this regard, patriotic people were those who had KANU party 
membership cards; wore KANU t-shirts, or hats; or hanged a portrait of the president in 
their houses or offices, while patriotic songs were those sung in praise of the president. 
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However, as resentment for KANU grew so was the defiance of this perverted patriotism. 
Unfortunately, even after the advent of multipartism no efforts were made to cultivate a 
true sense of patriotism. The problem of patriotism even became subject of discussion in 
the Kenya national assembly in June 1993, when Mr. Jillo Falana, the fiery MP for Saku 
constituency, succinctly captured the problem of patriotism among Kenyans: 
 
The other problem which affects all Kenyans is that one of 
lack of patriotism. We are not patriotic. Let us not cheat 
ourselves; we Kenyans are not patriotic. We are not 
concerned about Kenya and we do not really care what 
happens to Kenya
38
 
 
 
          More recently, there have been initiatives to promote patriotism among Kenyans 
such as Najivunia Kuwa Mkenya (I am proud to be Kenyan) initiative launched in 2004 
by the office of the president. It aimed at inspiring Kenyans to be patriotic and proud of 
their country. Unfortunately, this initiative was not spearheaded by the president himself, 
but by some junior officer in his office. As expected, the reaction took partisan turn, with 
those supporting the president and his party supporting it, while those aligned to the 
opposition denigrating it. The latter group developed corrupted versions of the initiative 
such as Navumilia Kuwa Mkenya (I am just persevering to be a Kenyan). The primary 
theme behind Navumilia Kuwa Mkenya is that to say you are proud to be Kenyan is to 
accept that you are benefitting from the current government at a time when the majority 
wallows in poverty and misery. Yet again patriotism gave way to parochial partisanship. 
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4.4.6 Gender and Perceptions of Democracy and the Economy  
          Similarly, perceptions about the state of the economy and the extent of democracy, 
do not significantly vary with gender. This surprising finding must be understood in the 
context of women and politics in Kenya. Women continue to play second fiddle to men in 
virtually all aspects of the Kenyan politics, notwithstanding their numerical superiority 
and a raft of measures aimed at women political empowerment. This is partly attributable 
to the patriarchal nature of the Kenyan society, the violent and masculine nature of the 
Kenyan politics, and women’s lack of both intellectual and financial resources. Hence, by 
2005 when the study data was collected, only nine out of the 200 elected members of the 
national assembly (4.5%) were women. Yet this was celebrated as the largest number of 
elected women ever in a single national assembly election in Kenya’s history.   
          The challenges that women face in the democratic process in Kenya extend beyond 
the elite women seeking elective political offices, to the ordinary women voters. Women 
face physical violence during political campaigns from at least two fronts. First, they face 
violence from “strangers”, mostly youths, hired by opposing candidates to intimidate 
those who support their opponents. Secondly, and even more disturbing, women also face 
violence from the “loved ones” like their spouses and parents if they support a candidate 
or party which they do not approve. Yet there is a weak legal framework for redressing 
gendered political violence, let alone the reluctance of the police to prosecute such cases.  
In short, ‘the kind of violence that attends political campaigns in Kenya are such that 
many women intent on running for political office are often forced to withdraw and leave 
the dirty game of politics for men to fight out’ (Nasong’o and Ayot, 2007:189). 
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          Against this background, it is reasonable to expect women to feel that Kenya is not 
democratic given that they still face numerous obstacles in the political process. It is thus 
surprising that women are as likely as men to feel that Kenya is democratic. It is possible 
that women do not necessarily view these challenges as expression of lack of democracy 
itself, but as unorthodox behavior of fellow political actors. Besides, their sense of 
exclusion may have been assuaged by the fact that the incumbent party, and by extension, 
the government signaled better times and greater attention and opportunity for women. In 
fact, eight of the nine elected women legislators were elected on incumbent NARC party 
ticket. Women may also have been mollified by the manifest improvement in Kenya’s 
Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) from 0.538 in 2004 to 0.547 in 2005.
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4.4.7 Ethnicity and Perceptions of Democracy and the Economy  
          Table 4.2 reveals that while ethnicity is a significant predictor of perceptions about 
the present economy among informed Kenyans, it has no significant effect on the other 
forms of perceptions. I explore these results further by directly comparing perceptions of 
the president’s ethnic group (the Kikuyu) with the perceptions of nine selected Kenyan 
ethnic groups. I calculated the proportion of each ethnic group who feel that the national 
economy is either good or very good, as well as those who feel that Kenya is either fairly 
democratic or very democratic. I then plotted each ethnic group’s perceptions about the 
national economy against perceptions about democracy for both informed and uniformed 
respondents as shown in Figures 4.3 (a) and (b). To give us a better sense of the results 
shown in Figures 4.3 (a) and (b) and the discussion that follows, I have also provided a 
map showing the geographical distribution of Kenyan ethnic groups. 
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Map 4.1: The Geographical Distribution of Kenyan Ethnic Groups 
 
           
Source: Online sourced map attributed to the UN/UK Foreign office, available and last 
accessed on March 22, 2012 at: http://www.uusc.org/content/map_ethnic_groups_kenya.  
 
          Figures 4.3(a) and (b) reveals that the aggregate ethnic perceptions about the 
national economy is significantly correlated with perceptions about the extent of 
democracy in Kenya among the uninformed (r = 0.475) and the informed (r = 0.525). As 
is now clear from previous sections, the informed tend to be more consistent in their 
evaluations than the uninformed and hence their evaluations of the national economy and 
democracy connect more strongly. Moreover, those communities that significantly feel 
that the national economy is good such as the Meru and Kikuyu also feel that Kenya is a 
strong democracy. Alternatively, communities like Luos who do not feel the economy is 
doing well are equally less enthusiastic about the extent of democracy in Kenya.  
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          It is notable for instance, that it is the Meru rather than the Kikuyu who are the most 
enthusiastic about the economy and democracy. The Meru are the seventh largest ethnic 
group in Kenya, and are linguistically closest to the Kikuyu than any other ethnic group. 
Besides, the Meru whose economic mainstay revolves around the cultivation and sale of a 
controversial stimulant drug, khat or miraa (Catha edulis),
40
 have consistently supported 
Kibaki ever since the first multiparty election of 1992.  
 
A man carrying miraa (Catha edulis), that is largely chewed to produce a stimulant drug, 
which according to experts, can cause some serious health problems including infertility. 
Picture sourced from Daily Nation Newspaper, May 11, 2011. 
 
 
          The genesis and reasons for their ardent support for Kibaki defies explanations. For 
instance, by October 1990, Kibaki was an avowed anti-miraa crusader, calling for a ban 
on its cultivation, sale and consumption. As health minister, he stated in parliament that, 
‘we do not need to plant miraa… miraa should be forgotten. As you know, miraa is 
actually a drug’.
41
 When Mr. Joseph Muturia who is an ardent pro-miraa legislator from 
Meru, challenged him to apologize for calling miraa a drug, Kibaki responded that: ‘the 
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honorable member [Mr. Muturia] would better be advised not to raise this issue. It would 
be better to leave it quite because it may become a [health] crisis sooner than he thinks’.
42
 
 
          Ironically, in the first multiparty elections held two years later in 1992, the Merus 
overwhelmingly voted for Kibaki in his first failed bid for presidency, while Mr. Muturia 
lost his parliamentary seat. This underscores the fact that people at times make decisions 
that undercut their self-interests (Lukes, 1974; Lewis, 2001; Frank, 2004; Bartels, 2008). 
The critical question arising from this inconsistency has been so well framed by Frank 
(2004): ‘how [can] so many people get it so wrong?’(p.1). Could it be the case as Luppia 
(2011) notes that ‘in politics, citizens must sometimes make inconsistent choices in order 
to ultimately have made a consistent one’? (p. 2). While the basis of this support remains 
unclear, it is notable that during Kibaki’s presidency, he has rewarded Meru elites with 
plum government jobs. While the tangible returns to the Meru masses from their support 
for Kibaki are hard to quantify, they have consistently supported his government.  
         On the other hand, Luos seem to be worlds apart from the Kikuyus and Merus in 
terms of perceptions, and appear to be least enthusiastic about democracy and the Kenyan 
economy. Their evaluation of the two issues underscores the deep-seated mutual distrust 
between them and the Kikuyu, dating back to the time of independence in 1963. The two 
communities fought for the country’s independence together under the KANU party, but 
six years after independence, ideological differences led to a fallout between President 
Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Luo and Vice President). The 
latter resigned in principle both from the Vice Presidency and from the KANU party and 
formed Kenya People’s Union (KPU), thus drawing political battle lines between the two 
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communities. In 1969, the only senior Luo politician remaining in KANU, Tom Mboya, 
was assassinated in broad daylight by a lone Kikuyu gunman, and ‘a bitter Luo nation 
accused the Kenyatta regime of having a hand in the assassination’ (Cohen and Atieno-
Odhiambo, 2004:175). In the same year, Kenyatta banned KPU, and detained Odinga. 
          These events and subsequent ones created a strong foundation for political enmity 
between the two communities. Interestingly, it was Odinga’s son, Raila Odinga who 
declared “Kibaki Tosha” (Kibaki is equal to the task) in 2002, at a time when the NARC 
opposition alliance was grappling with how to agree on one presidential flag bearer. Then 
Luos overwhelmingly voted for Kibaki in 2002, but upon his election, he did not appoint 
Raila as the Prime Minister as agreed in the pre-election arrangements. It is these political 
developments that explain the gap between the Kikuyu and the Luos in both figures. Thus 
the perception of being betrayed for the second time is the most likely reason why the 
Luo were disproportionately less inclined to judge the economy as good or the country as 
a strong democracy since the president (a Kikuyu) had not only short changed “one of 
their own” (Raila), but in so doing had in fact betrayed the whole community. 
          The relative positions of the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luos, in terms of perceptions 
about the economy, as shown in figure 4.3 (a), is symptomatic of the history of Kenya’s 
political economy which is succinctly described by The Economist of February, 18, 2010:  
Under Kenyatta’s presidency (1964-78) his own Kikuyu, easily the 
largest, richest and best-educated single group, dominated politics 
and business….to some extent he shared out the spoils of office 
across a tribal spectrum, giving chosen leaders of each group juicy 
rewards, while ensuring that his Kikuyu sat atop the pile…Under 
Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002), the pendulum swang away from the 
Kikuyu, though they continued to dominate business. A coterie 
around Mr. Moi, particularly from his own much smaller Kalenjin 
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group of tribes, amassed vast wealth and accumulated a lot of 
land….Under Mr. Kibaki, the pendulum swang once more towards 
the Kikuyu, causing resentment among those who have perennially 
missed out, especially the sorely neglected Luo, the third biggest 
tribe, whose unchallenged leader is Mr. Odinga (and which 
numbers Barrack Obama as one of its own). 
 
 
          It is equally interesting that the perceptions of informed and uninformed Kenyans 
vary considerably even within the same ethnic group. For instance, while the uninformed 
Somalis and Kambas tend to rate democracy in Kenya very highly, informed members of 
the same ethnic groups are far less enthusiastic about the state of democracy in Kenya. 
However, among the Kisii and Mjikenda, it is the informed people who rate democracy in 
Kenya highly compared to the uninformed. Still, there is a third group that seems to be 
fairly consistent in evaluating democracy, and comprise of Merus, Kikuyus, and Luhyas. 
Hence, perceptions about the extent of democracy and the state of the national economy 
vary not only from one ethnic group to the other, but also with the level of information. 
          In terms of inter-ethnic comparisons, there is a statistically significant difference 
between uninformed Kikuyus and uninformed Luo, Kisii, Kamba, Somali and “others” in 
their perceptions about the national economy. Except for Somalis, the differences persist 
even among the informed. In fact, apart from the Somalis, differences between informed 
Kikuyus and informed members of other ethnic groups are significant. When it comes to 
perceptions about the extent of democracy, uninformed Kikuyus significantly differ from 
all the other ethnic groups except Kambas and Luhyas. Once again, the differences 
diminish among those who are well informed except the Somali. 
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          Finally, the two figures, especially figure 4.3(b) is a clear depiction of the Kenyan 
political scenario at least from 2005 to the chaotic 2007 elections. In the referendum held 
about a month of the survey, the Meru and Kikuyu voted with president Kibaki in favor of 
the draft constitution, while all the other tribes, except the Kisii voted against it. Just the 
way the Kisii appear to think like the Kikuyu in terms of the extent of democracy and 
more like the other ethnic groups in terms of the economy, so they split votes between the 
two voting blocs. A similar voting pattern was replicated in the 2007 elections. Hence the 
2007 post-elections violence in Kenya can be explained in terms of these entrenched 
economic grievances against the Kikuyu and president Kibaki’s administration. 
4.5 Retrospective and Prospective Political Perceptions  
          Up to this point, I have only examined perceptions about the present, yet the way 
people form perceptions about the past, present and future may differ. In this section, I 
treat economy and politics as two distinct issue-areas, and introduce time-line dimension 
by dividing perceptions into three time-lines: retrospective, present and prospective 
perceptions as discussed in chapter 1. I then test the last dissertation hypothesis, H3.3: 
The influence of partisanship on the perceptions of the uninformed citizens varies with 
issue-timeline. Since I already addressed the perceptions about the present political and 
economic state of affairs in the previous section, the task here is limited to comparing 
retrospective and prospective perceptions about politics and the economy. For better 
comparison, I replicate the generic political perceptions model used in the last section. 
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4.5.1 Retrospective and Prospective Perceptions about Democracy 
Table 4.3 shows results of ordered logit regression models for the effect of partisanship 
on retrospective and prospective perceptions about democracy. These results enable us to 
compare how effects of partisanship on perceptions vary with political information levels.  
Table 4.3: Determinants of Retrospective  and Prospective perception of Democracy 
 
 Retrospective Perceptions 
 
Prospective Perceptions 
 
Uninformed  
 
Informed 
 
Uninformed  
 
Informed  
 
General Partisanship -0.34 0.34 0.26 0.02 
 (-1.31) (1.69) (0.81) (0.10) 
Incumbent Partisanship        0.45***    0.20*     0.48**       0.43***    
 (3.46) (2.36) (3.11) (4.94) 
Opposition Partisanship -0.02                                              -0.16 -0.02 -0.12 
 (-0.20)                                          (-1.75) (-0.16) (-1.27) 
Education 0.05       -0.20*** 0.14 0.04 
 (0.63) (-4.06) (1.39) (0.80) 
Ethnicity 0.71*                                                       0.26 0.80* 0.55** 
 (1.96)                   (1.18) (1.94) (2.45) 
Patriotism 0.16                                                      0.13 -0.14 0.01 
 (1.50)                                               (1.63) (-0.99) (0.16) 
Relative Deprivation -0.17 0.17 -0.12 0.11 
 (-1.52)                                            (1.80) (-0.93) (1.13) 
Gender: Female -0.01                                                      -0.16 -0.06 0.10 
 (-0.01)                                              (-0.89) (-0.17) (0.53) 
 2 Likelihood Ratio 29.09                                                     45.16 19.35 43.83 
Observations 239 552 160 511 
Entries are proportional ordered logit regression coefficients with t-values in brackets. 
Cut points are omitted for simplicity. Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
 
 
 
         It is apparent from table 4.3
43
 that prospective perceptions of both the informed and 
uninformed people about democracy are influenced by the same set of factors. These 
perceptions are manifestly influenced primarily by incumbent partisanship and to a lesser 
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extent by ethnicity. Hence, it is not surprising that the informed and uninformed people 
tend to form virtually the same prospective perceptions about democracy in Kenya. In 
fact, 23.7% of uninformed and 24.9% of informed people feel that Kenya is likely to be 
democratic in future. The difference between these two perceptions is just 1.2%, is highly 
improbable, and hence statistically insignificant. 
          In contrast, the retrospective perceptions of the informed and uninformed people 
appear to respond to a different mix of factors. The latter rely on incumbent partisanship 
and only to a lesser extent on ethnicity when forming retrospective perceptions, while the 
former rely more on education, and only to a lesser extent, on incumbent partisanship.  
This attentiveness to different mix of factors yield a statistically significant difference in 
their perceptions about the extent to which the 2002 elections were free and fair. More 
specifically, 43.9% of the uninformed and 58.3% of the informed people regard the 2002 
elections as having been very free and fair. 
          Table 4.3 shows that incumbent partisanship has the strongest and most consistent 
influence on the retrospective and prospective perceptions of both the informed and the 
uninformed people about democracy. In particular, strong incumbent partisanship raises 
optimism about the future of democracy in Kenya, and drives both the informed and the 
uninformed people towards the conclusion that the 2002 elections were free and fair. Yet 
again, general partisanship and opposition partisanship are not statistically significant. 
These are precisely the same results observed with respect to perceptions about the 
current state of democracy. In fact, as was the case then, all the other variables, except 
ethnicity, have no statistically significant effect on the retrospective and prospective 
perceptions of uninformed Kenyans about democracy.  
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          Figures 4.4(a) and (b) shows predicted probabilities for the influence of incumbent 
partisanship on the retrospective and prospective perceptions of the uninformed people 
about democracy. All other variables in the two models are held constant at the median. 
 
 
  
         Figures 4.4 (a) and (b) gives a clearer view of the effect of incumbent partisanship 
on the retrospective and prospective perceptions of informed people about democracy. It 
shows that non-incumbent partisans are 19% more likely to feel that the 2002 elections in 
Kenya were very democratic (free and fair), and 30% more likely to feel that the elections 
were fairly democratic than non-democratic. This means that even without the influence 
of incumbent partisanship, Kenyans are still more likely to feel that the elections were 
either very democratic or at least, fairly democratic as opposed to being non-democratic. 
Moreover, these perception gaps widen further as the strength of incumbent partisanship 
increases, so that strong partisans are 58% more likely to feel that the elections were very 
democratic rather than non-democratic. In other words, incumbent partisanship increases 
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the probability of viewing the elections as very democratic by 32% while simultaneously 
reducing the probability of viewing them as non-democratic by 7%.   
          With respect to prospective perceptions, non-incumbent partisans are 31% more 
likely to form the perception that Kenya will be fairly democratic in future as opposed to 
being non-democratic. However, they are also 25% more likely to project that in future 
Kenya is likely to be a weak democracy. Hence, the probability that they would form 
optimistic prospective perceptions about democracy is just 6% more than the probability 
of forming pessimistic prospective perceptions. A change from non-incumbent partisan 
to strong incumbent partisan raises the probability of forming the perception that Kenya 
will be a strong democracy in future by 20%, while also increasing the probability of 
projecting that she will be fairly democratic by 11%. Yet, it also reduces the likelihood of 
projecting that Kenya will be a weak democracy by 22%. 
          In comparative terms, it is evident that while incumbent partisanship has the same 
degree of influence on the retrospective and the prospective perception of Kenya as a fair 
democracy (-11% and 11% respectively), it has a much greater influence on retrospective 
(32%) than prospective perception (20%) of Kenya as a strong democracy. On this score, 
it is apparent that incumbent partisanship makes the uninformed people more optimistic 
about the past than the future, and less pessimistic about the future than the past. This is 
hardly surprising, since the past is an experience that is already lived, and about which 
facts are available in memory, and hence one can be more definitive about it. However, 
the future is a matter of speculation which at the very least, calls for cautious optimism. 
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          It is also clear that the stronger the incumbent partisanship, the greater the feeling 
that the 2002 elections were very free and fair, and hence Kenya was very democratic at 
least then. The corollary is also true. This is interesting when interpreted in the context of 
the Kenyan politics at the time. Given that the incumbent party (KANU) lost in the 2002 
elections, and considering that no major shifts in party preferences occurred after those 
elections, the partisanship roles were reversed so that a significant portion of the pre-2002 
opposition supporters became the (new) incumbent party (NARC) supporters and vice 
versa. Therefore, those who were incumbent partisans by the time of the survey in 2005 
had been opposition partisans in 2002. They are expected to view the elections as unfair; 
otherwise they would give credit to the ‘out-group’ contrary to ‘group-serving biases’. 
          I argue that because uninformed citizens lack an objective criterion for determining 
whether elections are free and fair, there are two possible, though not mutually exclusive, 
bias-driven cues available to both uninformed incumbent partisans and uninformed non-
incumbent partisans. First, the former may view elections as free and fair simply because 
the party they are aligned to was in power at the time and oversaw the electoral process. 
To say that the party they trust organized flawed elections would cast their party in bad 
light contrary to the well documented human penchant for ‘group-serving biases’.  
          Second, the incumbent partisans can judge the elections as free and fair merely 
because the party they are aligned to won those elections. In this case, to say that the 
elections were not free and fair is to suggest that their party too did not win fairly, which 
sounds absurd. The study results suggest that this second explanation is stronger among 
Kenyans. The tendency is for Kenyans to view elections as free and fair when those they 
associate with wins, even if elections are organized by an incumbent party that they do 
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not trust. However, elections are viewed as not free and fair when those they associate 
with lose, even when organized by an incumbent party that they trust a lot. 
         This attitude seems to be so deep-rooted that at one time the then vice-president, 
Professor George Saitoti, made the following remarks in the Kenya national assembly: 
It should not always be that only if the opposition wins that 
elections will be free and fair and that when they do not win 
the elections are not free and fair. That is a wrong attitude.
44
 
 
          Seen from a different perspective, the results suggest that retrospective perceptions 
about the 2002 elections were based on the respondent’s party identity at the time of the 
survey in 2005 rather than their 2002 party identity. These findings open a useful line of 
research regarding whether people retain and defend previously held perceptions or shift 
those perceptions when their partisanship changes. Tentatively, it can be inferred that 
people adjust their previous perceptions whenever their partisanship attachments change 
from the ruling party to the opposition, or vice versa. However, the case presently under 
review may not be the ideal for such determination, hence the need for further research. 
          It is evident from table 4.3 that ethnicity is the only other variable that influences 
both the retrospective and prospective perceptions about democracy in Kenya among the 
uninformed Kenyans. Apparently, members of the president’s ethnic group (Kikuyus) are 
more likely than the other Kenyans (non-Kikuyus) to form the perception that Kenya was 
democratic and will continue to be so in future. However, the effect of ethnicity appears 
to be minimal from table 4.3, suggesting that uninformed people rely more on incumbent 
partisanship, with ethnicity merely playing secondary role. I explore these clues using the 
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predicted probabilities or the uninformed Kenyans shown in figures 4.5 (a) and (b). The 
probabilities are computed while holding all the other variables constant at their medians. 
 
 
 
        Figures 4.5 (a) and (b) show that the probability of forming extreme pessimistic 
retrospective or prospective perceptions about democracy in Kenya is very low, and is 
not generally influenced in a significant manner by ethnicity. In other words, very few 
Kenyans, regardless of their ethnic identity, would neither argue that the 2002 elections 
were very undemocratic, nor forecast that Kenya could become very undemocratic in the 
future. The dominant perception among Kikuyus, just like the other Kenyans, was that the 
country would be fairly democratic in future. In fact, the proportion of Kikuyus holding 
the perception that Kenya will be fairly democratic in future (54%) is not significantly 
different from the proportion of other ethnic groups holding the same perception (50%).           
The only major difference in the prospective perceptions of the Kikuyus compared to 
other Kenyans is that the former is 12% more likely to feel that Kenya will be very 
democratic in future, and 12% less likely to feel that she will be fairly undemocratic, 
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compared to the latter. Thus, the overall picture is that Kikuyus are more likely to hold 
optimistic prospective perceptions about democracy than other Kenyans, and on average, 
Kenyans feel that the country will be fairly democratic in future. 
 
          Yet, just two years after the study survey data was collected, Kenya sunk deep into 
the undemocratic abyss, by conducting a thoroughly flawed election in 2007, that resulted 
in a catastrophic ethnic violence that left thousands of fatalities in its wake. The same 
Kenyans who did not foresee the country rolling back on its democratic gains, found 
themselves in the Hobbesian state of nature, cutting each other’s throats with machetes at 
the instigation of the elite. As noted in the Freedom House (2010: 321), ‘Kenya’s 
December 2007 presidential election was a profound blow to the consolidation of 
electoral democracy that had gradually emerged over polls in 1992, 1997 and 2002 
during the country’s transition from three decades of post-independence one-party rule’.  
 
          With respect to retrospective perceptions about democracy, Kikuyus are 17% more 
likely than non-Kikuyus to perceive the 2002 elections to have been very democratic. It is 
tempting to think that since president Kibaki who won the 2002 presidential elections is a 
Kikuyu, the Kikuyus had overwhelmingly voted for him and his party (NARC), and 
therefore the elections were free and fair in their eyes simply because their preferred 
party and candidate won. However, the reality is more complex than this. Partly because 
Kibaki’s main challenger in the elections was also a Kikuyu, he only secured 69% of the 
votes in his native central province, which is predominantly populated by Kikuyus. Yet, 
for instance, he received 76.3% and 72.5% of the votes in Eastern and Western provinces 
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respectively, where Kikuyus hardly constitute 1% of the population.
45
 Hence, Kibaki did 
not get significantly more support from Kikuyus than from other Kenyan ethnic groups.  
 
          It seems that after Kibaki won elections, even Kikuyus who had not supported him 
or NARC in 2002, embraced him, while the no-ethnics who supported him like Kambas, 
Luos and Luhyas, began to drift away due to his failure to honor pre-election agreement. 
While the three ethnic groups overly voted for NARC in 2002, their attitude towards it 
was already tepid by 2005. For instance, 72.2% of Kikuyus expressed intentions to vote 
for NARC if elections were held in 2005, compared to 59.1% of the Kamba, 48.0% of the 
Luhya, and 15.7% of Luos. This behavioral disposition translated into a polarized voting 
pattern in the referendum held in November 2005, and in the disastrous 2007 elections, 
all of which turned out to be contests between the Kikuyus versus the rest of Kenyans.   
          This contextual information yields two crucial points. First, even those members of 
a president’s ethnic group who did not vote for him in the elections, are likely to adopt 
positions that portray him/her and his/her party in good light during his/her presidency, 
and vote for him/her in the next elections. Indeed, in 2007, nearly all Kikuyus supported 
Kibaki’s reelection. Ironically, even his 2002 challenger, Uhuru Kenyatta, “abdicated” 
his role as official opposition leader and momentarily abandoned his presidential quest to 
enhance Kibaki’s re-election chances. While it can be argued that Uhuru did not contest 
the outcome as had been done by the losers in 1992 and 1997 elections largely to secure 
ethnic interests, the very fact that a loser conceded defeat presupposes that the elections 
were democratic (Lindberg, 2006). Taken together, these reasons explain why Kikuyus 
are more likely than non-Kikuyus to perceive the 2002 elections to have been democratic.  
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          Consistent with the foregoing discussion, it is notable that though previous studies 
have emphasized that most people are incapable of accurately recollecting basic political 
facts (Luppia and McCubbins, 1998; Pasek and Krosnick, 2010), it also seems that people 
at times ignore facts for expediency even when they have them, and when they have 
effectively expressed them in the not so distant past. For example, Murunga and Nasongo 
(2006) notes that in the 2005 constitutional referendum, prominent Kikuyu elites who had 
demanded parliamentary system during the Moi era, including Kibaki, Koigi Wamwere, 
Paul Muite, John Michuki and Kamau Kuria, became its critics since a strong presidency 
was now in their ‘ethnic’ interest. While ‘concentration of power in the presidency was 
bad under Moi; it became reasonable once “one of our own” assumed power’ (ibid p.18).  
          Second, when the incumbent president or party loses an election, it is ideally in the 
interest of both winners and losers to portray the elections as free and fair since nobody 
wants to be viewed as having won flawed elections, or presided over flawed elections but 
still lost. It appears that people are more likely to view elections as free and fair if they 
share ethnic identity with the winner, but not if they share identity with the loser. Indeed, 
the likelihood that a Kikuyu would view the 2002 elections as fairly democratic or very 
democratic is 12.5% greater than that of Kalenjins (former president Moi’s ethnic group). 
          The final observation is that perceptions about the past, present and future state of 
democracy are positively correlated, so that those who think that the past was democratic 
think the same of the present and the future, and vice versa. Thus, depending on the other 
factors that influence perceptions about democracy, people either see Kenya as constantly 
if not increasingly becoming democratic or undemocratic. This is not surprising since 
nearly similar factors seem to influence the three forms of perceptions about democracy. 
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4.5.2 Retrospective and Prospective Economic Perceptions  
          In this section, I compare the impact of partisanship on the retrospective and 
prospective perceptions about the economy, by replicating the ordered logit regression 
model used in the previous sections. The regression results are shown in table 4.4. Once 
again, the four models shown are statistically significant, with no collinearity problems. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Determinants of retrospective and prospective perception of the Economy  
 
 Retrospective Perceptions 
 
Prospective Perceptions 
 
 Uninformed 
Kenyans 
 
Informed 
Kenyans 
 
Uninformed 
Kenyans 
 
Informed 
Kenyans 
 
General Partisanship -0.42 -0.11 0.42 0.36    
  (1.70) (0.53) (1.55) (1.77) 
Incumbent Partisanship 0.01    -0.22**     0.30*       0.55***      
 (0.08) (2.49) (2.38) (6.43) 
Opposition Partisanship    -0.31**                                              0.02 0.04 -0.09 
 (2.58)                                          (0.15) (0.29) (0.96) 
Education 0.02 -0.03 0.14 0.12* 
 (0.24) (0.64) (1.65) (2.35) 
Ethnicity -0.79*                                                       -0.41 0.52       0.89*** 
 (2.30)                   (1.75) (1.41) (3.98) 
Patriotism 0.10                                                      -0.03 0.11 0.11 
 (0.98)                                               (0.38) (0.96) (1.42) 
Relative Deprivation       1.72***       2.57***       -0.63***      -0.66*** 
 (10.94)                                            (17.71) (-4.86) (6.91) 
Gender: Female 0.64*                                                      0.04 0.08 -0.01 
 (2.36)                                              (0.22) (0.27) (0.03) 
 2 Likelihood Ratio 189.59                                                     519.38 51.27 165.1 
Observations 269   567 225 510 
 
Entries are proportional ordered logit regression coefficients with t-values in brackets. 
Cut points are omitted for simplicity. Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
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          It can be inferred from table 4.4 that relative deprivation is the strongest and most 
consistent factor that influences the retrospective and prospective perceptions about the 
economy for both informed and uninformed Kenyans. It seems that relatively deprived 
Kenyans, regardless of whether they are informed or uninformed, are likely to develop 
optimistic retrospective perceptions and pessimistic prospective perceptions about the 
economy. This is not surprising because as narrowly defined in this study, one is viewed 
to be relatively deprived if his/her present living conditions are worse than the past living 
conditions. Hence, to be deprived in this sense implies that the past conditions were better 
than the present conditions. Yet, as past studies on Africa have found out, ‘views of the 
past strongly influence current and prospective perceptions’ (Bratton et al, 2005:225). 
 
          In essence, a person who feels that past economic conditions were better than the 
present is likely to form the perception that the conditions will be bad in future, and vice 
versa. That is, present economic perceptions are negatively correlated with retrospective 
perceptions, but positively correlated with prospective perceptions. Thus, people perceive 
their past, present and future economic conditions as a linear progression, so that when 
one moves from a good economic past to bad present or from bad past to worse present, 
he/she is likely to project the future economic conditions as bad or worse, and vice versa.    
          These results corroborate past studies which have found that, ‘if voters believe that 
the economy improved over the past year, then they might also be more likely to think 
that it will improve or continue to be strong in the future’ (Anderson, 2010: 150). Yet, the 
results counter the more curvilinear model proposed by Arceneaux (2004) who argues 
that, ‘when times are bad people tend to be optimistic about the future, but when times 
are good, they tend to be most pessimistic about the future’ (p. 201).  
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          Figures 4.6 (a) and (b) show the predicted probabilities for the effects of relative 
deprivation on the retrospective and prospective economic perceptions. 
 
 
 
          Figure 4.6(a) shows that as relative deprivation increases from not deprived to very 
deprived, the probability of forming the perception that the past economy was fairly bad 
or very bad decreases by 66%, and 21% respectively. A similar change raises the chances 
of judging the past economy as fairly good by 29% and very good by 65%. It is notable 
though that the predicted influence of relative deprivation on the perception that the past 
economy was fairly good increases only up to the ‘deprived’ level. Beyond this point, it 
declines by 28%, from 60% among deprived to 32% among very deprived people. These 
results suggest that an increased sense of deprivation enhances optimistic retrospective 
perceptions while reducing pessimistic retrospective perceptions. Thus, deprivation has 
an overall positive effect on retrospective economic perceptions of uninformed people.  
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          Similarly, figure 4.6(b) shows that a person who is not deprived is 63% more likely 
to form the perception that the future economy will be fairly good. Such a person is also 7% 
more likely to feel that the future economy will be very good, as opposed to very bad.  
However, a very deprived person is 38% more likely to project the future economy to be 
fairly bad, and 28% more likely to project it as very bad rather than very good. That is, 
relative deprivation increases the perception that the future economy will be fairly bad by 
28%, and very bad by 26%. Yet, it reduces perceptions that it will be fairly good by 47% 
and very good by 9%. Given that relative deprivation reduces the likelihood of forming 
optimistic prospective perceptions while increasing pessimistic prospective perceptions, 
it has a negative net effect on prospective economic perceptions of uninformed Kenyans. 
         The fact that relative deprivation is a significant predictor of the retrospective and 
prospective economic perceptions of informed and uninformed people suggest that people 
may be using their individual living conditions to gauge national living conditions. If this 
is true then, the debate on whether voting decisions are motivated by individual economic 
conditions (egotropism) or by the national economic conditions (sociotropism) becomes 
immaterial, given that individual conditions are causally linked to the national conditions. 
This mindset overlooks the fact that individual conditions can be bad even with booming 
national economy (for instance, due to poor distribution of benefits of economic growth) 
and vice versa (for instance, individuals may still get jobs even amid employment crisis).  
          With regard to partisanship, table 4.4 shows that incumbent partisanship positively 
influences prospective economic perceptions of the informed and uninformed Kenyans. 
However, its effect on the retrospective economic perceptions is rather startling. To begin 
with, it does not significantly influence retrospective perceptions of uninformed Kenyans. 
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Moreover, its effect on the perceptions of informed people is negative. These findings are 
surprising given that its effect on the other five forms of perceptions under review in this 
study is significant and positive. Accordingly, opposition partisanship is the sole form of 
partisanship with significant effect on retrospective economic perceptions of uninformed 
Kenyans. Indeed, consistent with group-serving attribution bias, opposition partisanship 
has strong negative influence on their retrospective perceptions.  
          The predicted probabilities for the influence of the opposition partisanship on the 
retrospective economic perceptions, and the effect of incumbent partisanship on the 
prospective perceptions of uninformed people are shown in figures 4.7(a) and (b). All the 
other variables in each model are held constant at their medians. 
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         It is clear from figure 4.7(a) that, regardless of where uninformed Kenyans place 
themselves on the opposition partisanship scale, they are more likely to view the past 
economy as either fairly good or fairly bad as opposed to very good or very bad. On the  
same vein, figure 4.7(b) show that, no matter their location on the Incumbent partisanship 
scale, uninformed Kenyans have a greater probability of viewing the country’s economic 
future as either fairly good or fairly bad rather than very good or very bad. That is, they 
tend to avoid very high or very low retrospective or prospective economic perceptions.   
          Non-incumbent partisans are just 6% more likely to project that the future economy 
will be fairly good rather than fairly bad. This perception gap widens with increase in the 
strength of incumbent partisanship, so that strong partisans are 37% more likely to feel 
that the future economy will be fairly good as opposed to fairly bad. That is, incumbent 
partisanship raises the prospects of evaluating the future economy as fairly good by 19%, 
while reducing the prospects of evaluating it as fairly bad by 12%.  
          On the other hand, the probability that non-(opposition) partisans will view the past 
economy as fairly good is 37% greater than the probability that they would view it as 
fairly bad. However, the gap narrows as the strength of opposition partisanship increases 
in, so that strong opposition partisans are almost as likely to feel that the past economy 
was fairly good (32%), as they are to feel that it was fairly bad (29%). Thus, opposition 
partisanship reduces optimism by 22%, while increasing pessimistic perceptions by 15%.  
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          Ethnicity is the other variable with significant influence on retrospective economic 
perceptions of the uninformed people. As already noted, Kenyans, regardless of ethnic 
identity, usually avoid extreme retrospective economic perceptions. They would rather 
depict the past economy as bad or good instead of very bad or very good. Surprisingly, an 
analysis of the predicted probabilities show that members of the president’s ethnic group 
(ethnics) are 16% less likely to feel that the past economy was good, but 14% more likely 
to feel that it was bad, compared to other Kenyans (non-ethnics). While non-ethnics are 
26% more likely to depict the past economy as good rather than bad, ethnics are almost 
as likely to depict it as bad (32%) as much as they are likely to say that it is good (28%). 
This is consistent with recent studies in Kenya which have reported that ‘co-ethnics do 
not appear to gain materially from one of their own being in power’ (Mueller, 2011:105). 
          I had expected that since the period referred to as “the past” in this context is just a 
year earlier, and the same president who was in power at the time of the interview had 
been in office for three years, the ethnics would form a more positive perception of the 
past, and indeed, the present economy. Just to be clear, the underlying assumption here is 
that uninformed people lack the capacity to know for certain how the national economy is 
doing, and even if they did, I expect them to take partisan and or ethnic cues and form 
perceptions that portray both the president and the incumbent party in favorable light that 
they are doing enough to improve the economy. Yet, the results show that the ethnics are 
in fact more disillusioned with the past economy than the non-ethnics. Up to this point, it 
is clear that uninformed people often use their living conditions to project the actual 
national living conditions, and hence the cynicism by the ethnics may reflect the fact that 
they may be expecting too much since the government is led by “one of their own”.  
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          These findings go to the heart of one of the paradoxes of ethnic voting. None of the 
more than 40 Kenya ethnic groups is large enough to win elections on its own. Even the 
largest ethnic group, Kikuyus, comprise only 20% of the population. Other larger ethnic 
groups are the Luhya (14%), Luo (11%), Kalenjin (11%) and Kamba (10%) (Beetham, 
2002). In such a set up, even the most ethnic-minded leaders must reach out to some non-
ethnic constituencies given that ethnic support cannot guarantee electoral victory. Indeed, 
despite Kibaki being from the largest ethnic group, he could not win the 1997 elections, 
and had to ride on the back of a multi-ethnic coalition to win in 2002.  
          After winning elections, the leader has to balance between keeping the non-ethnic 
supporters happy so as to retain their support in the future, and delivering the patronage 
resources to the ethnics. While non-ethnics can easily decamp to a more enterprising 
political client in the next elections, incumbent leaders hoping for re-election are more 
likely to secure the support of the ethnics even if for psychological reasons such as the 
self-esteem associated with sharing ethnic identity with the president. Hence, it is prudent 
for incumbent president to try and placate non-ethnics than the ethnics, if not both. 
          Apparently, after winning the 2002 elections, president Kibaki did not do enough 
to placate the non-ethnics, and by the time of the 2007 elections, he had lost the support 
of practically all the larger non-ethnics that had supported him in 2002 (the Luhya, Luo, 
and Kamba). The dramatic fallout was attributed to the perception that Kibaki was doing 
more for the ethnics, at the expense of the non-ethnics.  
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          As Horowitz (2008:4) observes: 
 
Kibaki had come to power on a promise to end tribalism in 
Kenya…Despite real achievements made by Kibaki government 
in terms of infrastructure, economic growth, education, and 
expanded political freedoms, many Kenyans felt Kibaki had 
failed to live to the promises he offered in 2002…But the 
Achilles heel for Kibaki was the perception that he had favored 
his own kikuyu ethnic group at the expense of others  
 
 
          While Horowitz provides a scholarly perspective to this issue, ordinary Kenyans 
have continued to echo similar sentiments even in daily discourses. As one reader noted 
in response to an article in Daily Nation Newspaper:  
Admission of a problem is always the first form of 
therapy. But the problem is that most Kikuyu never 
admit nor do they talk against Kikuyunization of the 
government. It is this defense of this biasness that 
confirms to the rest of Kenyans that the Kikuyus are 
actually benefitting from the vice. Otherwise, if they 
were not, they would shout hoarse about it.
46
 
 
 
           The fact that people seem to use individual living conditions as an indicator of the 
performance of the national economy, coupled with the finding that the ethnics are more 
upset with the economy than non-ethnics, show that the perception that Kibaki favored 
his ethnic group may not have been true after all, and that sharing ethnic identity with the 
president does not guarantee economic benefits. Yet, even when perceptions are devoid 
of facts, they still drive politics. An alternative explanation is that the perceptions may 
                                                          
46
 Anonymous comments on Gaitho Macharia. 2011. “Tibalistic Drivel Robbing 
Kenyans of Power to Reason and Common Sense”. The Daily Nation Newspaper 
(Online Version), December, 23. Available online and last accessed on January 15 2012 
at:http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Tribalistic+drivel+robbing+Kenyans+of+pow
er/-/440808/1295792/-/qe4t0u/-/index.html 
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actually be accurate but as already noted, the Kikuyu folks were probably expecting too 
much from the Kibaki government given that it is led by “one of their own”.  
          How does the emerging pattern of the factors that influence retrospective and 
prospective economic perceptions, affect the actual perceptions of the informed and the 
uninformed? It is apparent from Table 4.4 that besides relative deprivation, which exerts 
strong influence on retrospective economic perceptions of the informed and uninformed 
people, no other variable concurrently influences both groups in statistically significant 
ways. The fact that informed and uninformed people appeal to different partisan scales, 
coupled with the latter’s further reliance on ethnicity, explains why they form different 
retrospective perceptions ( 2 = 10.30, α < 0.01). In fact, 49.4% of uninformed and 61.0% 
of informed people feels that the past economy was either fairly good or very good.  
          In terms of prospective economic perceptions, Table 4.4 shows that the perceptions 
of both informed and uninformed people appear to be influenced primarily by two factors 
- relative deprivation and incumbent partisanship. To be precise, the perceptions of the 
former are further influenced by education and ethnicity. Yet, the prospective economic 
perceptions of informed and uninformed people are not different, since 52.6% of the 
uninformed and 51.0% of the informed feel that the future economy will be fairly good or 
very good. Thus, education and ethnicity do not alter perceptions of the informed much. 
These perceptions seem to be driven by relative deprivation and incumbent partisanship.   
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4.6 The Effect of Partisanship on Different Perceptions: Any emerging Patterns? 
          Up to this point, the study has established that partisanship significantly influences 
all the six forms of political perceptions under review. What remains now is to establish 
whether there are any emerging patterns in the formation of political perceptions by the 
uninformed people. To do this, I summarize the results obtained so far in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Significant Determinants of the Perceptions of Uninformed Kenyans 
 
Perception 
Issue Area 
Perception Timelines 
 
Retrospective 
Perceptions 
Present 
Perceptions 
Prospective 
Perceptions 
 
Politics 
(Democracy) 
Incumbent  
partisanship [3.46]** 
 
Ethnicity [1.96]* 
Incumbent 
partisanship[5.11]*** 
 
Incumbent  
partisanship [3.11]** 
 
Ethnicity [1.94] 
 
 
 
 
The economy 
Relative  
Deprivation [10.94]*** 
 
Opposition  
Partisanship [-2.58]** 
 
Gender [2.36]* 
 
Ethnicity [-2.30]* 
Relative  
Deprivation [-2.73]** 
 
Incumbent 
partisanship [2.01]* 
 
Education [2.94] 
 
Relative  
Deprivation [-4.86]*** 
 
Incumbent  
partisanship [2.38]* 
 
 
 
          The first observation is that incumbent partisanship is the only significant and most 
consistent predictor of all forms of political perceptions, except retrospective economic 
perceptions of the uninformed people, which is influenced by opposition partisanship. In 
essence, partisanship matters in the formation of political perceptions. More specifically, 
partisanship, particularly incumbent partisanship, is the single most significant predictor 
of perceptions about democracy. In contrast, even though partisanship is also a significant 
predictor of economic perceptions, its influence on economic perceptions is less strong 
compared to that of relative deprivation.  
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          On this account, I make two conclusions. First, I now make a firmer conclusion, 
consistent with Iyenger’s (1989) views, that perceptions about political issues are largely 
influenced more by political variables, while perceptions about the economy tend to be 
influenced more by economic variables. For instance, it has been argued that individual’s 
socio-economic status influences their political perceptions, to the extent that ‘individuals 
perceive the distribution of social goods – incomes, status, prestige – in relation to the 
extent to which they are in command of these goods’ (Alberg, 2003: 89). Secondly, there 
is marked difference in the range and mix of factors that affect perceptions about political 
issues and those that affect perceptions about economic issues. 
          In terms of the specific forms of perceptions, it is notable that both the opposition 
partisanship and gender only comes into play in the formation of retrospective economic 
perceptions. Moreover, the effect of relative deprivation on retrospective economic 
perceptions is not only high compared to prospective and present economic perceptions, 
but is also in the reverse direction. While increased sense of relative deprivation promotes 
pessimistic economic perceptions about the present and the future, it evokes optimism 
about the past economy. Besides, education is only significant with regard to the present 
economic perceptions, and in fact, its influence on that perception even surpasses that of 
relative deprivation. Thus, it can be inferred that the factors that influence the formation 
of the three forms of economic perceptions are not only different from those influencing 
perceptions about democracy, but are, to a large extent, also different from each other. 
          As regards perceptions about democracy, it is notable that, while the set of factors 
that influence the formation of the retrospective and prospective perceptions are similar 
(ethnicity and incumbent partisanship), they differ from those that shape the perceptions 
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about the current state of democracy, which is only influenced by the former and not the 
latter. While further studies may be necessary to validate these findings, particularly the 
similarity between retrospective and prospective perceptions about democracy, evidence 
adduced up to now seems to sustain the thesis that political perceptions vary along two 
dimensions - issue-area and issue-timeline. This justifies the proposal to classifying 
perceptions by issue-areas and time-lines for better understanding.  
4.7 Just how does Partisanship affect Political Perceptions? 
          So far, I have shown that, consistent with the political cue theory, partisanship has 
a significant influence on political perceptions. However, this only partially addresses the 
key question regarding what makes it possible for uninformed Kenyans to form informed 
perceptions that guide their actions and decisions in the democratic process. An equally 
important question which I turn to in the rest of this chapter is: just how does partisanship 
affect political perceptions? What does partisanship do to uninformed people that make 
them hold the same political perceptions as those who are well informed? 
          To address this question, I first focus on the influence of incumbent partisanship on 
the three forms of perceptions about democracy. The choice of incumbent partisanship 
should not be surprising for at least two reasons. First, as the results show, how people 
align themselves on the incumbent partisanship scale offers the best account of their 
perceptions about democracy compared to the other two forms of partisanship. Secondly, 
unlike the general and opposition partisans which are heterogeneous groups, incumbent 
partisans are a fairly a homogenous group. General partisans are heterogeneous since it 
lumps together both opposition and incumbent partisans; Opposition partisans are also 
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heterogeneous in that there are several parties that constitute the opposition, which may 
not necessarily send uniform cue signals to their respective partisans. 
 
          I reduced both the incumbent partisanship and the three types of perceptions about 
democracy to their dichotomous forms as shown in footnote 28. I then cross tabulated the 
incumbent partisanship with each of the three forms of perceptions about democracy. 
Next, I used the two-sided test of proportions to compare the proportions of informed and 
uninformed Kenyans who hold optimistic perceptions about democracy and how these 
proportions vary with the type and strength of partisanship. The results are in table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6 Effect of Partisanship on Perceptions about Democracy in Kenya 
 
Type of 
Perception 
 
 
Partisanship 
 
Political Information 
 
Test of Proportions  
with optimistic 
Perceptions 
Uninformed Informed  Difference   2 Statistical 
Significance  
 
Retrospective 
Perception of 
Democracy 
Non-Partisans 67.3%  85.5% 18.2% p < 0.01*** 
Incumbent 
 Partisans  
82.1% 89.3%  7.2% 0.22 
Effect of  
Partisanship 
14.8% 3.8% 11.0%      0.01*** 
 
Present 
Perception of 
Democracy 
Non-Partisans 33.3% 56.9% 23.6% p < 0.01*** 
Incumbent  
Partisans 
60.2% 71.9% 11.7% 0.11 
Effect of  
Partisanship 
26.9% 15.0% 11.9% 0.06 
 
Prospective 
Perception of 
Democracy 
Non-Partisans 50.0% 69.6% 19.6% p < 0.01*** 
Incumbent 
 Partisans 
76.1% 81.9% 5.8% 0.40  
Effect of  
Partisanship 
26.1% 12.3% 14.8%       0.02*** 
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          The first observation that can be drawn from Table 4.6 is that the perception gap
47
 
between informed non-partisans and uniformed non-partisans is not only huge but also 
statistically significant across all the perception time-lines. More specifically, without the 
intervention of incumbent partisanship, informed Kenyans tend to have more optimistic 
perceptions about democracy than the uninformed Kenyans. This gap appears greater for 
perceptions about the present state of democracy (23.6%), but virtually the same for 
retrospective (18.2%) and prospective perceptions (19.6%). In contrast, the perception 
gap among partisans is smaller and insignificant across all the three perception time-lines.  
 
          These results have two significant implications. In the first instance, they suggest 
that political information has a much greater effect on perceptions of non-partisans than 
partisans. For instance, whereas political information increases optimistic retrospective 
perceptions about democracy by 18.2% among the non-partisans, it only raises optimism 
among partisans by 7.2%; and while it raises optimistic prospective perceptions by 19.6% 
among non-partisans, it only raises optimism among partisans by a meager 5.8%. In other 
words, while political information may not significantly change perceptions of incumbent 
partisans, well targeted political information can sway the perceptions of those who are 
not strongly aligned to the incumbent party with relative ease. 
 
          The other significant implication of these findings is that partisanship considerably 
reduces the perception gap between the uniformed and the informed to insignificant 
levels, thereby enabling the uninformed people to form virtually the same perceptions as 
the informed people. Indeed, it reduces the perception gap by 12% for the retrospective 
                                                          
47
 Perception gap is defined here as the difference in the proportion of the informed and 
uniformed Kenyans who feel that Kenya is either fairly or very democracy. 
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perceptions, 11.9% for present perceptions, and 14.8% for prospective perceptions.  This 
supports a central thesis of this dissertation that partisanship intervenes in the process of 
forming political perceptions in ways that enable uninformed people to close either the 
political information gap or the perception gap between them and the informed, thereby 
enabling them to behave as if they are well informed. 
 
          The second observation, which is closely related to the first one, is that regardless 
of the type of perception time-line, the perceptions of uninformed partisan tends to be 
much closer to those of informed people than to those of uniformed non-partisans. That is, 
partisanship moves the perceptions of the uninformed closer to those of the informed. 
With respect to retrospective perceptions about democracy for instance, the perception 
gap between uninformed partisans and informed non-partisans is just 3.4%, while the gap 
between them and informed partisans is 7.2%. Yet, the perception gap between them and 
the uniformed non-partisans is a significant 14.8%. The same pattern is also evident in 
the present and prospective perceptions about democracy. This suggests that incumbent 
partisanship elevates the uninformed to the level of the informed. 
 
         It is also notable that incumbent partisanship and political information individually 
increases optimistic perceptions about democracy by nearly the same margin so that the 
difference between the effect of partisanship and the effect of political information on the 
perceptions about democracy are not only very small but also statistically insignificant. 
For instance, if uninformed non-(incumbent) partisans become incumbent partisans, their 
prospective perceptions about democracy become even more optimistic by 26.1%, but if 
instead, they become informed, it increases by 19.6%. The 6.5% difference is statistically 
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insignificant. In the case of present and retrospective perceptions, the differences are not 
only much smaller, but virtually the same (3.4% and 3.3% respectively). This suggests 
that partisanship can effectively serve as a substitute for political information. 
          To test whether the results also hold true for perceptions about the economy, table 
4.7 compares proportions of the informed and the uninformed with optimistic economic 
perceptions, and how the perceptions vary with partisanship and political information.  
 
Table 4.7 Effect of Partisanship on Perceptions about the Kenyan Economy 
 
Type of 
Perception 
 
Partisanship 
Political Information Test of Proportions with 
 optimistic Perceptions  
Uninformed Informed  Difference  2 Statistical 
Significance  
Retrospective 
Economic 
Perception 
Non-Partisans 59.5% 43.2% -16.3%        0.01*** 
Opposition 
Partisans 
44.9% 39.3% -5.6% 0.24 
Effect of 
 Partisanship 
-14.9%    -3.9%      -10.7%       0.02*** 
Present 
Economic 
Perception 
Non-Partisans 20.3% 16.7% 3.6% 0.68 
Incumbent 
Partisans 
25.7% 32.6% 6.9% 0.07 
Effect of 
 Partisanship 
5.4% 15.9% 10.5%      0.03*** 
Prospective 
Economic 
Perception  
Non-Partisans 37.5% 31.4% 6.1% 0.53 
Incumbent 
Partisans 
57.4% 56.4% 1.0% 0.89 
Effect of 
 Partisanship 
19.9% 25.0% 5.1% 0.49 
           
 
         Table 4.7 shows that, while the other forms of political perceptions are influenced 
by incumbent partisanship, retrospective economic perceptions are instead influenced by 
opposition partisanship. Furthermore, regardless of the level of political information, the 
proportion of opposition partisans, who are optimistic about the past economy, is smaller 
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compared to non-(opposition) partisans with similar economic perceptions. This suggests 
that opposition partisanship reduces rather than increase optimistic perceptions about the 
past economy. In contrast, the proportion of incumbent partisans who are optimistic 
about the present and the future national economy is greater than that of non-partisans, 
regardless of the information levels. Thus, consistent with what we observed with respect 
to perceptions about democracy, incumbent partisanship increases optimistic perceptions 
about the present and future economy. The sine qua non of these findings is that whether 
partisanship reduces or increases optimistic perceptions, its net effect is such that it tends 
to narrow the perception gap between the informed and the uniformed people.  
          The only apparent exception to this rule is perceptions about the present state of the 
economy. It is notable that the perception gap between the informed and uniformed non-
partisans, with regard to the present economic perceptions, are already very small (3.6%), 
and statistically insignificant (α = 0.68), even without the intervention of partisanship. 
Incumbent partisanship exacerbates this gap by increasing optimism about the current 
economy by a mere 5.4% among the uninformed, while considerably raising optimism by 
a massive 15.9% among the informed. The net effect of partisanship on present economic 
perceptions is that it widens the perception gap between the informed and uniformed.  
          Looked at from a different perspective, if the uninformed non-partisans become 
partisans, their likelihood of forming optimistic perceptions about the present economy 
would increase marginally by 5.4%. If instead they become informed, then the likelihood 
that they would form optimistic perceptions decreases equally marginally by 3.6%. Taken 
individually, the probability that these gaps would exist by chance is very high in both 
cases, and hence to a large extent, the differences are statistically insignificant. But taken 
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together, and considering that Kenya registered an impressive economic performance in 
2005, these results show that the effect of partisanship on perceptions about the present 
economy is 10.5% greater than the effect of political information. This difference is not 
trivial any longer as it shows that it is partisanship rather than information that moves 
perceptions closer to the true state of the economy.  
          Since Kenya’s 2005 economic performance
48
 was the best in five years, those who 
are optimistic about the current state of the economy, are actually closer to the true state 
of the economy. Yet it is clear from tables 4.6 and 4.7 that one needs both partisanship 
and information to maximize optimism. Besides, if uninformed non-partisans are unable 
to secure both partisanship and information, then they are better off being incumbent 
partisans than being informed. This is because if they become partisans, they are likely to 
form perceptions favorable to the incumbent party, which in this case coincides with the 
real state of the economy. Yet, a partisan without information, which political cue theory 
treat as a perceptual screen that filters information, is unlikely to the cues meaningfully.  
          Several general conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. To begin 
with, incumbent partisanship is the most significant form of partisanship with the greatest 
effect on perceptions about democracy and the economy, except retrospective economic 
perception, which is influenced more by opposition rather than incumbent partisanship. 
Secondly, the effect of partisanship on perceptions about the economy is quite different 
from its effect on perceptions about democracy. While incumbent partisanship tends to 
raise optimism about democracy, it typically reduces optimism about the economy. In 
other words, the effect of partisanship on political perceptions varies with issue-area. 
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 See footnote 4 for more details on Kenya’s economic outlook in 2005. 
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          Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that the effect of partisanship on political perceptions also 
varies across the three perception timelines. First, while partisanship decreases optimism 
about the past economy and increase optimism about the past democracy, the magnitude 
of these changes are virtually the same. In particular, the effect of incumbent partisanship 
on retrospective perceptions about democracy is -3.8% among the informed, and 14.8% 
among the uninformed. Similarly, the effect of opposition partisanship on retrospective 
economic perceptions is -3.9% among the informed and -14.9% among the uninformed. 
Secondly, partisanship uniformly changes perception gaps between the informed and the 
uninformed by about 10.0% for all forms of perceptions except prospective perceptions. 
However, partisanship reduces the perception gaps by roughly 15% for prospective 
perceptions about democracy, and by nearly 5% for prospective economic perceptions.  
          Finally, when we narrow the focus to economic perceptions, we notice for instance, 
that perceptions about the present economy differ from the others because it is the only 
one that is not significantly influenced by partisanship. Not only is optimism about the 
present economy very low, but it is neither significantly influenced by partisanship nor by 
political information. While these issues still need refinement, the results suggest that the 
effect of partisanship on perceptions varies with issue-area and issue-timeline, and justify 
classification of perceptions along the two continuums for better understanding.  
4.8 Chapter Conclusion 
          The primary objective of this chapter was to address the third dissertation research 
question: How do information deficient citizens form political perceptions that guide 
their decisions and actions in the democratic process? To answer this question, I tested 
three hypothesis derived from political cue theory and anchored the study on the premise 
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that perceptions determine behavior (Conover and Feldman, 1984; Zaller, 1992; Walsh 
2004; Cassino et al, 2007; Cottam et al, 2010). Thus, I began discussions in this chapter 
with a justification for focusing on perceptions about democracy and the economy.   
 
          The first hypothesis (H 3.1) postulates that partisanship has a greater effect on the 
perceptions of the uninformed than the informed people. To begin with, the results show 
that both informed and uninformed Kenyans use partisan cues. However, when it comes 
to who is affected most by partisan cues, the results are decidedly mixed, and vary from 
one partisanship scale to the other. For instance, the effect of general partisanship on the 
perceptions of the informed and uninformed Kenyans is virtually the same. In contrast, 
opposition partisanship has a greater effect on the perceptions of the informed than the 
uninformed people. It is incumbent partisanship which conforms to the above hypothesis. 
 
          Hypotheses H 3.2 state that the effect of partisanship on perceptions of uninformed 
Kenyans vary with issue-area. Consistent with this hypothesis, perceptions about political 
issues are affected more by political variables, while those about economy are affected 
more by economic variables. These results support Iyenger’s (1989) idea that perceptions 
about an issue depend on factors related to it. For instance, incumbent partisanship is the 
most consistent predictor of perceptions about both democracy and the economy, except 
retrospective economic perceptions, which are affected more by opposition partisanship. 
However, the effect of incumbent partisanship, which is a political variable, is stronger 
on perceptions about democracy, which is political, than on perceptions about the 
economy. While incumbent partisanship is the strongest predictor of perceptions about 
democracy, its effect on economic perceptions is secondary to that of relative deprivation 
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and education. Besides, relative deprivation, which is economic variable, affect economic 
perceptions of the informed and the uninformed, yet its effect on present perceptions 
about democracy, is insignificant. Moreover, incumbent partisanship raises optimistic 
perceptions about democracy, but reduces optimistic perceptions about the economy.  
 
          Hypothesis H 3.3 suggests that the effect of partisanship on political perceptions 
varies with issue time-line. While perceptions about the current state of democracy are 
largely influenced by incumbent partisanship, retrospective and prospective perceptions 
about democracy are further influenced by ethnicity. Likewise, opposition partisanship 
and ethnicity influences retrospective economic perceptions, yet they have no effect on 
present or prospective economic perceptions. Further, retrospective and prospective 
economic perceptions are largely influenced by relative deprivation, yet this is not true in 
the case of present economic perceptions which are influenced more by education.  
 
          This chapter also found that partisanship intervenes in the process of forming the 
political perceptions in ways that reduces the perception gap between the uninformed and 
the informed, thereby enabling the former to develop similar behavioral dispositions as 
the latter. Indeed, opposition partisanship significantly reduces optimism about the past 
economy among the uninformed, but only slightly among the informed. Yet, incumbent 
partisanship radically raises optimism about the present economy among the informed 
but only slightly among the uninformed. In both cases, perception gaps between informed 
and uninformed citizens reduced noticeably. Lastly, partisanship can substitute political 
information well, since both produces congruent effects at least on perceptions about 
democracy. It also seems to drive perceptions in the direction of, or closer to reality.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
5.1 General Overview of the Study and its Findings   
          This study was conceived within the context of normative democratic theory which, 
among other things, postulates that democracy requires well-informed citizens in order to 
function properly (Berelson et al, 1954; Dalton, 2008; Blais, 2010; Levendusky, 2011). 
Informed people are said to exhibit political behavior that is more supportive of 
democracy than uninformed people (Converse, 1964; Carpini and Keteer, 1996; 
Campbell, 2003; Carpini, 2009). For instance, political information promotes political 
participation so that the informed tend to vote more than the uninformed (Zaller, 1992; 
Carpini and Keteer, 2005; Lutz, 2006). Information also empowers people not just to 
understand their political world, but to form political attitudes consistent with their values 
and aspirations (Carpini and Keteer, 2005). These alleged differences between informed 
and uninformed people arise because the former tend to consider a wider range of issues 
when making political decisions and engaging in political activities than the latter (ibid).    
 
          However, study after study, mainly in the advanced democracies, shows that most 
people lack requisite political information (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Carpini and Keteer, 
1996; Shenkman, 2008; Brennan, 2011; Norris, 2011). Yet the information-deficient 
citizens somehow drive the information-intensive democratic process effectively (Zakaria, 
1997; Lansford, 2008; Swift, 2010). The emergent democratic puzzle is: how do we 
reconcile the very compelling theoretical postulation that democracy requires informed 
citizens to function well, with empirical evidence suggesting that democracy works well 
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even when most citizens are poorly informed? That is, if indeed, democracy requires 
informed citizens, what makes it possible for it to work well even in the face of an acute 
information-deficit? It is this puzzle that I set out to resolve in this dissertation. 
 
          One possible answer to this question is to admit that people are actually well 
informed but it is the way we measure political information that is problematic. Indeed, 
there is virtually no agreement among scholars on how to measure political information, 
or even what it means (Jones and McDermott, 2009; Jacoby, 2010). Moreover, the idea 
that citizens lack political information is based on studies done largely in advanced 
democracies and must be treated not as a universal fact, but as a feature of advanced 
democracies that need to be retested in new and emerging democracies like Kenya.  
          I tested this first possibility in chapter two by developing a new and robust formula 
for measuring political information (PII Index), and using it not only to evaluate 
information levels among Kenyans, but also to determine whether information varies 
systematically among Kenyans, and the factors that account for the variation. The results 
do not support this informed citizen explanation. Instead, the data show that Kenyans, 
like citizens of advanced democracies, have low political information levels. 
          The second possible solution to the democratic puzzle is to admit that information 
is necessary for democracy to work well, and to argue that democracy cannot and does 
not work well whenever most citizens have huge political information deficit. Hence, in 
chapter three, I tested whether democracy functions properly even in the face of huge 
political information deficit. In doing so, I used three indicators of a well functioning 
democracy - knowledge of democracy, satisfaction with democracy, and support for 
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democracy. I offered several rationales for using each of these indicators. For instance, 
with respect to knowledge of democracy, I showed that people who know the meaning of 
democracy tend to support it (Bratton and Mattes, 2001). When democracy works well, 
people tend to adopt behaviors and attitudes that support it and abstain from those that 
put it at risk. Hence, democracy becomes “the only game in town” and citizens tend to 
know it and its rules (Przeworski, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Once 
again, the results do not support this solution. Instead, democracy, as understood by the 
citizens, apparently works fairly well despite the information deficit among Kenyans. 
(Semetko, 2010). Moreover, expert evaluations by the Freedom House also support the 
idea that democracy seems to work well in Kenya, at least during the period under study. 
          Taken together, the results from chapters two and three raise an important question: 
How can uninformed people who have poor understanding of democracy, are inattentive 
to critical issues, and have inconsistent democratic attitudes, nevertheless evaluate 
democracy with the same precision as experts and informed people with better knowledge 
of democracy, who are attentive to issues, and with consistent democratic attitudes?  
          In chapter four therefore, I addressed the last possible solution to the puzzle. In this 
regard, I drew two important assumptions from political cue theory. First, political 
behavior is driven by subjective political perceptions rather than objective political facts 
(Canover and Feldman, 1984; Zaller, 1992; Walsh, 2004; Oskamp and Schultz, 2005; 
Cassino et al, 2007; Morris, 2008; Cottam et al, 2010). Secondly, uninformed people tend 
to think heuristically rather than ideologically about political issues. As a result, the 
uninformed draw political cues from the political parties that they trust. The cues shape 
their political perceptions, which, in turn, inform and guide their political decisions and 
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actions in the information-intensive democratic process (Canover and Feldman, 1984; 
Iyenger and McGuire, 1993; Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Hacker, 
2004; Jacoby, 2010). Hence, democracy works well even when there is a huge political 
information deficit among citizens, because the uninformed citizens are able to surmount 
information deficiency by relying on heuristic partisan cues.  
          The findings in chapter four largely support the prime hypothesis of political cue 
theory. More specifically, partisanship intervenes in the process of forming political 
perceptions in ways that fundamentally reduces the perception gap between the 
uninformed and the informed, thereby enabling the former to develop similar behavioral 
predispositions as the latter. To the extent that partisanship produces nearly the same 
effect on political perceptions as political information (at least in the case of perceptions 
about democracy), it can substitute political information well. In any case, partisanship 
often seems to drive perceptions in the direction of, or closer to, the reality. 
 
          Taken together, the study findings show that the reason why democracy appears to 
function well, even though study after study show that citizens are poorly informed, may 
be because citizens use political cues to abridge their lack of information. In conclusion, 
therefore, I concur with Canova and Feldman’s (1982:242-243) observations that:  
 
The prospects for democracy are not as bleak as some 
might suppose. Voters are enterprising souls who, when 
faced with adverse conditions do the best they can. 
Though it is not a perfect substitute for the unbiased 
perception of clear candidate stands, the use of political 
cues to infer candidates’ issue positions is a reasonable 
response to candidate ambiguity… Reliance on party 
cues may be an effective means for voters to cope with 
an otherwise ambiguous political environment. 
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5.2 Specific Findings of the Study and their Implications 
 
5.2.1 A New Robust Political Information Index (PII Index) 
          A major contribution of this study is the development of a new robust political 
information index. From an extensive literature search, I suggest that the questions used 
in constructing political information index should, as far as possible, meet the following 
conditions. First, the questions should be factual rather than matters of opinion (Zaller, 
1992; Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Kahn and Kennedy, 1999; Kuklinski et al, 2000). 
Second, questions should be open-ended rather than closed-ended (Lau, 1986; Hagen, 
1995; Graber, 2001; Krosnick et al, 2010; Pasek and Krosnick, 2010; Brennan, 2011).  
          In addition, the questions testing political information should be few but carefully 
selected (Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Mondak, 2001; Alberg, 2003; Althaus, 2003; Carpini, 
2009). Since there is no fixed or readily accessible pool from which such questions can 
be drawn (Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Krosnick, 1998; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2001; Marcus, 
2009; Krosnick et al, 2010), I suggest that instead of specifying a fixed number, or 
compiling a list of questions appropriate for information index, one should identify and 
classify questions that meet the above minimum thresholds into a broad taxonomy. The 
information index should incorporate questions from each category. I propose two broad 
categories of questions - questions on key political institutions and processes, and 
questions on the outputs of the political process, namely public policies. Fourth, there 
should be a mix of easy and difficult questions (Zaller, 1992; Carpini and Keteer, 1993; 
Mondak, 1995; Converse, 2000; Coaley, 2010). Fifth, questions should have sufficient 
empirical relationship among themselves so that responses to any of them can help to 
predict responses to any of the others (Coaley, 2010; Babbie, 2010).  
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          Finally, in the context of open-ended factual questions, incorrect guesses and don’t 
know responses should be viewed as outward manifestations of individual respondent’s 
willingness to either admit lack of information (honesty) or to hide lack of information 
(dishonesty). Hence, it adds no value to encourage or discourage don’t know responses, 
given that respondents will still bring them out depending on their mental predispositions. 
Besides, since don’t know responses and incorrect guesses do not constitute meaningful 
information, they should neither be viewed as shades of information as suggested by 
Mondak (2001), nor included when computing the political information index.       
          I have conceptualized and operationalized political information as a relative rather 
than an absolute measure, so that each individual’s information level is expressed as a 
function of, or relative to, the average citizen’s information level, which is the cut-off 
between the informed and the uninformed. This is a marked departure from the arbitrary, 
anonymous, and often subjective distinctions between informed and uninformed citizens 
that currently prevail in the literature (Norris, 2011a).  I have offered several advantages 
of the PII Index over traditional political information measures. The PII Index hopefully 
resolves measurement problems in the study of political information (Prior and Lupia, 
2008; Jones and McDermott, 2009; Jacoby, 2010; Norris, 2011a) since it is robust enough 
to use in comparative study of political information levels across countries and regions.  
5.2.2 Mean Political Information Level is Low, but Variance is very high. 
          Consistent with the findings of other past studies (Zaller, 1992; Converse, 2000), 
this study results show that Kenyans are generally poorly informed, with very low mean 
national political information, and an equally high variance. Hence, as Converse (2000) 
observed more than a decade ago, it is now even clearer that ‘we hardly need to argue 
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low information levels any more’ (p. 331). A major implication of this finding is that the 
problem of low political information levels is real and widespread even in the new and 
emerging democracies. It is neither a mere artifact of poor measurement of political 
information, nor a feature of the advanced democracies.  
          The high variance in the political information levels is partly because it is strongly 
influenced by several factors such as type and degree of partisanship, gender, educational 
attainment, and the extent of involvement in political discussions. For instance, general 
and opposition partisanships have significant influence on political information levels, 
while incumbent partisanship is not significant. When these results are interpreted in line 
with Petty and Cacioppo’s likelihood cue-taking model, cues drawn from the opposition 
parties tend to follow ‘the central route’ by focusing on the substance of the issues at 
hand, thereby enhancing information levels. In contrast, cues taken from the incumbent 
party tend to follow ‘the peripheral route’ by focusing largely on extraneous issues, and 
hardly enhance information levels. Yet, our 2005 Afrobarometer data on Kenya show that 
it is the incumbent partisanship rather than the opposition or general partisanship which 
has a much greater and statistically significant influence on political perceptions.    
          In essence, partisan cues that purport to provide the uninformed with information 
hardly influence their perceptions in statistically significant ways, perhaps because the 
uninformed cannot interpret such information accurately, given that ‘it takes information 
to generate new combinations of information’ (Converse, 2000:336). Alternatively, it is 
also possible that the information is usually deliberately distorted given that ‘much of the 
information carried in elite discourse is neither neutral nor strictly factual…since they 
have been framed for partisan purposes’ (Zaller, 1992: 22). Moreover, Kenyan parties are 
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ineffective conduits for disseminating political information given that they are not well 
institutionalized. It is in this context that we need to understand the arguments that the 
heuristic cues may sometimes mislead rather than enlighten the citizens (Bartels, 1996; 
Althaus, 2003; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001).  
5.2.3 The Propensity to Guess is highly correlated with Political Information Levels 
          Although incorrect guesses do not in themselves constitute political information, 
there is a strong positive correlation between the predisposition to make guesses when 
one is unsure of the answer, and one’s level of political information. To begin with, the 
same set of factors that increase the likelihood of making incorrect guesses like general 
partisanship, education, and male-gender, are more or less the same factors that increase 
political information levels. Hence, respondents typically have higher information scores 
if they have the tendency to guess than if they honestly admit that they don’t know. This 
suggests that either people who know most questions tend to guess the few they do not 
know, or alternatively, a significant proportion of what people guess usually turn out to 
be correct, thereby boosting their political information scores.  
          To underscore this discussion, it is noteworthy that the average PII Index for the 
uninformed respondents who tend to guess when unsure is -0.238, and for those who tend 
to admit they don’t know’ when unsure is -0.390. The difference is 0.152, which is 
virtually the same as the national PII Index of 0.151 (which is the difference between 
accurate and inaccurate responses). Put differently, for an average person, the ratio of 
incorrect guesses to don’t know’ responses (60:40) are nearly the same as the ratio of 
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accurate responses to inaccurate responses
49
 (58:42). In other words, for every five 
questions that a respondent is unsure of answers, he/she is likely to guess three and admit 
he/she doesn’t know two; and for all questions that a respondent is presented with, he/she 
will answer three correctly and give inaccurate response for two. The actual ratio of 3:2 
would obviously change from one context to another, but the more fundamental question 
is whether the fact that the ratio of incorrect guesses to don’t know’ responses is the same 
as the ratio of accurate to inaccurate responses, is unique to this study or is a general 
pattern observable in other studies. However, a detailed examination of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Until then, it can be tentatively concluded that 
guessed responses significantly contribute to the observed political information levels.   
5.2.4 Most people are Generalists rather than Specialists on Political Information  
          Consistent with the view that people tend to be generalists rather than specialists 
(Carpini and Keteer, 1993; Althaus, 2003; Carpini, 2009), the data shows that those who 
are knowledgeable about one issue, tend to be knowledgeable about other issues too, and 
thus tend to get a higher PII Index than those who are not knowledgeable, and vice versa. 
For instance, the probability that someone who is knowledgeable about constitutionality 
of law would also know the presidential term limits is 34%, while the probability that 
someone who is not knowledgeable about the former would know the latter is only 11%. 
Besides, 98% of all the respondents who correctly answered all the six questions I used to 
construct the PII Index were able to correctly define democracy too. In contrast, only 30% 
of those who did not answer any of the six questions correctly were able to correctly 
define democracy. However, the fact that people tend to be generalists should not be 
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 Inaccurate responses is a combination of incorrect guesses and don’t know’ responses.  
254 
 
misconstrued to imply that people know all things equally well. In fact, even the most 
informed people know some issues better than others (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002). For 
instance, I found that on average, knowledge of the public policy component of the PII 
Index represents nearly two-thirds of an individual’s political knowledge reflected in the 
PII Index. Therefore, to a large extent, an individual’s PII Index depends on how well 
he/she understands the public policy component of the political information index.    
          One implication of the preceding finding is that people tend to be relatively better 
informed about the dynamic outputs of the political process such as public policies, than 
the more stable political institutions and processes like the constitutionality of the law 
and the presidential tenure. This fairly high level of information regarding public policy 
is good, because it shows that citizens are attentive to public policies and can use it not 
only for electoral decisions, but also for purposes of holding elected leaders accountable. 
However, information about public policy is more useful if electoral politics revolves 
around issues, and if it is matched with knowledge of political institutions. But it is also 
important for the masses to be able to distinguish the policy positions held by different 
political parties and candidates for a more informed choice of leaders, and to be able to 
hold elected leaders accountable for their actions (Craig et al, 2005). Thus, what is 
needed is balanced knowledge of public policies and political institutions and processes. 
5.2.5 The Partisanship Variable is multidimensional rather than Unidimensional  
          Although partisanship is a cornerstone variable in political behavior research, its 
conceptualization continues to be dogged with controversies (Baker et al, 1981; Bartle, 
2001; Jones, 2001; Blais et al, 2002; Best and Radcliff, 2005; Miller and Klobucar, 2005; 
Settle et al, 2009; Kroh and Selb, 2009). A key point of contention in this debate is 
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whether partisanship is a unidimensional or multidimensional variable. I argue that, in the 
political contexts characterized by multiplicity of political parties, it is only reasonable to 
treat partisanship as a multidimensional variable. This is particularly critical in the new 
and emerging democracies where partisanship is fluid and being partisan relative to the 
opposition does not preclude being partisan relative to the incumbent party. In fact, even 
in the advanced democracies like the United States, it has been argued that ‘partisanship 
should not be measured on a single dimension running from strong Democrat to strong 
Republican, because adhering to any of the categories is not the polar opposite of another 
category on the scale’ (Best and Radcliffe, 2005:503).  
          Under the circumstances, I proposed and tested a three-pronged conceptualization 
of partisanship comprising general partisanship (self-reported closeness, rather than 
attachment to, or membership of a party); incumbent partisanship (partisanship relative to 
the incumbent party); and opposition partisanship (partisanship relative to the opposition 
parties). Consistent with Best and Radcliffe’s (2005) contention above, the study found 
that the three continuums along which I have measured partisanship (the general 
partisanship continuum, the incumbent party continuum, and the opposition parties 
continuum) are completely independent of each other so that being partisan along one 
continuum does not necessarily preclude being partisan on the other continuums. This 
suggests that none of the three partisanships are significantly correlated. 
          Moreover, the various models in which partisanship has been used as independent 
variable in the data shows that each type of partisanship influences the dependent 
variables differently. For instance, while, general partisanship has positive influence on 
political information levels, opposition partisanship has negative influence, while the 
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incumbent partisanship has no statistically significant influence. Hence, the tendency to 
treat partisanship as a unidimensional variable, ranging from non-partisans to partisans, 
without isolating incumbent from opposition partisans, should be reconsidered for studies 
in multiparty contexts. The results justify the use of a three-pronged conceptualization of 
the partisanship variable, and underscore the utility of incorporating all the three 
partisanship variables in models testing its influence in multiparty contexts. 
5.2.6 Democracy Functions well in Kenya despite Information Deficit 
          The study results show that democracy, as viewed by citizens, works fairly well in 
Kenya even in the face of information deficit. More specifically, Kenyans generally have 
a high level of understanding of democracy, so that three in every four Kenyans are able 
to correctly define democracy. The relatively high level of knowledge of democracy can 
be interpreted as an indication that democracy may be increasingly becoming “the only 
game” in Kenya as Przeworski (1991) puts it, and hence Kenyans known it and its rules.  
          In addition, Kenyans are also generally satisfied with the way democracy works in 
their country. Indeed, three in every five Kenyans are generally satisfied with democracy. 
Citizens’ evaluation of how well democracy is working has been found to mirror reality 
so that when citizens say they are satisfied, it usually turns out that even scholars agree 
that democracy is functioning well in that country (Norris, 2011b). Finally, the study also 
found a very high level of support for democracy among Kenyans, whereby four in every 
five Kenyans support democracy. Yet again, support of democratic principles is a critical 
attitude for a democratic citizen. While support for democratic ideals may not necessarily 
mean that democracy is working well, it is unlikely that a democracy would thrive and 
function well without a citizenry that embraces democratic values and attitudes. 
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5.2.7 Education is Key but not the only Determinant of Knowledge of Democracy 
          The results show that education is the only variable with consistent, significant and 
positive influence on knowledge of democracy for both informed and informed people. 
Nonetheless a surprisingly significant proportion of people without formal education 
(43%), are also able to define democracy. Further analysis reveal that when uninformed 
people without formal education engage in political discussions frequently, they tend to 
have better understanding of democracy, suggesting that they gain from the discussions. 
          The results further show that as political information level increases, the likelihood 
of knowing democracy increases too, so that informed citizens tend to understand the 
meaning of democracy more than the uninformed. This reinforces  the view that people 
tend to be generalists as opposed to specialists, so that those who know a set of issues 
(like the issues used to compute the PII Index) are equally likely to know other issues 
(such as the meaning of democracy) (Zaller, 1986; Carpini and Keteer, 1993).  
          I use a simple information-accessibility and information-seeking behavior model to 
account for the disparities in the levels of understanding of democracy between the urban 
and rural dwellers in Kenya. I begin from the two premises that information is relatively 
more readily accessible in urban than rural areas, and that informed people tend to engage 
in information-seeking behavior (Bimber, 2003; Converse, 2000). Thus, informed urban 
dwellers tend to be more knowledgeable about democracy. Relatedly, I have shown that 
the information-seeking behavior of informed people, coupled with their interest in public 
affairs, also explain their relatively better knowledge of democracy. 
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          Surprisingly, none of the three partisanship variables has a statistically significant 
effect on knowledge of democracy. Hence, partisans are just as likely as non-partisans to 
understand democracy. Put differently, being closer to a party does not improve one’s 
understanding of democracy. This is perhaps because the structure and operations of most 
Kenyan political parties neither makes them models of democracy, nor reliable conduits 
for disseminating democratic values and ideals. Under the circumstances, it is pointless 
for a partisan to try to discern the meaning of democracy by observing what goes on in 
the political parties, at least in Kenya, since the results would be thoroughly misleading. 
5.2.8 People tend to adjust previous perceptions whenever their Partisanship changes  
          It is expected that in an election in which the incumbent president and or political 
party loses, it is in the interest of both winners and losers to portray the elections as free 
and fair since nobody wants to be viewed as having won flawed elections, and nobody 
wants to be seen to have presided over but still lost flawed elections. If this argument 
holds then opposition partisans may view elections as free and fair purely because their 
party was in power at the time and oversaw the election process. The incumbent partisans 
may also view the elections as free and fair just because to say that the elections were not 
free and fair is to suggest that their party too did not win fairly. In essence, partisanship 
would not influence perceptions about the elections since people would view elections as 
free and fair regardless of their locations on opposition or incumbent partisanship scales. 
          Contrary to these expectations, the results show that incumbent partisans are more 
likely than the non-(incumbent) partisans to view elections as having been free and fair. 
It is notable that since the incumbent party (KANU) lost the elections, partisan roles were 
supposed to have reversed so that a significant segment of the 2002 opposition partisans 
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became incumbent partisans and vice versa. Ideally therefore, incumbent partisans at the 
time of survey in 2005 were opposition partisans or at least non-(incumbent) partisans in 
2002. These results show that retrospective perceptions about the 2002 elections were 
influenced more by closeness to the winning party rather than closeness to the party that 
organized the elections. More fundamentally, it appears that the perceptions were based 
on respondents’ partisan identity at the time of survey in 2005 rather than their identity at 
the election time in 2002. This finding supports the view that ‘people tend to assume that 
they always believed what they believe today’ (Pasek and Krosnick, 2010: 41). 
Furthermore, it suggests that people tend to adjust their previous perceptions whenever 
their partisanship changes from incumbent to the opposition, and vice versa. 
5.2.9 Informed Citizens pay attention to a wider range of issues than the uninformed  
          Consistent with the extant literature, the findings support the view that informed 
people tend to pay attention to, and hence anchor their evaluation of democracy on, a 
much wider range of issues than uninformed people (Bennie, 2001; Carpini and Keteer, 
2005; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010). In terms of knowledge of democracy for instance, 
the uninformed are influenced largely by education and, to a little extent, by ethnicity. 
However, the informed are influenced by education, interest in public affairs, and 
residence. Also, satisfaction with democracy among both informed and uninformed 
people is primarily influenced by economic policy approval and incumbent partisanship. 
However, in addition to these variables, satisfaction with democracy among the informed 
also depends on general partisanship, freedom of speech and government corruption.    
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5.2.10 The Informed have more consistent Democratic Attitudes than the Uninformed  
          A critical component of democratic consolidation, which is often ignored, is the 
extent to which citizens have gained and nurtured democratic attitudes. When democracy 
functions well and becomes ‘the only game in town”, citizens are likely to form attitudes 
that support democratic values and ideals, and hence are antithetical to non-democratic 
ideals and practices. Linz and Stepan (1997) capture these issues in two of their 
dimensions of democratic consolidation – behavioral and attitudinal. The former occurs 
when the forces bent on propagating non-democratic values are absent, while the latter 
occurs when mass public opinion favors democracy as the best form of government.  
          Against this background, I tested for the consistency of democratic attitudes among 
the informed and uninformed Kenyans, using seven related democratic attitude measures 
- support for democracy, support for universal adult suffrage, support for rule of law, 
support for free and fair elections, opposition to one-man rule, opposition to a one-party 
system and opposition to military rule. In line with the findings of several past studies 
(see Bennie, 2001; Reilly, 2010), the results show that informed people tend to have more 
consistent democratic attitudes than uninformed citizens.   
5.2.11 Both the Informed and Uninformed Kenyans Use Partisan Cues 
          We already know from political cue theory, which guides this study, that citizens 
derive political cues from political parties they trust, and that the cues enable uninformed 
people to act as though they are informed (Canover and Feldman, 1984; Popkin, 1991; 
Luppia, 1994; Sekhon, 2004; Kam, 2005; McDermott, 2006). One of the issues that has 
remained unclear is whether it is only the uninformed people who use partisan cues, or 
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whether both the informed and the uninformed use partisan cues. This study has shown 
that both informed and uninformed people use partisan cues.  
          The other issue that has also been unclear among those who subscribe to the view 
that both informed and uninformed people use cues is whether partisanship has a greater 
influence on the perceptions of uninformed than informed people. This problem has been 
exacerbated by the fact that past studies have traditionally defined partisanship as a single 
unidimensional variable constructed on the basis of party ideology. This has made it 
difficult to tell whether partisan inclinations towards the incumbent party and the 
opposition parties influence the informed and the uninformed in the same way. The issue 
is critical, especially in new and emerging democracies with a plethora of parties that are 
hardly distinguishable on any meaningful ideological criteria.  
          I have shown that whether partisanship has a greater influence on perceptions of 
uninformed than informed people depends on the type of partisanship as well as the issue 
area. For instance, the influence of incumbent partisanship on present and prospective 
economic perceptions is greater among informed than uninformed people. Nevertheless, 
its influence on retrospective, present, and prospective perceptions about democracy is 
greater among uninformed than informed people. While opposition partisanship only 
influences retrospective economic perceptions, the influence is greater on the perceptions 
of the informed than the uninformed. In contrast, general partisanship has virtually the 
same effect on the informed and the uninformed. 
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5.2.12 Partisanship influences Perceptions, but its influence vary with Issue Area  
          Consistent with political cue theory, the study has established that partisanship 
significantly influences all six forms of political perceptions under review in this study. 
Specifically, incumbent partisanship is the only significant and consistent predictor of all 
forms of political perceptions, except retrospective economic perceptions, which are 
influenced by opposition partisanship.  However, the influence of partisanship on the 
perceptions of uninformed Kenyans varies with the issue-area. Consistent with Iyenger’s 
(1989) argument that perceptions about a given issue depend on factors related to that 
particular issue, the results show that perceptions about purely political issues are 
influenced more by political variables, while perceptions about the economy tend to be 
influenced more by economic variables.  
          For instance, while incumbent partisanship, which is a political variable, influences 
perceptions about the national economy and the extent of democracy, its influence on the 
latter, which is a political issue, is stronger than the former, which is an economic issue. 
Besides, while its effect on economic perceptions is strong, it plays second fiddle to 
relative deprivation and education. On the other hand, while relative deprivation, which is 
an economic variable, has a significant effect on economic perceptions, it has no 
statistically significant influence on perceptions about the extent of democracy in Kenya. 
5.2.13 Partisan influences on Political Perceptions Vary with Issue Timeline  
          The study also found that the effect of partisanship on political perceptions varies 
with the perception issue time-line. For instance, while perceptions about the current state 
of democracy are largely influenced by incumbent partisanship, retrospective and 
prospective perceptions about democracy are further influenced by ethnicity. It would 
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appear that incumbent partisanship and ethnicity guide people’s reflections about the past 
much in the same way they aid them to project into the future when thinking about 
democracy. However, when evaluating the current state of democracy, people’s thinking 
depends solely on where they place themselves on the incumbent partisanship scale. 
 
          On the other hand, the range and mix of factors that influence the formation of 
retrospective, present and prospective economic perceptions are not only different from 
those that influence perceptions about democracy, but are also different from each other. 
While a total of five factors variously influence the three forms of economic perceptions, 
only relative deprivation influences all of them. For instance, opposition partisanship and 
ethnicity significantly influence the retrospective economic perceptions, yet they have no 
significant effect on present or prospective economic perceptions. Moreover, while 
retrospective and prospective economic perceptions are largely shaped by relative 
deprivation, present economic perceptions are influenced more by education.   
5.2.14 Partisanship narrows perception gap between uninformed and informed citizens 
          Having established that partisanship significantly influences political perceptions, I 
also sought to establish the specific ways in which this influence occurs. What exactly 
does partisanship do to the perceptions of the uninformed that make them behave as if 
they were informed? The results show that people who are both uninformed and are also 
not (incumbent) partisan tend to form far less optimistic perceptions about democracy in 
Kenya. Hence, uninformed non-partisans form perceptions about democracy that are a lot 
different from those of informed non-partisans. This difference persists regardless of the 
perception timeline. However, incumbent partisanship drastically raises optimism among 
the uninformed while only mildly raising optimism among the informed. The net effect is 
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that incumbent partisanship drastically reduces the perception gap between uninformed 
and informed citizens, thus enabling the uninformed to behave as if they are informed. 
This pattern recurs in all the three forms of perceptions about democracy.  
          In the case of retrospective economic perception, which is influenced more by the 
opposition rather than incumbent partisanship, partisanship actually reduces optimism by 
a very huge margin among the uninformed and only slightly among the informed. In the 
case of present economic perceptions, incumbent partisanship mildly raises optimism 
among the uninformed while increasing optimism among the informed by a big margin to 
the extent that optimism among the latter surpasses that of the former. Despite this huge 
leap in optimism among the informed, the perception gap between them and uninformed 
people remains statistically insignificant. Either way, partisanship seems to intervene in 
the process of forming political perceptions in ways that significantly close the perception 
gap between uninformed and informed citizens.   
5.2.15 Partisanship effectively serves as a substitute for Political Information 
          The study shows that incumbent partisanship and political information individually 
increases optimistic perceptions about democracy by nearly the same margin so that the 
difference between the effect of partisanship and the effect of political information is not 
statistically significant. For instance, if uninformed non-(incumbent) partisans become 
incumbent partisans, their retrospective perception about democracy becomes even more 
optimistic by 18.2%, but if, instead, they become informed, it increases by 14.8%. The 
3.4% difference is statistically insignificant, with a 65% chance that the true difference 
could in fact be zero. The same pattern is replicated in all forms of perceptions except the 
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prospective economic perceptions. But even in this apparently deviant latter case, it is the 
effect of partisanship that significantly surpasses that of political information by 13.8%.  
          The results suggest that partisanship serves effectively as a substitute for political 
information, not just because it produces congruent effects with political information (at 
least in the case of perceptions about democracy), but more importantly, because it seems 
to drive perceptions in the direction of, or closer to the truth/reality. It is notable in the 
case of present and prospective economic perceptions for instance, that information 
actually reduces optimism about the economy, while partisanship increases the optimism. 
Yet, since the economy was doing fairly well at the time, optimism should increase rather 
than decrease. Hence, partisanship seems to drive perceptions in the right direction, while 
information is pulling it in the wrong direction. In the circumstances, one would rather be 
an incumbent partisan and get it right than seek information and get it wrong, perhaps due 
to the inability to properly process the information to derive correct inferences. 
         In addition, the study also found that the influence of ethnicity on satisfaction with 
democracy significantly varies with the political information levels, and the strength of 
incumbent partisanship. Non-ethnics who are also non-(incumbent) partisans tend to be 
just as satisfied with democracy as the ethnics if they are informed, but far less satisfied if 
they are uninformed. In contrast, non- ethnics who are strong incumbent partisans do not 
need information to be satisfied with democracy since incumbent partisanship itself is 
sufficient to raise their satisfaction levels close to that of the ethnics.   
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5.2.16 People perceive their past, present and future conditions as a linear progression  
          This dissertation has found that perceptions about the present economic or political 
conditions are negatively correlated with their respective retrospective perceptions, but 
positively correlated with prospective perceptions. That is, when a person perceives past 
economic conditions or the past state of democracy as better than the present, he/she is 
likely to form the perception that future economic conditions or the future state of 
democracy will be as bad if not worse than the present. This suggests that people perceive 
their past, present and future economic and political conditions as a linear progression, 
moving either from bad to good or from good to bad. Thus, an individual who perceives 
the past conditions as good and the present as bad, is likely to project the future to be as 
bad as the present if not worse, and vice versa.  
          These results seem to corroborate past studies that have found that voters who 
believe that the economy improved over the past year are likely to believe that it will 
improve or continue to be strong in the future (Anderson, 2010). However, they stand in 
stark contrast with the argument that people who feel that the conditions are not good 
now are likely to feel that they will get better in future and vice versa (Arceneaux, 2004).  
5.3 General Implications of the Study Findings  
5.3.1 Recasting the Democratic Theory 
          The study results have critical implications in terms of driving democratic theory 
forward. It is instructive to note that normative democratic theory suggests that a properly 
functioning democracy requires political information. Yet, consistent with political cue 
theory, this study has found that even in the absence of political information, democracy 
would function properly if citizens drew reliable political cues from the parties that they 
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trust. Evidently, the ideal situation for the proper functioning of democracy would be 
where citizens are either politically well informed or partisan, and the worst case would 
be where citizens are neither politically well informed nor partisan.  
 
          It is not surprising for instance, that the decline of American democracy, typified 
by dwindling voter turnouts, began nearly the same time as both partisanship and political 
information levels began to take a seemingly ceaseless nose dive. Paulson (2007:1) traces 
some salient changes in American democracy from the middle of the twentieth century: 
 
American voters began to identify less with either of the major 
parties, and more as independents; voters began to split their 
tickets at the polls more frequently; divided governments appeared 
to become a systemic result of American elections because of a 
conscious rebuke, some argued, by the voters of both parties; and 
voter turnout declined to new, low levels that would prove to be 
habitual… [And] polling data began to indicate that Americans 
were feeling a declining faith in their political institutions 
generally, which have never recovered to previous levels 
 
 
          These developments, coupled with the well documented general lack of pertinent 
political information among most Americans highlighted in chapter one (Converse, 1964; 
Carpini and Keteer, 1996; Taber, 2003; Galstone, 2007; Shenkman, 2008), did not auger 
well for the future of democracy in America. I argue that by disembarking from political 
parties at a time when the political information deficit was also increasing, uninformed 
Americans lost access to partisan cues which would have enabled them to surmount their 
information deficit and effectively participate in the democratic process.  Thus, to 
stimulate participation in politics in America, and indeed in any democracy facing the 
two challenges, requires either improved access to information, or re-energization of the 
political bases of leading political parties so as to enhance partisan ties. 
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5.3.2 The link between Political Behavior and Political Institutions  
          While a casual look at this dissertation is likely to reveal a rigid focus on political 
behavior, a deeper reading should reveal attempts to demonstrate the connection between 
political attitudes and behavior on the one hand, and political institutions and processes 
on the other. I have demonstrated that partisanship influences political perceptions, and 
by extension, therefore, that political parties are vital institutions in shaping mass political 
perceptions. To the extent that political parties play a key role in empowering uninformed 
citizens, democracy requires the strengthening and institutionalization of political parties.   
          Consequently, I advance a four-premised argument in order to recast the critical 
link between political behavior and political institutions, which is central to this study:  
 
I. The informed tend to exhibit political behaviors that are more supportive of democracy 
than the uninformed, and thus the greater the number of politically informed citizens, the 
more likely democracy will work well (Carpini, 2009; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010).  
 
II. Political behavior is driven more by subjective political perceptions than objective 
political reality (Canover and Feldman, 1984; Zaller, 1992; Walsh, 2004; Oskamp and 
Schultz, 2005; Cassino et al, 2007; Morris, 2008; Cottam et al, 2010). Consequently, the 
differences in the democracy-enhancing behaviors of informed and uninformed citizens 
can be traced to the differences in their political perceptions (perception gaps).  
 
 
III. Political perceptions are mainly influenced by political information and partisanship. 
The interaction between these two factors is critical for the formation of perceptions that 
promote democracy-enhancing political behaviors. Specifically, partisanship intervenes 
in the process of forming political perceptions in ways that reduce the perception gaps 
between informed and uninformed citizens, thus raising the probability that the former 
can acquire the same democracy-enhancing behavioral predispositions as the latter.   
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IV. The fact that partisan cues derived from political parties as institutions play a pivotal 
role in reducing perception gaps between informed and uninformed citizens and in re-
engineering political perceptions of uniformed citizens towards democracy-enhancing 
behavioral predispositions underscores both the utility of political institutions in 
promoting democratic behavior, and the indelible link between institutions and behavior. 
 
5.3.3 Understanding Ethnicity and its influence on Political Behavior  
(a) Ethnic Groups are not necessarily a Homogenous Category 
          Part of the problem with most studies of ethnicity in Kenya, and indeed in Africa, 
is the propensity to treat an ethnic group as a homogenous category, while most ethnic 
groups exhibit significant internal disparities even in political behavior. This study 
reveals some profound intra-ethnic group disconnects, especially between the informed 
and uninformed members of several ethnic groups in terms of their political perceptions. 
Yet, it is political perceptions that considerably influence most political behavior. It is 
ironic for instance that among informed Kenyans, Kalenjins are the most satisfied with 
democracy (75.5%), yet among the uninformed, they are the least satisfied (46.7%).  
 
          Similarly, informed Luos are 15.1% more likely to be satisfied with democracy 
than uninformed Luos. Equally interesting is the fact that uninformed Somalis and 
Kambas tend to rate Kenya as extremely democratic, yet the informed members of the 
same ethnic groups are far less enthusiastic about the state of democracy in Kenya. The 
reverse is true for Kisiis and Mjikendas. Moreover, among informed Kenyans, Kikuyus 
are just as satisfied with democracy as the Luos and Kalenjins, but more satisfied than 
Kambas and Luhyas. Yet, among the uninformed, the pattern is reversed, so that Kikuyus 
are more satisfied than Luos and Kalenjins, but just as satisfied as Kambas and Luhyas. 
These results show that, at least in Kenya, the influence of ethnicity on political behavior 
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appears to be severely restrained by political information, and possibly by other factors 
beyond this study. Hence, in the battle between ethnicity and political information, it is 
ethnicity that loses. In a sense therefore, ‘in Africa, ethnicity is almost never absent from 
politics, yet at the same time it does not provide its basic fabric’ (Bayart, 2009:55). 
 
(b) Ethnic Voting in Fragmented Societies is full of Unresolved Paradoxes  
          The study has also unmasked the paradox of ethnic voting in Kenya, and indeed in 
Africa. When no ethnic group is large enough to win elections on its own due to ethnic 
fragmentation, as is the case in Kenya, a winning coalition must be able to appeal to both 
ethnic and non-ethnic voters. After winning elections, the coalition leader has to balance 
between placating non-ethnic supporters to retain their support, and delivering patronage 
resources to the ethnics. The ethnics are more likely to continue supporting the incumbent 
president even if they do not disproportionately receive tangible material benefits from 
his government, due to psychological reasons like the self-esteem associated with sharing 
ethnic identity with the president. In contrast, non-ethnics can easily withdraw support if 
they do not feel sufficiently rewarded for their support. Thus, in light of scarce patronage 
resources, it is prudent for incumbent presidents to appease non-ethnics more than ethnics 
to forestall the perception that the ethnics are benefitting more at the expense of others.  
 
          The paradox is that those who vote for a candidate with shared ethnic identity often 
expect patronage resources in return. Yet, tactless delivery of such rewards to the ethnics 
is politically suicidal, both for an incumbent seeking reelection and for the legacy of an 
incumbent in his or her final term. In fact, excessive reward of one’s ethnic supporters 
alienates an incumbent from the non-ethnics and may undermine the stability of his or her 
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regime. In essence, it is neither in the interest of a voter to support a coalition presidential 
candidate from his or her ethnic group, nor for an incumbent president who is elected on 
a coalition ticket to skew resource distribution to overly benefit his ethnic constituency.  
 
          Failure to appreciate the paradoxes of ethnic voting underscores most of the study 
results relating to ethnicity. First, our data show that ethnics are more disillusioned with 
the economy than non-ethnics, and I attribute their cynicism to the possibility that they 
expected too much, since the government is led by “one of their own”. Second, the 
disintegration of the NARC coalition that defeated KANU in 2002 after being in power 
for 39 years is directly attributable to the failure of president Kibaki to placate the non-
ethnics, and the concomitant perception among the restless non-ethnics that his ethnic 
group was unduly benefitting at the expense of other Kenyans. These perceptions in turn 
coalesced into an anti-Kikuyu sentiment, which transformed both the 2005 constitutional 
referendum and the 2007 general elections into a contest between the ethnics and the non-
ethnics. The 2007 elections were bungled, produced no winner, and forced the incumbent 
party, PNU into a coalition with ODM to end the country’s worst-ever electoral violence.  
5.4 Study Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
5.4.1 External Validity and the Need for Cross-National Comparative Studies 
          One weakness in this study is that it focuses on a single country at one point in 
time. This threatens its external validity since there is no guarantee that replicating the 
study in a different context would yield similar results. It should be noted, regrettably, 
that most past studies have also tended to focus on a single country, with very few cross-
national comparative studies (Saward, 1998; Milner, 2010; Hooghe, 2011). This trend has 
been attributed to problems of data as well as ‘lack of consistent, comparable indicators 
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of political knowledge’ (Milner, 2010:99). Nonetheless, the external validity problem in 
this study is not so severe, since most of the findings of this dissertation support results of 
some earlier studies done in very different contexts. Moving forward, the new political 
information index developed in this dissertation should aid us to overcome measurement 
problems, and hence future studies should aim more at cross-national comparisons. Such 
comparative studies may target all or any part of this dissertation. 
          It should also be noted that the choice of this approach was informed by a number 
of other considerations. First, one of the things that set this study apart from most past 
studies is its focus on how democracy works without informed democratic citizens, in a 
geographical region which political information studies have tended to neglect – Africa. 
Yet most African countries, including Kenya, which is the focus of this study, have been 
characterized by a series of democratic gains and reversals. Indeed, ‘in recent decades, 
until the fateful elections of December 2007, Kenya was viewed as one of Africa’s most 
stable democratic countries’ (Semetko, 2010:167). Therefore, the study had to focus on 
periods when democracy was at its zenith in the country of study. A way should be found 
around these problems to allow for studies of several countries over a period of time. 
5.4.2 Purifying the Political Information Index from the Effects of Guesswork 
          This study has found a strong correlation between an individual’s predisposition to 
guess and their political information levels, suggesting that guesswork greatly infiltrates 
the political information scores. I have noted that even the proposed PII Index is not 
immune to this problem. That is why the PII Index is defined as an estimate rather than a 
precise measure of an individual’s political information levels. This opens avenues worth 
further exploring to determine how to estimate and eliminate or at least minimize the 
273 
 
influence of guesswork which tends to inflate the political information indices. This is a 
viable and worthy course that will constitute my future research endeavors. We suspect 
from this study that guesswork is a matter of an individual’s predisposition – some people 
like guessing, while others do not. This can be verified. It is possible, for instance, to 
begin by calculating an individual’s likelihood of guessing, construct a guessing scale, 
and then finding ways of using the scale to penalize inflated political information indices.   
5.4.3 Do the Informed Use Partisan Cues for the same purpose as the Uninformed?  
          Although this study clearly shows that both the informed and the uninformed use 
partisan cues, there is still one crucial issue for which I have only provided tentative 
explanations - do informed people use partisan cues for the same purpose as uninformed 
people? In response, I have suggested that the informed and uninformed citizens may be 
using partisan cues for different purposes – the latter use it to make up for an information 
deficit, while the former use it to align their perceptions to party interest. This question 
requires greater scrutiny than could be accommodated in this dissertation.  
5.4.4 Do people recant previous perceptions when their partisanship changes?  
          One of the tentative conclusions of this dissertation is that people typically adjust 
their previous perceptions to suit the present circumstances, whenever their partisanship 
changes from incumbent to the opposition, and vice versa. This is more likely when the 
opposition wins elections. There is need for a much broader cross-national comparative 
study of several post-election civic behaviors to find out whether the patterns noticed 
here persist even across different nations and over a longer period of time. 
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5.4.5 What makes partisan cues more accessible than political information?  
A fundamental question arising from the findings of this dissertation is why uninformed 
people find it easier to try to gauge what their preferred political parties stand for rather 
than seek the political information that will empower them to form independent views on 
politically relevant issues. This question is less than trivial, because, intuitively, the cost 
of obtaining information about party position on any issue may be just as high as that of 
seeking the relevant information, particularly where the information cost is very high.  
5.4.6 Why does education affect perceptions of economy and democracy differently? 
          The study results indicate that education raises optimism about the ‘current’ state 
of the economy but reduces optimism about the extent of democracy. Given the ‘current’ 
state of the economy and democracy, it would appear that highly educated Kenyans are 
more likely to accurately assess the economy, but less likely to make accurate evaluations 
of democracy, and vice versa. This raises several questions that require detailed inquiry 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. For instance, it is important to test whether the 
educated are more attentive to the economy than politics, while the uneducated are more 
attentive to politics than to the economy, and why this could be so. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Indicators from 2005 Afrobarometer Survey for Kenya 
 
Variables Indicators and Measurements  
Gender 1=Male, 2=Female  
Education What is the highest level of education you have completed? 0=No formal schooling, 
1=Informal Schooling; 2=Some Primary Schooling; 3=Primary School Completed; 4=Some 
High school; 5= High School Completed; 6=Post-Secondary Qualifications but not 
University; 7=Some University; 8=University Completed; 9=Post-Graduate 
Patriotism Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a ________ 
[respondent’s identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached 
to? 1= Feel Only [ethnic] 2= Feel More [ethnic] than Kenyan; 3= Feel Equally Kenyan and 
[ethnic]; 4= Feel More Kenyan than [ethnic]; 5= Feel only Kenyan 
Religiosity 
 
Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? 
1=Never, 2=About once a year or less, 3=About once every several months, 4=About once a 
month, 5=About once a week, 6=More than once a week  
Living 
Conditions 
In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions? 
1=Very bad; 2=Fairly bad; 3=Neither good nor bad; 4=Fairly good; 5=Very good 
Relative 
Deprivation  
 Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Your living 
conditions? 1=Much worse; 2=Worse; 3=Same; 4=Better; 5=Much better. 
 
Recoded: 1=Not at all Deprived (5); 2. Not very Deprived (4); 3. Same (3); 4. Deprived (2); 
5. Very Deprived(1)  
Present 
economic 
perceptions 
In general, how would you describe the present economic conditions of this country? 1=Very 
Bad; 2=Fairly Bad;, 3=Neither Good nor Bad, 4=Fairly Good, 5=Very Good 
Retrospective 
economic 
perceptions   
Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to 12 months ago: economic 
conditions in this country? 1=much worse; 2=worse; 3=same; 4=better; 5=much better 
Prospective 
economic 
perceptions   
Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this 
country in twelve months time? 
 1=Much worse; 2=Worse; 3=Same; 4=Better; 5=Much better 
Economic 
Policy  
Approval  
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or B. 
A: Government’s economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered;  
B: Government’s economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few. 
1=Agree Strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree Strongly with B 
 
Recoded: 0 = Disapprove economic Policies (responses 3 and 4); approve economic policies 
(1 = responses 1 and 2) 
Political 
Discussion 
When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political 
matters: 0=Never, 1=Occasionally, 2=Frequently 
Interest in 
Public 
Affairs 
How interested would you say you are in public affairs? 0=Not at all interested, 1=Not very 
interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Very interested 
Retrospective 
perceptions 
on 
democracy 
On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held 
in 2002? Was it: 1=completely free and fair; 2=Free and fair with minor problems; 3=Free 
and Fair with major problems; 4=Not free and fair 
 
Recoded: 0 = very undemocratic; 1 = fairly undemocratic 2 = fairly democratic 3 = very 
democratic  
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Present  
perceptions 
on 
democracy 
In your opinion how much of a democracy is Kenya today?  
0 = Not a democracy; 1 = A democracy with major problems; 3 = A democracy with minor 
problems; 4 =  A full democracy 
 
Recoded: 0 = very undemocratic; 1 = fairly undemocratic 2 = fairly democratic 3 = very 
democratic 
Prospective 
perceptions 
on 
democracy  
In your opinion, how likely is it that Kenya will remain a democratic country? 0 = Not At All 
Likely; 1 = Not Very Likely; 2 = Likely; 3 = Very Likely  
 
Recoded: 0 = very undemocratic; 1 = fairly undemocratic 2 = fairly democratic 3 = very 
democratic 
General  
Partisanship 
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 0=No, not close to any party, 1=Yes 
 
Recoded: 0 = Non-partisan; 1 = partisan  
Incumbent 
Partisanship 
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: 
The Ruling Party? 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot  
Opposition 
Partisanship 
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: 
opposition political parties? 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=Somewhat; 3=Alot 
Freedom of 
Speech 
Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a few years ago, 
or are they about the same: Freedom to say what you think? 
1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better  
Knowledge 
of 
Democracy  
What if anything does democracy mean to you? 1=Understood “democracy” in English; 2= 
Required local language translation; 3=Did not understand the word or question, even in the 
local language 
 
Recoded: 0= Does not Know Democracy (3) ; 1=  Knows Democracy (1 and 2)  
Satisfaction 
with 
Democracy  
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Kenya? Are you: 
0=Not at All Satisfied, 1=Not Very Satisfied, 2=Fairly Satisfied, 3=Very Satisfied 
Support for 
Democracy  
 
Q37: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? A: Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of government. B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic 
government can be preferable. C: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of 
government we have. 0 =Statements B and C; 1 = Statement A  
Respondent 
Honesty 
What was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the interview? Was he or she: honest, 
in between, or misleading? 1=Honest, 2=In between, 3=Misleading 
 
Recoded: 0 = Not Honest (Responses 2 and 3); 1 = Honest (Response 1). 
Interview 
Question 
Difficulty 
What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering? 
0=None, 1=Few, 2=Some, 3=Most, 4=All  
Source: 2005 Afrobarometer dataset for Kenya, available at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/ last 
accessed on 03/2/2012.  
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Appendix 2: Strategic Party Alignments in Kenya 
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Author’s Conceptualization, 2012. 
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